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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Napoleonic Governance 
and the Integration of Europe
Abstract This study is concerned with the ways in which the present-day 
Netherlands and Northwest Germany were integrated into the Napoleonic 
Empire, by replacing local institutions and traditional governing practices 
with French ones. This process of running the Empire is referred to as 
Napoleonic governance. Traditionally, little attention was given to the 
dynamics of French rule in conquered Europe. Nationalistic tendencies 
long obstructed a neutral view of Napoleon’s treatment of conquered 
Europe, certainly when it came to the Dutch and Northwest German 
regions. It was assumed French reforms were accepted unconditionally by 
local populations. Recent research shows that in newly acquired lands, 
officials often had to proceed differently. However, the northern periph-
ery of the Napoleonic Empire is not yet fully explored. The premise of this 
study is that a (trans)regional perspective can lead to new interpretations. 
Napoleonic governance is analyzed by distinguishing between the phases 
of conquest, incorporation, and integration. In a broader sense, the study 
aims to gain a better understanding of the difficulties that have been inher-
ent to workings of the Napoleonic Empire.
Keywords Napoleonic governance • Netherlands • Northwest 
Germany • Historiography • Empire-building
2
EmpirE-building and its limits
By 1810, the Napoleonic Empire, almost at the height of its power, 
encompassed much of Continental Europe. The vast European Empire 
was the outcome of more than a decade of French power politics. Soon 
after general Napoleon Bonaparte had seized power in 1799, he strove to 
unite Europe under the leadership of the French. Initially, he formed alli-
ances and founded vassal states, but increasingly he sought to bind the 
nations of Europe to France by conquering them and transforming them 
into French departments.1 Napoleon continued a policy that was devel-
oped earlier by French revolutionaries. Present-day Belgium and the 
German territories situated on the left bank of the Rhine had already been 
conquered by French forces and incorporated into the French Republic. 
After that, large parts of Central Europe and Italy gradually followed. As 
his Empire grew, Bonaparte began to fantasize about a unified Europe—
an entity organized according to his principles. His desire to rule from 
above and to destroy local diversity was a recurring element in his policy.2 
Admittedly, Napoleon never had a definite masterplan for Europe, but 
undeniably he did start to regard uniformity as essential.3
In the North, the Kingdom of Holland and the Hanseatic cities and 
principalities of Northwest Germany, in 1810, were not yet incorporated 
into the Empire. Although they were within the Napoleonic sphere of 
influence, Napoleon Bonaparte long believed a certain autonomy for these 
regions was in his interest. Other measures, like military pressure and 
invoking coups d’état, were considered sufficient. Nevertheless, driven by 
ambitions and growing fears of British interventions at the North Sea 
Coast, he eventually put an end to the Dutch state, Hanseatic city-states, 
and many German principalities in Northwest Germany. Soon after, 
Catalonia and the Illyrian Provinces in the northern Balkans, would also, 
albeit briefly, be incorporated, expanding the French Empire to its maxi-
mum territorial extent, comprising no less than 130 departments.
Throughout his reign, Napoleon’s reforms focused on the construction 
of a centralized bureaucratic state, characterized by uniform and rational 
1 Jean Tulard, ‘Les politiques européennes de Napoléon’, in: T. Lentz ed., Napoléon et 
l’Europe (Paris 2005) 427–429.
2 Annie Jourdan, L’empire de Napoléon (Paris 2000) 125.
3 Thierry Lentz, ‘Imperial France in 1808 and beyond’, in: M.  Broers, P.  Hicks and 




structures in the French style. On the one hand, it was simply efficient for 
the governability of the Empire to introduce French institutions and per-
sonnel in the newly acquired territories.4 On the other hand, many French 
officials were convinced that they were the sole driving force behind the 
‘modernization’ (understood as ‘Francization’) of Europe.5 Certainly, 
hardliners among them felt contempt for local traditions. The intended 
export of the French model was without doubt partly an expression of 
feelings of cultural superiority.6 However, it was tremendously difficult for 
the Napoleonic government to immediately create support for the forma-
tion of a new modern state without taking into account local circum-
stances and wishes. Although scholars disagree over the extent to which 
the central government was willing to compromise, for the French officials 
‘the price of collaboration was’, in the words of historian Stuart Woolf, 
‘the acceptance of limits’.7
napolEonic govErnancE in thE rEgions
This study discusses the ways in which Napoleon tried to integrate the 
present-day Netherlands and Northwest Germany into the French Empire, 
by replacing local institutions and traditional governing practices with 
French ones. More specifically, it deals with the imposition of a French 
system of governance on the conquered Dutch and German territories. By 
Napoleonic governance I do not narrowly refer to the administrative struc-
tures of the Empire, but more broadly the process of governing this 
entity—or less abstractly: the ways in which the expanding Napoleonic 
Empire was run, not merely at the top, but also in the regions. Recent 
scholarship increasingly emphasizes that governance goes beyond the 
authority of the central state, and acknowledges the diversity of governing 
practices in past and present. To quote scholar Mark Bevir: ‘Governance is 
explained by the narratives that the relevant actors first inherit as historical 
4 D. G. Wright, Napoleon and Europe (Harlow 1984) 65–67.
5 Stuart Woolf, ‘Napoleon and Europe revisited’, Modern & Contemporary France 8 
(2000) 471. https://doi.org/10.1080/713685288
6 Michael Broers, ‘Napoleon, Charlemagne, and Lotharingia: Acculturation and the 
boundaries of Napoleonic Europe’, The Historical Journal 44 (2001) 178. https://www.
jstor.org/stable/3133664; Aurélien Lignereux, L’Empire des Français: 1799–1815 
(Paris 2012).
7 Stuart Woolf, Napoleon’s integration of Europe (London and New York 1991) 115.
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traditions and then revise in response to dilemmas’, which, according to 
Bevir, gives governance a greater explanatory power than other terms.8
This approach sets governance apart from regime—a term that is fre-
quently used when referring to the rule of Napoleon and his collaborators. 
I have chosen Napoleonic governance over Napoleonic regime, since gover-
nance explicitly sees the running of a state as a dynamic process, with 
multiple actors, and not as a somewhat static set of regulations dictated by 
an omnipotent leader—the latter being the more institutional approach 
stressing the primacy of the central government. Moreover, in daily speech, 
the term regime carries a negative connotation, implying a position in 
scholarly debates on the nature of Napoleonic rule. Such an a priori 
assumption might yield biased results. Instead of stressing the, unques-
tionably very authoritarian, leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte, I focus on 
lesser-known individuals who were tasked with empire-building in the 
regions. Undeniably, there has been large-scale suffering because of 
Napoleonic measures and exploitation; but my primary objective is analyz-
ing how those measures reached the regions, were interpreted there, and 
interacted with existing governing practices.
Finally, using the governance concept has a practical reason. Working in 
four languages brings the problem of false friends. ‘Administration/
administratie’ and ‘gouvernement/government’ have different meanings 
in Dutch, English, French and German. Nor do these fully correspond to 
Germanic equivalents like ‘Regierung/regering’, ‘Verwaltung’, or 
‘bestuur’. And the concept of police/politie/Polizey could also be 
included, since it was not until the Napoleonic period that these concepts 
gradually became distinct from each other.9 ‘Governance’ circumvents 
such translation difficulties.
Territories conquered by French were faced with the introduction of an 
extremely hierarchical and top-down state model. Yet, as Michael Broers 
has argued, the Napoleonic Empire was actually centralized like a ‘spider’s 
web’. There were five main lines along which the central government in 
Paris attempted to assert its power over the farthest corners of the Empire: 
the Ministries of the Interior, General Police, War, Finance, and Justice. 
These branches of government were firmly separated; each branch had its 
8 Mark Bevir, A theory of governance (Berkeley 2013) 1–5.
9 Igor Moullier, ‘Police et politique de la ville sous Napoléon’, Revue d’histoire moderne et 
contemporaine (2007) 117–139. https://doi.org/10.3917/rhmc.542.0117
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own competencies, spheres of action, and mechanisms of self-regulation.10 
In this study, I explore a significant line from Paris: the prefectoral system. 
This branch was part of the Ministry of the Interior and, in theory, the 
vehicle of choice for state power. So-called préfets (prefects) were the heads 
of a department, the main administrative units within the French state, 
and delegated tasks to the sous-préfets (subprefects). Conversely, local 
information had to come back to the ministries fast; the prefectoral system 
has been called ‘the interface between a centralized state and a local 
society’.11
Complicating matters, Napoleonic officials in many incorporated terri-
tories often had to deal with an intermediary governance body set up by 
the French government, for instance in Hamburg and Amsterdam. Such 
intermediary gouvernements généraux had an ambiguous place within the 
structure of the Empire.
Emphasis on these specific aspects of the functioning of the Napoleonic 
state also relates to current discussions on the nature of Napoleonic inter-
ventions in Europe. Regarding the French treatment of the incorporated 
lands and subject states, there are essentially two opposing interpretations. 
Historians either stress, often depending on their geographical area of 
study, the positive reforming influences of Napoleon’s system of gover-
nance, or underline the negative effects of severe exploitation and harsh 
domination. Geoffrey Ellis has summed it up as the ‘continuing debates of 
the kicks and kindnesses of French rule’.12
For instance, Alexander Grab has stressed that Napoleon was more 
than an exploiting dictator and his reform programs left a great, often 
constructive impact on Europe, especially the export of the modern cen-
tral state.13 Similarly, Brendan Simms has pointed out positive conse-
quences of the Napoleonic experience. Napoleonic officials in Europe 
‘created some of the preconditions for a capitalist, legally equal, religiously 
10 Michael Broers, ‘Pride and prejudice: The Napoleonic Empire through the eyes of its 
rulers’, in: U.  Planert ed., Napoleon’s empire: European politics in global perspective 
(Basingstoke 2016) 309; Michael Broers, Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815 (London and 
New York 1996) 54–55.
11 Gavin Daly, Inside Napoleonic France. State and society in Rouen, 1800–1815 (Aldershot 
2001) 64.
12 Geoffrey Ellis, The Napoleonic empire (2nd ed.; Basingstoke 2003) 93–94. For the 
German case see T.  C. W.  Blanning, ‘The French revolution and the modernization of 
Germany’, Central European History 22 (1989) 109–129. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0008938900011468
13 Alexander Grab, Napoleon and the transformation of Europe (Basingstoke 2003) 
205–206.
1 INTRODUCTION: NAPOLEONIC GOVERNANCE AND THE INTEGRATION… 
6
tolerant and rationally governed bourgeois society’, a requisite for the for-
mation of the nation-state.14 Michael Broers, however, has underscored 
the harshness and rigidity of Napoleonic personnel. Not denying the prag-
matism (or even reasonableness) of individual Napoleonic state servants, 
according to Broers it was with the repressive forces, such as military and 
police, that power really lay. These men were hardly concerned with 
appeasing and enlightening the newly conquered subjects—certainly not 
during the closing years of the Empire.15 And Pierre Horn, who has more 
recently investigated the cultural distance between French authorities and 
the populations of East Belgium, West Rhineland and Luxembourg, points 
to increasing exhaustion of the pays réunies and economic crises (such as 
poor harvests, inflation, taxation, and declining international trade). 
Horn’s study suggests that many officials may have been willing to listen 
to local concerns, but could not thwart negative measures from the impe-
rial core.16
More historians could be quoted here—but the main point is that the 
perspective of researchers (top-down or bottom-up, center or periphery) 
plays a role in their position in the debate on ‘the kicks and kindnesses of 
French rule’, and thereby their evaluation of Napoleonic governance. The 
imperial authorities in Paris are often taken as the starting point for a 
study, not actors at a lower level in the hierarchy. But as Stuart Woolf has 
argued, Napoleonic representatives in the regions, such as prefects and 
their collaborators were ‘closer to the ground’ than other authorities. Due 
to the range of their responsibilities they provide good information on the 
local responses to French governance. Given the wide powers of the pre-
fects and their role as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the central government, their 
archives harbor a wealth of information about local reactions to centralist 
measures, which unfortunately are not often used by historians.17
14 Brendan Simms, The struggle for mastery in Germany, 1779–1850 (Basingstoke 1998) 88.
15 Michael Broers, ‘Cultural imperialism in a European context? Political culture and cul-
tural politics in Napoleonic Italy’, Past and Present (2001) 152–180. https://doi.
org/10.1093/past/170.1.152; Broers, Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815, 67.
16 Pierre Horn, Le défi de l’enracinement napoléonien entre Rhin et Meuse 1810–1814: 
l’opinion publique dans les départements de la Roër, de l’Ourthe, des Forêts et de la Moselle 
(Berlin 2017).




Napoleonic governance, or administration in general for that matter, has 
never really captured the hearts and minds of historians the way, for 
instance, statesmen and generals have done. Compared to other aspects of 
Napoleonic history, there is little literature on the European dimension of 
Napoleonic governance. Up until the late 1980s, historiography on the 
Napoleonic Empire was dominated by military history, or by biographical 
studies of Bonaparte. Whether past historians criticized or admired 
Napoleon, many emphasized the vision of one man. Moreover, many pub-
lications were rather francocentric, assuming that French restructurings 
were accepted unconditionally by local populations. Little attention was 
given to the dynamics of French rule in conquered Europe. Since the 
1990s, however, there has been a shift toward studies focusing on core- 
periphery relations and on the dynamics of integration into the Empire. It 
has become clear that there, French had to act differently, often more 
cautiously.18 By exploring the impact of Napoleonic rule in Europe, schol-
ars reveal responses of the Europeans to French imperialism.
Stuart Woolf’s pioneering study Napoleon’s integration of Europe or 
Napoléon et la conquête de l’Europe (1990/1991)—note the differences in 
title—is often cited as one of the first studies that examined the fundamen-
tal problems with Napoleonic attempts to force the heterogeneous 
European societies into a single mold.19 It was intended to encourage 
historians to breach away from the excessive attention given to Bonaparte 
and metropolitan France. Woolf argued that the Napoleonic Empire could 
and should be examined by looking beyond the Emperor. Instead, inte-
gration attempts are explored by looking both through the eyes of the 
central government and at responses of local communities to Napoleonic 
measures. Woolf encouraged European historians to look beyond their 
national borders; regretting the ‘hegemony [of] deep-rooted political and 
national imperatives of European historiography’.20
Historian Isser Woloch also contributed to a different understanding of 
governance in the Napoleonic Empire, by moving the attention given to 
18 Steven Englund, ‘Monstre sacré: The question of cultural imperialism and the Napoleonic 
Empire’, The Historical Journal 51 (2008) 216–217. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0018246X07006656
19 Stuart Woolf, Napoléon et la conquête de l’Europe (Paris 1990); Woolf, Napoleon’s inte-
gration of Europe.
20 Woolf, Napoleon’s integration of Europe, 477.
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the Emperor, toward the men in the imperial entourage. Those have been 
influential and not necessarily staunch supporters of Napoleon.21 And in 
The New Regime, Woloch calls for a shift from a ‘top-down’ to a ‘bottom-
 up’ view on the French state. Woloch questions the extent to which the 
state could impose its will on local communities. By studying state forma-
tion from the bottom up, Woloch argues that Napoleon (and his 
Revolutionary predecessors) succeeded mainly by pragmatism and negoti-
ation—a legacy he left to the Restoration monarchs.22
Likewise, Oxford historian Michael Broers has examined (dis)continu-
ity in his influential studies Europe under Napoleon (1996) and Europe 
after Napoleon (1996).23 The Emperor was well aware of diversity in 
Europe, and, Broers argues, this understanding entailed a form of cultural 
imperialism.24 Broers has suggested that the Napoleonic Empire consisted 
of a well-integrated ‘inner empire’, an intermediate zone, and an ‘outer 
empire’ where Napoleon’s rule was constantly contested. Broers argues 
that many of the incorporated territories were, in fact, better integrated 
into the Empire than large parts of the French rural areas.25
Many scholars have embraced the ‘New Napoleonic History’. Geoffrey 
Ellis, Annie Jourdan, Alexander Grab, and Aurélien Lignereux (to name but 
a few) have written well-documented, studies on the Empire from a 
European viewpoint.26 However, in monographs and conference volumes, 
the imperial North Sea coast and its hinterland are not well represented, 
certainly not when it comes to Napoleonic governance. Partly this can be 
contributed to historians’ scant knowledge of Dutch or German, but even 
in German-language and Dutch-language scholarship, relatively few studies 
have been published on the period of French rule. Long, both in Northwest 
Germany and in the Netherlands, the influence of traditional anti-French 
historiography was significant. The period was seen as an interlude, which at 
most would have served as the starting point of a modern national 
21 Isser Woloch, Napoleon and his collaborators: The making of a dictatorship (New 
York 2001).
22 Isser Woloch, The new regime. Transformations of the French civic order, 1789–1820s 
(New York 1995).
23 Broers, Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815, 4; Michael Broers, Europe after Napoleon. 
Revolution, reaction, and romanticism, 1814–1848 (Manchester 1996).
24 Broers, ‘Cultural imperialism’.
25 Broers, ‘Napoleon, Charlemagne, and Lotharingia’.
26 Ellis, The Napoleonic empire; Jourdan, L’empire de Napoléon; Grab, Napoleon and the 
transformation of Europe; Lignereux, L’Empire des Français.
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consciousness. This characterization is a legacy of nineteenth- century histo-
rians who emphasized the foreignness of the Napoleonic period.
German Historiography
In Germany, the creation of a unified state under Prussian leadership 
intensified the neglect of the Napoleonic period. The creations of federal 
states under Napoleon (the so-called Confederation of the Rhine) and 
after Napoleon (the German Confederation) were considered historical 
‘errors’ that did not fit national history.27 However, more and more histo-
rians aim to approach the period more neutrally, recognizing the diversity 
of German experiences.28 When it comes to a possible reappraisal of the 
Napoleonic era in Northwest Germany, the main difficulty has always been 
the territorial and geopolitical reordering, contributing to a historiograph-
ical fragmentation (see also the problems with archival sources, below). 
There has been little institutional continuity before and after the years 
1806–1814, therefore studies on the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era in 
North(west) Germany tend to focus on specific towns or regions.
In the early 1970s, Antoinette Joulia wrote a well-documented doc-
toral thesis on the Ems-Supérieur department and several articles on the 
Hanseatic departments.29 Concurrently, Jean Vidalenc, who primarily 
worked on Old France, published two articles on Napoleonic governance 
in the Hanseatic departments.30 In 1981, the first edition of Elisabeth 
Fehrenbach’s Vom Ancien Régime zum Wiener Kongress was published, 
presenting a thorough and concise analysis of the Revolutionary Period in 
Germany. She shifted emphasis from Prussia to the Confederacy of the 
27 Andreas Fahrmeier, ‘Centralisation versus particularism in the ‘Third Germany”, in: 
M. Rowe ed., Collaboration and resistance in Napoleonic Europe. State-formation in an age of 
upheaval, c. 1800–1815 (Basingstoke 2003) 107–120.
28 For example, Alan Forrest and Peter H. Wilson ed., The bee and the eagle. Napoleonic 
France and the end of the holy roman empire, 1806 (Basingstoke 2008).
29 Antoinette Joulia, ‘Les institutions administratives des départements hanséatiques’, 
Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 17 (1970) 880–892; Antoinette Joulia, Le 
département de l’Ems-Supérieur 1810–1813. Étude de la mise en place du système adminis-
tratif en milieu allemand (Ph.D. thesis Strassbourg 1972); Antoinette Joulia, ‘Ein franzö-
sischer Verwaltungsbezirk in Deutschland: Das Oberemsdepartement (1810–1813)’, 
Osnabrücker Mitteilungen 80 (1973) 21–102.
30 Jean Vidalenc, ‘Les notables des départements hanséatiques’, Revue d’histoire moderne et 
contemporaine 17 (1970) 777–794; Jean Vidalenc, ‘Les ‘départements hanséatiques’ et 
l’administration napoléonienne’, Francia 1 (1973) 414–450.
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Rhine, with some coverage of Northwest German areas outside the 
Confederacy. The book also explored the study of cultural transfer in the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic period—an early transnational approach 
that received an impetus, late twentieth century.31 Concurrently, Thomas 
Nipperdey published his Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866 (1983) in which 
Napoleon’ impact received serious attention, starting with the sentence: 
‘Am Anfang war Napoleon’ (‘In the beginning was Napoleon’).32
From an urban-historical perspective, in his study Hamburg im Zeitalter 
der Französischen Revolution und Napoleons, Burghart Schmidt examined 
many aspects of Hamburg in the time of the French Revolution and 
Napoleon. He wanted to go beyond a simplistic interpretation German- 
French relations, stating that previous historians were too much influ-
enced by national(ist) interpretations. Schmidt wanted to distance himself 
from the strong distinction between ‘victims’ and ‘oppressors’ that is pres-
ent in traditional historiography. Schmidt acknowledges that Germans 
suffered under many harsh measures taken by the French authorities, but 
he also points to the positive effects of modernization, and to 
cooperation.33
Of great interest is the work of Katherine Aaslestad on Northwest 
German culture in the Napoleonic period, with an emphasis on the city-
state Hamburg, specifically its impact on local, regional and national iden-
tity formation. In her book Place and politics, Aaslestad investigates 
transformations in civic culture and republicanism, against the background 
of socio-economic changes. In the Napoleonic period, local identities 
remained important, but also regional ones emerged, within the context 
of German national thought.34 Her research provides insights into how 
local populations responded to Napoleonic governance, in a  time of 
31 Elisabeth Fehrenbach, Vom Ancien Régime zum Wiener Kongress (4th ed.; München 
2001); Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink and Rolf Reichardt ed., Kulturtransfer im Epochenumbruch: 
Frankreich-Deutschland 1770 bis 1815 (Leipzig 1997).
32 Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866: Bürgerwelt und starker Staat 
(München 1983) 11.
33 Burghart Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter der Französischen Revolution und Napoleons 
(1789–1813) (Hamburg 1998) 741–743.
34 Katherine Aaslestad, Place and politics: Local identity, civic culture and German national-
ism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era (Leiden 2005) 10–11; Katherine 
Aaslestad and Karen Hagemann, ‘1806 and its aftermath: Revisiting the period of the 




economic crisis and military exploitation. Aaslestad argues that reactions 
to Napoleon’s measures were, first and foremost, motivated by local cir-
cumstances. State interventions actually ‘generated new forms of regional-
ism’, such as a broader Hanseatic identity, simultaneously such regional 
tendencies would inspire nineteenth-century national thinkers.35
Lastly, Helmut Stubbe da Luz, an expert on civilian-military relations, 
has worked on occupation, during the Napoleonic period in Northwest 
Germany, but also in a broader sense.36 Stubbe da Luz has extensively 
published on the three Hanseatic departments as a whole. His 
‘Franzosenzeit’ in Norddeutschland is one of the few monographs on the 
matter, and it devotes ample attention to Napoleonic governance.37 
Importantly, in his edited volume Statthalterregimes, Stubbe da Luz initi-
ated a comparison of different intermediary governments in Italy, the 
Netherlands and Germany (the gouvernements généraux) in Napoleonic 
Europe. Basing himself on several case studies written by international 
historians, Stubbe da Luz analyzes the diffusion of the gouvernement 
général as an instrument of integration, though he prefers the term 
Besetzung (occupation) as the lens to study cases through.38
Dutch Historiography
There are notable differences and similarities between German and Dutch 
historiography on the years of Napoleon’s rule. An obvious difference is, 
of course, the continuity between the Dutch departments and the later 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, and Belgium, opposed to the discontinuity 
in Germany. Virtually all Dutch departments were converted into prov-
inces and, apart from the rupture between North and South in 1830, state 
borders changed little. This stability facilitated the emergence of a national 
historiography. Strikingly similar to Germany (taking Prussia as pars pro 
toto), the establishment of the new monarchy in 1814–1815 was 
35 Katherine Aaslestad, ‘Paying for war: Experiences of Napoleonic rule in the Hanseatic 
Cities’, Central European History 39 (2006) 675. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0008938906000215
36 Helmut Stubbe da Luz, Okkupanten und Okkupierte: Napoleons Statthalterregimes in 
den Hansestädten (6 vols.) 2004–2013 (München 2004).
37 Helmut Stubbe da Luz, ‘Franzosenzeit’ in Norddeutschland (1803–1814). Napoleons 
Hanseatische Departements (Bremen 2003).
38 Helmut Stubbe da Luz ed., Statthalterregimes—Napoleons Generalgouvernements in 
Italien, Holland und Deutschland (1808–1814) (Hamburg 2016).
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accompanied by a process of collective amnesia. Only events that could be 
interpreted as a prelude to the nineteenth-century nation-state with the 
House of Orange-Nassau were remembered. The Napoleonic period did 
not ideologically fit in with the newly constructed Dutch monarchy. 
Historian Matthijs Lok has made clear how from 1813 onward, the 
Napoleonic period was simply ignored. This was somewhat more straight-
forward than in Germany since, in contrast to Germany, there was a single 
monarch, William I, whose government pursued an unofficial policy of 
‘forgetting’. Many of the actions during the Napoleonic period were 
blamed on the French, and the contributions of the Dutch forgotten or 
glossed over.39
Due to this historical amnesia, until the twenty-first century, there were 
only two monographs on the Napoleonic period in the Netherlands. 
Firstly, Johanna Naber’s well-received book Overheersching en vrijwording 
(first edition 1909; revised edition 1913) which offered a nuanced view of 
the period.40 Naber carefully investigated many aspects of the years of inte-
gration and the end of Napoleon’s rule in the Netherlands. A few years 
later, Inlijving en opstand (1913) was published by Herman Theodoor 
Colenbrander. According to Colenbrander the Dutch under Napoleon 
had been characterized by a state of passivity. Colenbrander, a nationally 
orientated historian, focused on the House of Orange and its connections 
with Dutch history. The Napoleonic period was interpreted as merely a 
prologue to the establishment of the Dutch nation-state.41 Colenbrander 
seems to have based significant parts of his book on Overheersching en 
vrijwording, without really acknowledging the work of Naber. 
Colenbrander’s book was also less thorough, but as a Leiden Professor his 
prestige was greater than the women’s rights activist Johanna Naber, 
therefore his evaluation of the Napoleonic period in the Netherlands 
would long be influential.42
The 1960s and 1970s saw a wave of new research into the years of 
Revolution and, to a much lesser extent, the Napoleonic period in the 
39 Matthijs Lok, Windvanen: Napoleontische bestuurders in de Nederlandse en Franse restau-
ratie (1813–1820) (Amsterdam 2009) 166–167.
40 Johanna W. A. Naber, Overheersching en vrijwording: geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens 
de inlijving bij Frankrijk, juli 1810-november 1813 (Haarlem 1913).
41 H. T. Colenbrander, Inlijving en opstand (Amsterdam 1913) 127.





Netherlands. For instance, studies by Robert Palmer, Simon Schama, and 
C. H. E. de Wit—who all agreed the French model during the long Dutch 
Age of Revolution (c. 1780–1815) was less dominant than had been por-
trayed.43 In the 1980s, new research focused mainly on late-eighteenth- 
century political thought: new research by historians like Niek van Sas, 
Wijnand Mijnhardt, Renger de Bruin, Stephan Klein, and Joost Rosendaal 
cleared the way for new scholars of Napoleonic history to re-evaluate the 
position of the Dutch within the Napoleonic Empire.44
Since 2000 more serious attention has been given to Napoleonic 
Netherlands. Johan Joor, in his De Adelaar en het Lam (The Eagle and the 
Lamb), made clear that the Dutch contested Napoleonic rule. Joor showed 
that in every corner of the Kingdom of Holland (1806–1810), and later 
the Dutch imperial departments, inhabitants challenged Napoleonic mea-
sures. Dutch uprisings were primarily local in nature, but such protests 
successfully destabilized the state. According to Joor, previous historians 
neglected these struggles because they only looked for conflicts that were 
explicitly pro-Orange and anti-French.45 Literary scholar Lotte Jensen 
works on Dutch resistance literature, and its impact on Dutch national 
thought. According Jensen, certain forms of protest or opposition did 
contribute to national feelings under Napoleon. She states that from a 
cultural and literary viewpoint, protest was embedded in a national 
context.46
Bart Verheijen’s book Nederland onder Napoleon (The Netherlands 
under Napoleon) echoes the title of the earlier-mentioned work by Michael 
Broers. Verheijen studies political-cultural identity formation, and has 
shown that Frenchmen not necessarily worked together in good harmony, 
and, conversely, Dutchmen were certainly not all preoccupied with 
43 R. R. Palmer, ‘Much in little: The Dutch Revolution of 1795’, The Journal of Modern 
History 26 (1954) 15–35. C. H. E. de Wit, De strijd tussen aristocratie en democratie in 
Nederland, 1780–1848: kritisch onderzoek van een historisch beeld en herwaardering van een 
periode (Heerlen 1965). Simon Schama, Patriotten en bevrijders: revolutie in de Noordelijke 
Nederlanden, 1780–1813 (Amsterdam 1989).
44 For example, N.  C. F. van Sas, De metamorfose van Nederland. Van oude orde naar 
moderniteit, 1750–1900 (Amsterdam 2004).
45 Johan Joor, De Adelaar en het Lam: onrust, opruiing en onwilligheid in Nederland ten 
tijde van het Koninkrijk Holland en de inlijving bij het Franse keizerrijk (1806–1813) 
(Amsterdam 2000).
46 Lotte Jensen, Verzet tegen Napoleon (Nijmegen 2013).
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proto- nationalism.47 By taking political debate as a point of departure, 
Verheijen deepens the insights of Johan Joor, as well as those of Lotte 
Jensen: for instance, he links regional rural upheaval concerning national 
taxes with national thought of writers and poets.
Many aspects of the Dutch Napoleonic experience deserve further 
attention. Joor, Jensen, and Verheijen have given valuables insights into 
popular protest, state repression, identity formation and public debate, yet 
a critical study on how the Empire was constructed and run is lacking.48 
To quote Matthijs Lok: ‘A study of the administration of the Dutch prov-
inces as part of the huge Napoleonic empire, which integrates the Dutch 
case in international research on this topic and does not regard the years 
1810–1813 from the perspective of its outcome, is therefore urgently 
needed’.49 This can also be said for the even lesser studied Hanseatic 
departments.
Transregional Perspectives
As noted above, the history of the area under scrutiny was long written 
from nationally defined viewpoints, sharply discriminating between pre-
sumed ‘oppressors’ and ‘victims’. Consequently, neighboring Netherlands 
and Northwest Germany have often been studied in isolation. Changing 
spatial frameworks can however lead to new insights, both transnational 
and transregional, thus questioning the nation-state as a unit of analysis.50 
Particularly, a transregional study of Napoleonic governance can be rele-
vant. Until recent, there have been few studies concerning its reception at 
lower levels, certainly not in conquered Europe. Yet the scope of 
Napoleon’s centralist reforms can perhaps best be measured regionally, 
since ‘Paris’ specifically wanted to destroy traditional diversity. Serious 
47 Bart Verheijen, Nederland onder Napoleon: partijstrijd en natievorming 1801–1813 
(Nijmegen 2017).
48 An indispensible overview of institutional changes, literature and archives is Joke 
Roelevink, Onderzoeksgids bestuur en administratie van de Bataafs-Franse tijd, 1795–1813 
(Den Haag 2012). http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bataafsfransetijd
49 Matthijs Lok, ‘The bicentennial of ‘1813–1815’ and national history writing: Remarks 
on a new consensus’, BMGN—Low Countries Historical Review 130 (2015) 118. https://
doi.org/10.18352/bmgn-lchr.10148
50 Eric Storm, ‘The spatial turn and the history of nationalism. Nationalism between 
regionalism and transnational approaches’, in: S. Berger and E. Storm ed., Writing the history 
of nationalism (London 2019) 215–238.
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clashes must have occurred between the pursuit of Napoleonic governance 
and the wishes of communities. Fortunately, fresh studies on state- building 
from the bottom-up provide new images of Napoleonic rule in the regions.
Historians increasingly pay attention to alternative regional narratives, 
such as Katherine Aaslestad and Michael Rowe, who stress the importance 
of regional approaches to nuance the one-sided image of Napoleonic 
times as only a period of burgeoning national consciousness. Transregional 
is Aaslestad’s ‘Lost neutrality and economic warfare’, which treats the 
Napoleonic Netherlands, Northwest Germany, and Southern Denmark as 
a whole. She argues that around 1800, North Europeans were not unfa-
miliar with (economic) warfare and exploitative occupations, but the scale 
and scope were unprecedented. In combination with the legacy of 
Napoleonic governance, such dramatic events fostered regionalism.51
This goes for many regions. For instance, Michael Rowe has examined 
the connections between regional and national identities in the German 
Rhineland. Rowe has shown how a regional identity did not form in oppo-
sition to the French, but how ‘Rhenishness’, primarily after the years of 
Napoleonic rule, had a problematic relationship with Prussian concepts of 
German identity. The Rhenish elites used the Napoleonic framework to 
secure their position, taking advantage of the problematic nature of 
Napoleonic governance.52 Similarly, Brecht Deseure and Diederik Smit 
have demonstrated for post-Napoleonic Low Countries how the 
Restoration government took regional variations into account, for exam-
ple, by reintroducing the provinces. For the new rulers, the appropriation 
of early modern institutions and sentiments was a key instrument in the 
creation of a new unified state, as long as regional differences were 
acknowledged.53
Lacunae in national or regional historiographies should also be consid-
ered in relation to the availability and completeness of regional archival 
material. In the Netherlands, thanks to the relative institutional continuity 
51 Katherine Aaslestad, ‘Lost neutrality and economic warfare. Napoleonic warfare in 
Northern Europe, 1795–1815’, in: R. Chickering and S. Förster ed., War in an age of revolu-
tion, 1775–1815 (Cambridge 2010) 394.
52 Michael Rowe, ‘Between Empire and home town: Napoleonic rule on the Rhine, 
1799–1814’, The Historical Journal 42 (1999) 643–674. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0018246X9900850X
53 Brecht Deseure and Diederik Smit, ‘Pre-revolutionary provinces in a post-Napoleonic 
state’, BMGN—Low Countries Historical Review 133 (2018) 98–121. https://doi.
org/10.18352/bmgn-lchr.10589
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between the Napoleonic departments and the current Dutch provinces, 
most historical official records are well preserved in national, provincial, 
and regional archives.54 In contrast, continuous redrawing of Northwest 
German borders dispersed regional archival sources. Regrettably, the 
German situation is also complicated because of twentieth-century war 
damages. The archives of the Ems-Oriental department are in Aurich, but 
unfortunately incomplete. The well-preserved records of the Ems- 
Supérieur department are in Osnabrück. Since the department of Bouches- 
du- Weser was split in 1815 between Hannover and Oldenburg, its archives 
are divided between Bremen and Oldenburg. Sadly, Bouches-de-l’Elbe’s 
archive was damaged in 1942 due to Second World War bombings. Most 
of the Lippe department’s archival material can be consulted in Münster.55
In view of the limitations of this study, use has been made mainly of 
secondary literature, published sources, and a limited selection of archival 
material, such as correspondence between officials (regional and local), 
formal reports, memoranda, newspapers, and memoires. Given the frag-
mentation of German source material, the analysis of the German depart-
ments is, in comparison to the Dutch departments, relatively more 
dependent on literature and published source material.
QuEstions of dEfinition
This study is concerned with the 13 imperial departments which nowadays 
are part of the Netherlands and Germany and were integrated in 
1810–1811. I have tried to transcend national histories by looking at the 
French departments in the present-day Netherlands and Northwest 
Germany in conjunction—territories which were referred to as the départe-
ments de la Hollande and the départements (h)anséatiques, respectively. 
Unfortunately, these terms can be confusing. Napoleonic plans to inte-
grate both areas entailed the (re)definition of Dutch and German territo-
ries. Officials in Paris not seldom had a hard time distinguishing between 
the two regions; consequently, even some contemporary historians 
54 See https://www.archieven.nl/
55 See Archive in Nordrhein-Westfalen, https://www.archive.nrw.de/; Archive in 




accidentally mix up the two areas. Vague distinctions between ‘Dutch’ and 
‘German’ complicate the evaluation of Napoleonic governance.
Administratively, the government in Paris discriminated between the 
departments of Hollande (which corresponded with the Gouvernement 
général of Charles-François Lebrun in Amsterdam), the Hanseatic depart-
ments (supervised by General-Governor Davout in Hamburg), and three 
Dutch and German departments that did not fall under the authority of 
Amsterdam or Hamburg (Map 1.1).
Not all territories part of the départements de la Hollande were actually 
Dutch. Ems-Oriental (the present-day region of Ostfriesland) was a former 
Prussian province that had been incorporated into the Kingdom of Holland 
in 1807. Nevertheless, this ‘Dutch’ department fell under the Imperial 
Court in Hamburg. Furthermore, the lands that would later make up the 
Lippe department were initially part of three adjacent Dutch departments, 
thus part of the départements de la Hollande. But resistance from the local 
elite in Münster led to the creation of a separate German- speaking Lippe 
department, not under the supervision of the French in Amsterdam or 
Hamburg (more on this in Chap. 5). Nevertheless, some actors within the 
Empire (for instance, the gendarmerie, and to a certain extent the 
Map 1.1 Administrative division of the Dutch and Northwest German 
departments
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intermediary government in Amsterdam) treated Lippe as part of 
‘Holland’, and sometimes it was viewed as ‘Hanseatic’. Lippe can also be 
seen as an extension of the bordering departments of the Rhineland. For 
instance, it fell under the Imperial Court in Liège, and not the one in 
Hamburg.
Conversely, some parts belonging to the former Dutch Republic 
became an integral part of the Empire. The departments south of the 
Rhine—Bouches-de-l’Escaut (formerly the Dutch province of Zeeland) 
and Bouches-du-Rhin (Dutch Noord-Brabant) were not qualified as 
Dutch. The district of Breda was even merged with the existing Belgian 
department of Deux-Nèthes, probably due to its strategic value between 
the estuaries of the rivers Scheldt and Meuse.56 In official discourse, the 
French presented the river Rhine as their natural border, therefore in the 
eyes of the Ministry of the Interior, these former Dutch territories were 
not part of ‘Holland’. In brief, ad hoc decisions based on cultural- linguistic 
aspects on the one hand, and pragmatism, on the other hand, redrew sub-
national borders in a complicated manner.
Given these imprecise definitions, a distinction is made between 
‘German’ and ‘Dutch’ departments (Map 1.2), based on various consider-
ations. Firstly, as a matter of convenience, ‘Dutch departments’ are defined 
as the departments that formerly belonged to the Dutch Republic, were 
predominantly Dutch-speaking and would later form the present-day 
Netherlands. ‘(Northwest) German departments’ are defined as the largely 
German-speaking lands, including Lippe and Ems-Oriental/Ostfriesland, 
which formerly belonged to the Holy Roman Empire and today are part 
of Niedersachsen or Nordrhein-Westfalen. Secondly, when I refer to 
actions of the intermediary governments in Amsterdam or Hamburg these 
concern, of course, specifically the departments under their respective 
jurisdictions. Therefore, when interpreting French official documents of 
the time, it should be borne in mind that Hollande denotes the seven 
departments supervised by General-Governor Lebrun, and départements 
(h)anséatiques usually refers to the three departments which General- 
Governor Davout oversaw from Hamburg.
Another question of definition concerns the key terms ‘conquest’, 
‘incorporation’, and ‘integration’. In the past, the Napoleonic period in 
the Netherlands and Northwest German has often been referred to simply 
56 Since the district of Breda was added to the department of Deux-Nèthes, it is excluded 
in the present study.
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as inlijving/Einverleibung (incorporation) or bezetting/Besetzung (occu-
pation). Here, I differentiate between ‘conquest’, ‘incorporation’, and 
‘integration’.
Firstly, conquest is characterized by a change of power, whether or not 
by force, making one country controlling, partially or fully, the territory of 
another country. This is not necessarily a definitive violation of a nation’s 
sovereignty, since it does not mark the legal transfer of power. In the early 
modern period this notion largely overlapped with ‘occupation’, in the 
sense of occupatio bellica.57 As said, particularly German historians have 
made use of the notion of ‘occupation’ as analytical concept. However, I 
choose ‘conquest’ over ‘occupation’, firstly, because of Napoleon’s fre-
quent referrals to pays conquis and his preoccupation with droit de con-
quête. Secondly, many of the earlier-mentioned historians have already 
extensively explored the concept of occupation. And thirdly, Stuart Woolf 
doubts the explanatory value of ‘occupation’, as it does little justice to 
57 Peter M.  R. Stirk, ‘The concept of military occupation in the era of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars’, Comparative Legal History 3 (2015) 64. https://doi.
org/10.1080/2049677X.2015.1041726
Map 1.2 ‘Dutch’ and ‘German’ departments as defined in this study, with pré-
fectures (departmental seats of government)
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sincere efforts many administrators made to build a new state and society, 
albeit with mixed results.58
Secondly, incorporation entails the constitutional transfer of sover-
eignty. I favor ‘incorporation’ as an analytical concept to ‘annexation’ 
because of its resemblance to Dutch inlijving, and German Einverleibung. 
In many ways incorporation is a legal act, often an imperial decree, on an 
exact date. Incorporation does not imply that all state institutions are 
straightaway imposed on the incorporated territory, let alone that new 
authorities are genuinely accepted.
In contrast, integration, to complete the trichotomy, does aim to ren-
der incorporated lands integral parts of the Empire, by extending the cen-
tral government’s authority, and with it, implicitly or explicitly, reducing 
the mental distance between core and periphery. Unlike incorporation, 
integration was not a well-defined, single legal act, but a continuing pro-
cess of molding pays conquis into pays réunies. It does so primarily through 
the implementation of imperial institutions and governing practices. In 
this perspective, Woolf speaks of Napoleonic integration as ‘a model of 
government and administration, an updated and far more powerful ver-
sion of the mainstream ideals of Enlightenment writers and the practical 
reforms of some Enlightenment rulers and administrators’.59 Such an idea 
of integration implied a strong opposition between local diversity and 
‘modern’ uniformity, which affected the policies pursued in Europe. 
Although Napoleonic administrators did not use the term ‘moderniza-
tion’, they regarded themselves as the modernizing force of Europe. Their 
view of the modern state consisted of the concentration of the exercises of 
power in the hands of state servants, to the detriment of traditional, less 
specialized institutions.60 In other words, in this study, integration and 
modernization are strongly associated with the introduction of Napoleonic 
governance.
Obviously, historical developments are never linear and boundaries 
between abovementioned phases can be contested. As a matter of fact, one 
58 Stuart Woolf, ‘Napoleon: Politics of integration?’, Bibliothek des Deutschen Historischen 
Instituts in Rom 127 (2013) 22.
59 Ibid., 23.
60 John Breuilly, ‘Napoleonic Germany and state-formation’, in: M. Rowe ed., Collaboration 
and resistance in Napoleonic Europe. State-formation in an age of upheaval, c.1800–1815 
(Basingstoke 2003) 135–142; Michael Rowe, ‘Napoleon and the ‘modernisation’ of 




of the main conclusions of this study, as will be elaborated on in the final 
chapter ‘Incomplete integration’, is the lack of agreement between 
Napoleonic authorities on the timing and intensity of integration.
In sum, by proposing a comparative and (trans)regional approach to 
Napoleonic governance in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany, this 
study will hopefully fill a lacuna in the Dutch-German body of scholarly 
literature. Going beyond national historiographies is easier said than done, 
but nation-states should not be taken as the natural starting point for his-
torical investigation.61 Of course, cross-national history entails many prac-
tical and methodological issues, yet I believe its benefits outweigh the 
difficulties.62 The overarching goal is to gain a better understanding of 
Napoleonic governance in its entirety, shedding light on the endeavor of 
Napoleonic France to create a modern Europe shaped in its own image.
61 Peter van Dam, ‘Vervlochten geschiedenis. Hoe histoire croisée de natiestaat bedwingt’, 
Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 125 (2012) 96–109. https://doi.org/10.5117/
tvgesch2012.1.dam
62 Jürgen Kocka’s argument for the comparative method is essential reading for all aca-
demic historians. See  Jürgen Kocka, ‘Comparison and beyond’, History and Theory 42 
(2003) 39–44.
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CHAPTER 2
Revolution and Warfare: The North Before 
Conquest
Abstract This chapter lays the foundation for an understanding of 
Napoleonic governance in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany. 
Dutch and German lands were governed in many different ways in the 
early modern age. During the eighteenth century attempts at reform were 
made in both areas, with varying results. The French Revolution was both 
admired and feared, especially as it became clear that the ‘liberation’ of 
Europe entailed aggressive expansionism. France’s growth showed the dif-
ficulties of imposing rules and practices on a hitherto foreign population. 
Which policies were effective, which not? True, German secularization 
and mediatization (the historic Reichsdeputationshauptschluss of 1803), 
and repeated coup d’états in the Batavian Republic, restructured gover-
nance on the right bank of the Rhine. Yet, both in the Netherlands and 
Northwest Germany, the combination of awe of, and fear for, the French 
Empire strengthened identity formation, whether local, regional, or 
national, which was not necessarily beneficial for future integration 
into France.




French interventions in Northwestern Europe in the years leading up to 
Napoleon’s ascension to the imperial throne, caused drastic reorganiza-
tions of countries and societies. Millions of people changed state, and 
would repeatedly do so until after the definitive fall of Napoleon. During 
the process clashes occurred between longstanding traditions and revolu-
tionary novelties. Yet, well before the Revolutionary period, the 
Netherlands and Northwest Germany were affected by waves of reformist 
thought. There were, however, significant differences in the extent of each 
region’s revolutionary fervor, and the ways ideas translated into actual 
reforms. Political conjuncture, international relations, and the persever-
ance of traditional structures, thwarted change.
Dutch and German internal affairs were greatly complicated when 
Revolutionary France redefined warfare. Under the creed of ridding the 
peoples of Europe from ‘despots’, liberation, conquest, and exploitation 
went hand in hand. The old modes of military conflict and diplomacy gave 
way to new types of forms, in which nation-building and empire-building 
came to the fore.
Smaller states within the borders of France, such as Nice and the former 
papal enclaves, had been incorporated at an early stage, but when 
Revolutionary France went on the offensive, major geopolitical transforma-
tions ensued. The northwest corner of continental Europe had further 
acquainted itself with French expansionism around 1795, when the French 
troops conquered many parts on the Left bank of the Rhine and started 
incorporating present-day Belgium and the Rhineland. The integration of 
both areas is especially significant given the fact that the French experiences 
in these newly conquered lands would affect how Napoleonic governance 
would be later introduced in the Dutch and Northwest German departments.
By discussing the pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary periods in the 
lands north of Old France, this chapter lays the foundation for a proper 
understanding of Napoleonic governance in the Netherlands and 
Northwest Germany.
abSolutiSm and republicaniSm
Present-day Netherlands and Northwest Germany were very heteroge-
neous during the early modern period. The origins of the Dutch state can 
be traced back to the revolt against Habsburg rule. When loyalty to the 
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Spanish king Philip II was formally renounced, the United Provinces of 
the Netherlands, or Dutch Republic (1579–1795), was set up as a con-
federation of seven autonomous provinces. The provinces enjoyed a 
substantial degree of self-rule. Each sent delegates to the States-General 
in The Hague. Initially, the States-General became responsible for 
chiefly military and foreign matters. But quickly, their decisions came to 
apply to a wider sphere of government. Apart from the Provinces, the 
Dutch Republic also comprised so-called Generality Lands, ruled by the 
States-General. No delegates from these areas—with a predominantly 
Catholic population—were represented in The Hague. In practice, con-
trary to the republican ideal of equality, not all Provinces were equally 
powerful. The States of Holland dominated the Republic. And within 
the Province of Holland, Amsterdam soon became the most influen-
tial city.
Another binding factor were the Stadtholders. These nobles had been 
originally representatives from the Habsburg Emperor. One of them, 
William of Orange, had played a major role during the Revolt. From that 
moment, as no monarch could mediate between provinces, the individual 
Provincial States appointed Stadholders. These officials—often provinces 
chose different Stadholders—commanded the army, but also functioned 
as highest office-holders. In many towns the Stadtholder selected urban 
magistrates. In short, the Dutch Republic at a first glance was a league of 
sovereign provinces, but in fact was a unique political entity which oper-
ated as a powerful federal state.1
Meanwhile, the area that would later become the Northwest German 
part of the Napoleonic Empire, was still distributed over many indepen-
dent states. The largest state was Hanover, or the Electorate of Brunswick- 
Lüneburg, which stretched from the North Sea to Central Germany, and 
also governed adjacent areas, such as the County of Bentheim. The British 
king ruled Hanover and the United Kingdom in a personal union. The 
Duchy of Oldenburg, around the city of the same name, was also a per-
sonal union, namely with the Prince-Bishopric of Lübeck. During the 
eighteenth century, the Kingdom of Prussia had acquired more and more 
territories in the West, such as the province of Ostfriesland and the County 
of Lingen. The Prince-Bishopric of Münster, was an ecclesiastical state, 
ruled by a bishop, who not only exercised spiritual power but also secular 
1 Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic. Its rise, greatness, and fall. 1477–1806 (Oxford 
1998) 276–306.
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power. The same applied to the slightly smaller Prince-Bishopric of 
Osnabrück. Geographically much smaller, but long-time economic and 
political power factors, were the three Hanseatic cities (the Free Imperial 
Cities) of Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg. In each, power was distributed 
between a Senate and Citizen’s Councils. Notwithstanding subtle differ-
ences between cities, Hanseatic government, as in the Dutch Republic, 
was in essence collegial government, dominated mainly by urban mer-
chant families.2
Unlike the Dutch, most of the inhabitants of Northwest Germany were 
affected by enlightened absolutism, which emerged during the second half 
of the eighteenth century. It envisaged a rational government safeguard-
ing internal socioeconomic conditions. The idea of the droit divin gave 
way to a more secular approach to princely power, in which the promotion 
of societal happiness was the most fundamental task of the state.3 Ambitious 
enlightened monarchs also tried to profile themselves internationally, con-
tinuing the earlier absolutist pursuit of a large and efficient army and civil 
service. For example, King Frederick William I had already reformed gov-
ernance in his kingdom, severely curtailing the autonomy of provincial 
and local rulers. King Frederick II retained his father’s effective state appa-
ratus and increased Prussia international standing. The state grew in 
importance, and therefore that of its embodiment: the prince, who could 
maintain absolute control to monitor the greater good. This notion of 
governance has been characterized as a ‘teleocratic style of governance’.4
In Northern Germany, Hanseatic city-states were islands of republican-
ism. There, civic tradition, Protestant aversion to exuberance, and new 
enlightened ideas went hand in hand, culminating in a variety of enlight-
ened reforms. Respect for the city’s history was part of civic community- 
building and republican self-identification. This had a strong 
anti-aristocratic character, even more so than in Dutch republicanism 
2 Mary Lindemann, ‘Voluntarism in social welfare and urban government: The case of 
Hamburg, 1700–1799’, Journal of Urban History 36 (2010) 316–331. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0096144209359143
3 Elisabeth Fehrenbach, Vom Ancien Régime zum Wiener Kongress (4th ed.; München 
2001) 55.
4 H. M. Scott, ‘Introduction: The problem of enlightened absolutism’, in: H. Scott ed., 
Enlightened absolutism: Reform and reformers in later eighteenth-century Europe (London 
1989) 1–2, 16; Michael Spicer, ‘Public administration: The history of ideas, and the rein-
venting government movement’, Public Administration Review 64 (2004) 356. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00379.x
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which—unlike the Hanseatic city-states—did not have to position itself 
vis-à-vis enlightened absolutist Princes.5
While many European states experienced centralizing tendencies, the 
Dutch Republic maintained its local particularistic state structure—a 
tightknit network of urban communities. Things changed at the end of 
the eighteenth century, with the Patriot movement of the 1780s. Following 
the military and economic decline of the Republic, republican patriots 
tried to reclaim what they thought were traditional rights. Having little say 
in political matters, the Patriots focalized their attention on the civic mili-
tias. Throughout the Republic, militias that had been dormant for decades, 
or centuries, were revived as symbols of civic pride. Middle-class patriots 
demanded that civic corporations, like militias and craft guilds, had to be 
consulted by the city government in public matters. Also, Patriots called 
for the election of urban councilors and town officials, as well as the right 
of (legislative) initiative.6
As many Dutch towns, the Hanseatic city-states developed a vivid pub-
lic sphere, in the form of neutral enlightened societies, coffee houses, and 
reading societies, where citizens came together to discuss social issues. 
Gradually they formed a breeding ground for early democratic ideas. The 
most prominent enlightened society was the Patriotic Society (1765), in 
Hamburg, which was in close contact with the urban government, con-
tributing to the reform of Hamburg’s governance. Similar societies were 
established in many towns in Northwest Germany.7
As more and more Dutch towns and provinces embraced the Patriot 
cause, the Republic effectively was in a state of civil war. Following repres-
sive actions of Stadtholder William V, factions within the Patriot move-
ment started to call for popular sovereignty and new liberties, thus 
developing a new democratic republican discourse. This led to a rupture 
between moderate Patriots and democratic Patriots who increasingly 
attacked the perceived ‘aristocratic’ system of governance.8 In September 
5 Katherine Aaslestad, Place and politics: Local identity, civic culture and German national-
ism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era (Leiden 2005) 58–59, 67.
6 N.  C. F. van Sas, De metamorfose van Nederland. Van oude orde naar moderniteit, 
1750–1900 (Amsterdam 2004) 214.
7 Aaslestad, Place and politics, 68–75, 108–109.
8 Mart Rutjes, ‘Onderdrukt onbehagen. Het ontstaan van de repressieve staat in 
Nederland’, in: P. van Dam, J. Turpijn and B. Mellink ed., Onbehagen in de polder. Nederland 
in conflict sinds 1795 (Amsterdam 2014) 25.
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1787, the Stadtholder—thanks to a military intervention of his Prussian 
brother-in-law Frederick II—regained his power. The unorganized Patriot 
militias were no match for a standing army. Urban governments and mili-
tias were purged of Patriots; many of whom fled to the Southern 
Netherlands or France, which caused a flight of capital.
Twenty years later, the counter-revolution played a part in discussions 
on the incorporation of the Netherlands. That William V had needed help 
from Prussian troops to overthrow the Patriots and re-impose his author-
ity, was seen by Emperor Napoleon as a justification to incorporate the 
Netherlands. Effectively, the Dutch had already been conquered in 1787, 
Napoleon would argue (see Chap. 3).
Despite its military might, the Orangist counter-revolution of 1787 
was not a real victory. In the long run, the repressive actions of the 
Stadholder only served to give the Patriot ideals more support. Remaining 
Patriots went underground in so-called reading societies. In spite of feel-
ings of national solidarity, individual revolutionary groups were local in 
nature.9 This made more and more Dutch Patriots realize that a national 
movement was of great importance.
The enlightened German citizens called themselves ‘Patriots’, but 
Katherine Aaslestad has argued that ‘public moralists’ is a more precise 
term, since their point of view was mainly ethical, or moral in nature.10 
Partly this also applies to the Dutch Patriots, but they gradually became 
more politicized, especially as some of them began to embrace progressive 
ideas about popular sovereignty. Dutch Patriots also had to take an explicit 
stance on the issue of local or provincial autonomy versus federal or 
national uniformity. Such an issue was one that hardly concerned 
Northwest German Patriots in 1780s.
While Stadholder William V was helped by his Prussian brother-in-law, 
French King Louis XVI struggled with political-theoretical criticism of 
philosophes, opposition to social and economic inequalities, and a mount-
ing debt burden. This necessitated the convening of the États généraux 
(States-General) for the first time since 1614. The Third Estate called for 
a single assembly in which the citizenry would have a numerical majority, 
adorning itself with the title Assemblée nationale. The reluctant Louis XVI 
initially hesitated to intervene. In July and August, popular uprisings 
9 J. G. M. M. Rosendaal, Tot nut van Nederland: polarisatie en revolutie in een grensgebied, 
1783–1787 (Nijmegen 2012) 237–238.
10 Aaslestad, Place and politics, 97.
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showed the weaknesses of the monarchy. Louis XVI’s reluctance hindered 
the establishment of a new constitutional framework. Due to his failed 
attempt to flee, in the summer of 1791, lack of unanimity among the revo-
lutionaries, and constant war threat, the government steadily lost its grip 
on the population. Louis XVI, like Stadholder William V, had tried to 
appeal to the band of brothers-in-law to restore his authority, in his case 
Austrian Emperor Leopold II. The constitutional monarchy lost its cred-
ibility. After the adoption of the first French constitution in October 1791, 
dissatisfaction grew. When armed civilians entered the Palais de Tuileries 
on 10 August 1792, the constitutional monarchy was moribund.11
Subsequently, the brutality that characterized the rule of the powerful 
Committee of Public Safety, with Maximilien Robespierre as its most 
prominent member, culminated in an outburst of violence that claimed 
the lives of tens of thousands of French people, including Louis XVI and 
his family. The Terror had a decisive influence on the course of the French 
Revolution. Nationally, it made many people long for a definitive end to 
the revolution. Foreign sympathizers rarely could reconcile themselves 
with the extreme turn that the Revolution had taken.12 This was at odds 
with France’s growing ambition to rid Europe of the Old Regime ‘despots’.
For instance, in 1789 many educated German citizens had initially 
greeted the French Revolution, due to widespread dissatisfaction with the 
situation in Germany. There were also close personal ties with French rev-
olutionaries and Hamburg in particular was a lively meeting place for 
international ‘Jacobins’, as conservatives derogatorily, called revolutionar-
ies.13 On the one hand, there was a disappointment at the waning momen-
tum of enlightened absolutism; on the other, worsening social conditions 
caused dissatisfaction. In particular in Northern Germany, which was a 
center of journalism and book publishing, a radical revolutionary move-
ment arose that no longer only demanded freedom but also equality. 
While the Hamburg merchant citizenry was close to the Girondins, intel-
lectuals and craftsmen sympathized with the Montagnards. For example, 
Jacobin Georg Conrad Meyer from Flensburg, in his periodical Der neue 
Mensch, propagated the equal distribution of goods, however nowhere in 
11 Annie Jourdan, La Révolution, une exception française? (Paris 2004) 49–50.
12 Ibid., 371–374.
13 Aaslestad, Place and politics, 118–122.
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Northern Germany were any genuine attempts made to put the principles 
of the French Revolution into practice.14
Although the Revolution was admired from afar, there was also fear for 
its potential consequences. Skepticism prevailed. The German lands were 
said not to be ripe for a revolution. Even Heinrich Würzer, one of Northern 
Germany’s most famous ‘Jacobins’, understood revolution to be nothing 
more than reform. Civil disobedience was acceptable, but a bloody upris-
ing had little to do with a real revolution, he argued.15 The violence of the 
First French Republic confirmed to civic Northwest Germans that the 
French lacked morality, and thus strengthened their belief in their own 
superiority.16
Dutch Patriots who had fled from the Republic to France, did not react 
unequivocally to the radicalization of the revolution. A small number of 
ultra-revolutionary exiles were in close contact with French kindred spir-
its, and united in the Comité Révolutionnaire Batave, hoping to reform 
the Dutch situation along French lines. However, Robespierre believed 
that the Dutch would not benefit from the French model as each people 
had its own customs and habits. Moreover, early 1793, the French had 
declared war on the Stadholder, thus justifying the war without compro-
mising Dutch popular sovereignty. The majority of government members 
called for the usefulness of an independent Dutch Sister Republic. A small 
minority within the National Convention, however, believed that the 
Netherlands could simply be incorporated.17 Many Dutch Patriots there-
fore lost their enthusiasm for the French cause during this period. 
Conversely, many Jacobins were suspicious of, the in their eyes bourgeois, 
Dutchmen.18
14 Fehrenbach, Vom Ancien Régime, 65.
15 Ibid., 61–63.
16 Aaslestad, Place and politics, 127–129.
17 Marc Belissa, ‘‘Faire la guerre au Stadhouder ou à la nation Hollandaise?’: Le débat 
politique autour de la déclaration de guerre (décembre 1792–mars 1793)’, in: A. Jourdan 
and J. Leerssen ed., Remous révolutionnaires: République batave, armée française (Amsterdam 
1996) 69–80.
18 Joost Rosendaal, ‘‘La liberté est une garce!’ Les Bataves à Paris (1787–1795)’, in: 
A. Jourdan and J. Leerssen ed., Remous révolutionnaires: République batave, armée française 
(Amsterdam 1996) 66–67.
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exporting the revolution
With the demise of the French monarchy, a long series of wars began that 
no longer involved the traditional balance of power, but placed the nation 
on a pedestal. The novelty of this concept of war lay in the fact that foreign 
policy could no longer be separated from domestic policy. Warfare acted 
as a nation-building instrument in a politically and socially divided France, 
turning into an outlet for internal tensions. Successive French revolution-
ary governments, prolonged and increased warfare, with growing mission-
ary zeal. Defensive warfare turned into a war of liberation and conquest. 
The French threat was, however, not immediately recognized by European 
diplomats who only knew international power politics.19
In November 1792 French troops invaded the Austrian Netherlands, 
hoping to establish a Sister Republic. Officially, the Constitution of 1791 
had determined that France renounced ‘the undertaking of any war with 
a view to making conquests, and [would] never use its forces against the 
liberty of any people’. And also in the years that followed it was official 
policy that ‘liberated’ peoples should, in principle, retain existing laws and 
institutions. But the actual behavior of generals and officials in conquered 
lands was not always in line with that.20 The French thought that the 
Belgians, who were dissatisfied with their Habsburg sovereign, would be 
enthusiastic. Initially, Revolutionary France was indeed seen as a liberator, 
but it soon became apparent that opinions differed widely. Like the Dutch 
patriots of the 1780s, Belgians attached great value to the restoration of 
old, local privileges as protection against a centralist monarch. However, 
the French National Convention dismantled traditional bodies in 
December 1792 with the aim of an organization based on the French 
model.21 Moreover, in the North, military advances of General Charles- 
François Dumouriez and Dutch exile Lieutenant-General Herman Willem 
Daendels were halted, and local support was meagre, forcing withdrawal.
After a brief restoration of Austria’s power, French troops finally pre-
vailed in July 1794. A new Conseil de gouvernement, headed by 
19 Fehrenbach, Vom Ancien Régime, 42–46.
20 Peter M.  R. Stirk, ‘The concept of military occupation in the era of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars’, Comparative Legal History 3 (2015) 69–74. https://
doi.org/10.1080/2049677X.2015.1041726
21 Brecht Deseure, “Etre libre de nom et esclave de fait’. De Brabantse constituties tijdens 
de Franse periode (Zuidelijke Nederlanden)’, Noordbrabants Historisch Jaarboek 29 (2012) 
349–369.
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Commissioner Louis-Ghislain de Bouteville, replaced extant governmen-
tal institutions and was to look after the implementation of the French 
system of governance in the nine ‘Belgian’ departments. Legal and admin-
istrative integration started, leading to rigorous reforms. Old Regime 
practices and institutions were abolished, and an end was put to all pre-
rogatives of the Church. Consequently, many members of the Belgian 
elite lost their positions. With the introduction of elections, in 1797, the 
number of local administrators and magistrates increased, which some-
what improved the reputation of French governance and stimulated its 
acceptance. And when, with Napoleon’s rise to power in 1799, the 
Commissioner in Brussels disappeared, the Belgian departments were 
truly organized along French lines.22
Concurrently, the German Rhineland was conquered. The Peace of 
Basel, of 5 April 1795, stated that the French would occupy the Rhineland 
momentarily. When peace would return, a definite arrangement would be 
made. However, the secret articles of the treaty prescribed that Prussia and 
France would eventually come to an exchange. The French relatively 
quickly insisted on obtaining the Rhineland, something that the French 
monarchs had never demanded so explicitly. The Prussian king would give 
up his rights in the Rhineland in return for territorial compensation else-
where, which would have to be specified at a later date.23 A demarcation 
line was drawn, to the north of which all German states would remain 
neutral. The French promised not cross this line, thus increasing the influ-
ences of Prussia in Northern Germany.
In November 1797, four ‘Rhenish’ departments were established, with 
François Joseph Rudler as Commissioner to oversee their organization. 
From Parisians desks, the departments were further divided into districts, 
cantons, and municipalities, by the summer of 1798.24 What made the 
situation in the Rhineland complicated, was that unwilling local elites were 
not eager to support French rule, and French were uncertain how to deal 
with traditional prerogatives and social inequalities. Hesitations on the 
22 Dirk Heirbaut, ‘De Franse overheersing in België’, in: A. Berkvens, J. Hallebeek and 
A.  Sirks ed., Het Franse Nederland: de inlijving 1810–1813. De juridische en bestuurlijke 
gevolgen van de ‘Réunion’ met Frankrijk (Hilversum 2012) 17–23.
23 Josef Smets, ‘Le Rhin, frontière naturelle de la France’, Annales historiques de la 
Révolution française 314 (1998) 686–687, 697. https://doi.org/10.3406/ahrf.1998.2206
24 Bernd Wunder, ‘L’administration territoriale des départements allemands annexés par 
l’Empire napoléonien’, in: M.  Pertué ed., L’administration territoriale de la France 
(1750–1940) (Orléans 1998) 349–350.
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side of the French, combined with local resistance, led to a slow start of 
integration, creating an uncomfortable situation for the intermediary 
French administrations.25 Collaboration was not necessarily a signal that 
the population was fully accommodating to French rule. The French 
authorities had to comply with older patronage networks for strategic rea-
sons. The French learn that existing practices could survive within the new 
system of governance.26 Effective governance was extra welcome when 
late 1798, drastic French measures, such as the restriction of the power of 
the Church and the introduction of conscription, led to popular resistance 
in Belgium and the Rhineland, the Boerenkrijg or Klüppelkrieg. Given the 
different local circumstances, the Belgian and German regions were incor-
porated in different tempi. It was not until 1801, when the great powers 
ratified the Treaty of Luneville, that the left bank of the Rhine was perma-
nently incorporated.27
revolutionary republicanS in the north
The Dutch Patriots, or ‘Batavians’ as they were increasingly called, wit-
nessed how the French emerged as conquerors in Belgium and Germany, 
and expressed doubts about French intervention. Alexander Gogel (later 
member of the Napoleonic intermediary government in Amsterdam) rec-
ognized, on the eve of the Batavian Revolution, that support from France 
was indispensable, but was keen to prevent the Netherlands from being 
regarded as a pays conquis; in his eyes, wherever possible Dutchmen had to 
take the lead.28 With the invasion of French-Batavian troops (this time led 
by Jean-Charles Pichegru, with Dutch assistance by Daendels and Jan 
Willem de Winter) and in January 1795, Stadtholder William V fled to 
England, and all over the Dutch Republic, provincial and city govern-
ments were purged of Orangists. After the proclamation of the Batavian 
Republic, major differences of opinion emerged about what the new state 
should look like. Because of the devastating defeat that ended all patriot 
25 Smets, ‘Le Rhin’.
26 Michael Rowe, ‘Between Empire and home town: Napoleonic rule on the Rhine, 
1799–1814’, The Historical Journal 42 (1999) 643–674. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0018246X9900850X
27 Kees Schaapveld, Bestuur en bestuurders in Nedermaas, 1794–1814: met bijzondere aan-
dacht voor het lokale bestuur in het kanton Wittem/Gulpen (Hilversum 2017) 44.
28 Jan Postma, Alexander Gogel (1765–1821): grondlegger van de Nederlandse staat 
(Hilversum 2017) 32–39.
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experiments in 1787, and the French Revolution, nearly all Batavian revo-
lutionaries demanded a true unitary state.29 However, there was continual 
disagreement about the degree of participation of citizens and about how 
the state should be centralized. Paradoxically, the very democratic ideals 
that had mobilized the revolutionaries formed an obstacle for political 
reform.30
The optimism of the Dutch revolutionaries was tempered when the 
question of the future of the Batavian was raised. The French demanded 
compensation for their efforts: the Batavian Republic lost part of its terri-
tory in the South, it had to pay a sum of 100 million guilders to France, 
and maintain a French force. Mutual irritations soon caused dissatisfaction 
from both sides. Batavians wanted a friendly and commercial alliance, but 
were faced with a military alliance. They were offended by the French 
financial and military requirements which they saw as an attack on their 
autonomy. The French treated their revolutionary brothers with a high 
degree of prejudice and had little regard for the political sensitivities within 
the Batavian Republic. They often let their own interests prevail. However, 
the Batavians were also opportunistic, turning French interventions to 
their own advantage.31
In the years following France’s expansion, the Hanseatic city-states 
benefited from their neutral status. Trade flourished. Especially Hamburg 
became an economic and financial center, at the expense of notably 
Amsterdam. But citizens realized that neutrality, without being backed by 
military power, was fragile. That Bremen was briefly occupied by 
Hanoverian and English troops demonstrated this, as did the growing 
Prussian ambitions in Northern Germany. That the cities were formally 
part of the anti-French Holy Roman Empire did not help either. On 11 
May 1795, representatives from Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck con-
vened in the first Hansetag (Hanseatic Conference) since 1669. The aim 
was to ensure Hanseatic neutrality, by emphasizing its positive effect for all 
European states, as a platform for free trade and prosperity. The 
29 Stephan Klein, ‘De sprong naar ’95. Van patriots naar Bataafs republikanisme’, De 
Achttiende Eeuw 28 (1996) 39–46.
30 See also Thomas Poell, The democratic paradox. Dutch revolutionary struggles over 
democratisation and centralisation (1780–1813) (PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam 
2007). https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/22668
31 Annie Jourdan, ‘Le rôle des agents français dans la constitution batave de 1798’, Annales 
historiques de la Révolution française 351 (2008) 99–119. https://doi.org/10.4000/
ahrf.11367
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cooperation forced by common dangers was accompanied by a program of 
regional identity formation.32
On 18 fructidor year V (5 September 1797) in France republicans 
seized power with the help of the army to counter the growing power of 
royalists. This coup, which showed the extent to which the army was 
becoming a decisive factor, prompted Dutch sympathizers to seek secret 
contact with the French. Supported by French troops, Batavians from the 
camp of the radical unitarians staged a coup d’état on 22 January 1798. 
The French ambassador Charles Delacroix had planned the coup together 
with mainly Amsterdam radicals. Moderate political opponents were 
imprisoned. Following an undemocratic referendum, a radical constitu-
tion was accepted that turned the Batavian Republic in a ‘one and indivis-
ible’ unitary nation-state. Although the radical democratic government 
realized the ideals of a unitary state and civic liberties, at the same time it 
alienated a large part of the people from politics. In June 1798 the govern-
ment was purged of radicals, and moderates regained power, yet the revo-
lutionary constitution, and its accomplishments, were kept.33
the firSt conSul and europe
General Bonaparte, after his Italian and Egyptian campaigns, came to 
power on 18 brumaire year VIII (9 November 1799). In the preceding 
year, Bonaparte became convinced he was the one who could regenerate 
the French Republic. Like many French citizens he was disillusioned with 
the Directory, given the defeats in the War of the Second Coalition, prob-
lems with conscription, and economic issues; to name but a few difficulties 
that severely hindered the effectiveness of the Directory. Politicians from 
different factions longed to revise the constitution but were in disagree-
ment on how exactly to go about this. Together with Director Emmanuel 
Joseph Sieyès, who strived for a stronger executive without destroying the 
Republic, Napoleon Bonaparte had planned the coup d’état. Much has 
been written on 18 brumaire, for instance, on the role played by brother 
Lucien Bonaparte, the newly elected president of the Council of Five 
Hundred, who arranged the council’s ‘consent’ that was needed to legiti-
mize the coup. The coup showed that the military leader possessed 
32 Aaslestad, Place and politics, 204–210.
33 Martijn van der Burg, Nederland onder Franse invloed. Culturele overdracht en staats-
vorming in de napoleontische tijd, 1799–1813 (Amsterdam 2009) 44–45.
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political talents and was capable of appeasing different groups within soci-
ety while pursuing his own program.34
The new French constitution of the year VIII, 25 December 1799, 
foresaw a supposedly democratic government. But Bonaparte was able to 
curtail democratic institutions, not least because he was supported by an 
antiparty, technocratic elite; a group which would form a rich source of 
Napoleonic state representatives.35 From the coup of brumaire on, legisla-
tion was made primarily in the newly created Conseil d’État, whose mem-
bers were selected by Bonaparte. The Conseil d’État also nominated all 
high officials, such as prefects. The constitution introduced tricameralism; 
three legislative or parliamentary chambers were created: the Sénat conser-
vateur, the Corps législatif and the Tribunat. Members of the highest and 
most important chamber, the Senate, were appointed for life by Bonaparte. 
Senators were mostly moderate veterans of the Revolution. They had at 
their disposal the procedure of sénatus-consultum, or sénatus-consulte 
which allowed the loyal Senate to approve constitutional changes pro-
posed by the First Consul and thus bypass the already weak Legislative 
body and the Tribunate.36 Importantly, the instrument of the sénatus- 
consulte would be used frequently during the process of empire-building, 
specifically a sénatus-consulte organique which amended the constitution.
Via a plebiscite held on 7 February 1800 the French citizens entitled to 
vote officially accepted the new constitution, although the government 
tampered with the figures. Together with Jean-Jacques-Régis de 
Cambacérès and Charles-François Lebrun, Napoleon became Consul of 
the French Republic. As First Consul, Napoleon effectively ruled alone. 
Cambacérès and Lebrun had a purely consultative role. Cambacérès 
advised Bonaparte on legal matters, Lebrun on financial matters. In these 
two domains, the First Consul could use the assistance of experienced 
public servants.37
Napoleon inherited the ideological warfare policy of the Directory. 
Under the Directory, the idea of liberating Europe from feudal despots 
34 Annie Jourdan, L’empire de Napoléon (Paris 2000) 45–51; D. G. Wright, Napoleon and 
Europe (Harlow 1984) 16–18.
35 Lynn Hunt, David Lansky, and Paul Hanson, ‘The failure of the liberal republic in 
France, 1795–1799: The road to brumaire’, The Journal of Modern History 51 (1979) 
758–759. https://doi.org/10.1086/241988
36 Geoffrey Ellis, The Napoleonic empire (2nd ed.; Basingstoke 2003) 24–25.
37 Isser Woloch, Napoleon and his collaborators: The making of a dictatorship (New York 
2001) 122–123.
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had changed into the wish to extend France to its presumed natural bor-
ders. In his days as general, Napoleon had been an ardent supporter of 
expansionist measures. As First Consul, his ambitions grew larger and 
increasingly ignored long-accepted frontiers.38 The notion of the Rhine as 
a natural border of France was not new. Long before the French Revolution, 
the idea existed that France could make historical claims on the (alleged) 
homeland of the Gauls, situated between the Pyrenees, the Alps and the 
Rhine, from 1792 onward was brought to the forefront again.39 The year 
1799 saw the consolidation of French rule in annexed territories, like a 
protective layer shielding Old France. Plus, the First Consul took over 
from the Directory a seasoned army, an efficient system of conscription 
and an organized corps diplomatique. All this enabled him to develop his 
European offensive politics, disguised as defensive (protecting the Republic 
from foreign threats).40
The First Consul faced little opposition from within the government. 
Napoleon’s Minister of the Exterior Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand (who 
had been appointed under the Directory, in 1797) was comfortable with 
the First Consul directing foreign policy. He was primarily interested in 
commercial and financial aspects. For instance, it was not him but Joseph 
Bonaparte who had a large role in the peace negotiations of 1800–1802. 
Nevertheless, during the incorporation of northern Italy, Talleyrand did 
object to the continuing expansion of the Empire. France had to perfect 
its system of governance before imposing it on Europe; better yet, France 
needed allies, not more territory, he argued.41
In the Netherlands, revolutionary politicians from different parties, at 
first welcomed 18 brumaire. Some saw it as a return to the original liberal 
ideals of the Revolution, and assumed the former general, as a head of 
state, would pursue lasting peace. However, the First Consul primarily 
assessed the Dutch sister republic on its financial and military potential. 
Within a few weeks, Bonaparte demanded a financial contribution from 
the Sister Republic; in return, he would stimulate Dutch commerce. The 
First Consul was in great need of funds. In the end, the deal failed and 
38 Jourdan, L’empire de Napoléon, 113–114.
39 Smets, ‘Le Rhin’, 676.
40 Jacques-Olivier Boudon, ‘L’Europe en 1800’, in: T.  Lentz ed., Napoléon et l’Europe 
(Paris 2005) 80–81.
41 Emmanuel de Waresquiel, ‘Talleyrand, une vision européenne’, in: T.  Lentz ed., 
Napoléon et l’Europe (Paris 2005) 134–135.
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Napoleon would never forget the ‘arrogance’ of the ‘wealthy’ Dutch.42 
During his entire reign, Napoleon, taking no notice of the miserable state 
of the Dutch economy, assumed that the Dutch were almost literally sit-
ting on millions of guilders but refused to fulfill their financial duties. This 
misassumption dated back to the early French Revolution.43
Napoleon’s rise to power also had its effects on Northwest Germany. 
The Hanseatic city-states struggled with their neutrality in 1799. The 
question of neutrality was considered of great importance for the future 
well-being of the urban communities. Politicians were greatly aware that 
neutrality, in practice, was only possible if the French and the British were 
convinced that their neutrality program served their own interests as well. 
The Hanseatic city-states were stuck between British and French demands 
and tried to offend neither party. For the time being, France was willing to 
respect their neutrality, as long as it was beneficial in (economic) warfare.44
In July 1800 a conflict started between the United Kingdom and neu-
tral Denmark. The British demanded the right to search Danish vessels in 
open seas. Persuaded by 19 British warships in the Sound the Danish had 
to agree, whereupon Napoleon considered them to be unable to remain 
neutral. Napoleon urged Denmark to join forces with other neutral coun-
tries.45 Russian Tsar Paul I, seeing an opportunity to enlarge his sphere of 
influence, encouraged the Danish and Swedish governments to discuss 
matters, and also Prussia was invited to join Russia. Problematic was that 
the three smaller countries involved were traditional rivals and had serious 
conflicts of interest. Thus, on 16 and 18 December 1800, the three coun-
tries signed bilateral Neutrality Conventions with Russia, establishing the 
League of Armed Neutrality intended to resist British interference.46 The 
British, not amused, planned a preemptive naval attack on Copenhagen. 
42 François Crouzet, ‘Aspects financiers de la relation franco-batave’, in: A. Jourdan and 
J. Leerssen ed., Remous révolutionnaires: République batave, armée française (Amsterdam 
1996) 56; Annie Jourdan, ‘La république batave et le 18 brumaire: la grande illusion’, 
Annales historiques de la Révolution française (1999) 763–764. https://doi.org/10.4000/
ahrf.301
43 Annie Jourdan, ‘Les Gaulois en Batavie: des relations diplomatiques machiavéliques’, in: 
A. Jourdan and J. Leerssen ed., Remous révolutionnaires: République batave, armée française 
(Amsterdam 1996) 102.
44 Aaslestad, Place and politics, 214.
45 Eric Lerdrup-Bourgois, ‘Napoléon et le Nord. Le Danemark-Norvège et la Suède’, in: 
T. Lentz ed., Napoléon et l’Europe (Paris 2005) 343–346.
46 Ole Feldbæk, ‘The foreign policy of Tsar Paul I, 1800–1801: An interpretation’, 
Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 30 (1982) 21–26.
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British military superiority and the decease of Tsar Paul on 23 March 1801 
made the league fall apart.
In their conflict with the British, between 29 March and 5 April 1801 
Danish troops occupied Hamburg, Lübeck, and Travemünde and confis-
cated some British goods in the warehouses. However, after some weeks 
Prussia demanded the Danish withdraw, while the Prussians themselves 
intensified their presence in Northern Germany.47 Although brief, the 
Danish intervention ignited the public debate on the sustainability of neu-
trality. Several internal tensions came to the surface, which were linked to 
the question of whether or not to openly choose a side in the 
European wars.48
In the Netherlands, unease grew with the hostile tone of Napoleon. 
When the Batavians repeatedly proved unable to meet his demands, the 
First Consul decided to intervene. An orchestrated coup in September 
1801 met with little resistance. Both French and Dutch hoped in particu-
lar that a new constitution would be sustainable and thereby guarantee 
peace. Napoleon rejected the idea of simply copying the French 
Constitution; to stress the autonomy of the Batavian Republic, the consti-
tutional change had to be presented as genuinely Dutch, and aimed at 
political reconciliation. As in France, legislative power transitioned from 
the members of the Legislative Body to the executive, the collegial 
Staatsbewind—or ‘Regency of State’, consisting of 12 directors. This col-
legial government was in line with administrative tradition. The state was 
renamed ‘Batavian Commonwealth’, to give it a somewhat less revolu-
tionary ring. Early modern symbols and institutions reappeared; for 
instance, the pre-revolutionary borders of the provinces were restored. 
Old elites also re-emerged. When former Stadholder William V gave up 
his claims to the Netherlands for a financial or territorial compensation, 
the way was paved for appeasement between moderate revolutionary and 
Orangists. Despite appearances, ‘1801’ was not a radical break from the 
revolution. Although democratic institutions were largely abandoned, the 
Enlightenment ideals of freedom and equality were still praised by Dutch 
politicians. Moreover, the central government succeeded in firming its 
grip on local and provincial administrations.49
47 Ole Feldbæk, The battle of Copenhagen 1801: Nelson and the Danes (Barnsley 2002) 230.
48 Aaslestad, Place and politics, 220–221.
49 L. de Gou ed., De Staatsregeling van 1801: bronnen voor de totstandkoming (’s-Graven-
hage 1995) XX–XXVI.; Matthijs Lok and Martijn van der Burg, ‘The Dutch case: The 
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The idea of introducing a single head of state, in contradiction to Dutch 
tradition, was seen as unwanted. French ambassador Charles-Louis 
Huguet de Sémonville noticed the Batavians’ aversion to a strong execu-
tive power. Governance in the Netherlands was not to be too ‘French’, 
Talleyrand and the First Consul stressed.50 Napoleon certainly remained 
keen to entice the Batavians to cooperate, as oppose to the use of force. 
He welcomed the new Batavian Ambassador Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck 
with great pomp and circumstance, as did the Cambacérès and Lebrun; 
the latter would a few years later become a key player in the integration of 
the Netherlands into the Napoleonic Empire.51
the reorganization of germany north of the rhine
Concerning the German lands, Bonaparte’s approach was unconventional, 
certainly compared to the more prudent Talleyrand. Disregarding tradi-
tions, he developed many geopolitical redesigns in rapid succession fol-
lowing his victories on German soil. Of great importance was the 
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss, passed by the Imperial Diet of the Holy 
Roman Empire (Reichstag) on 25 February 1803, which was ratified a 
month later by Francis II, the last Holy Roman Emperor. This decision of 
the Diet, made under pressure from France and Russia, was a direct con-
sequence of the French annexing of the Rhineland. Prussia and Austria 
had accepted the loss of these German lands but insisted that the princes 
who had been deprived of their lands would be compensated elsewhere in 
the Holy Roman Empire via the secularization of ecclesial possessions. 
During his Consulship, Napoleon actively intervened in the rearrange-
ment of Germany prior to the Imperial Recess. Instead of merely secular-
izing German land, all ecclesiastical principalities were disbanded and 
Germany was ‘mediatized’. Mediatization meant that almost all German 
states lost their ‘imperial immediacy’ (Reichsunmittelbarkeit). Prior to 
1803, many free imperial cities and states had been placed under the 
immediate authority of the Holy Roman Emperor, without interference of 
Kingdom of Holland and the imperial departments’, in: M. Broers, P. Hicks and A. Guimerá 
ed., The Napoleonic empire and the new European political culture (Basingstoke 2012) 
100–111. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137271396_10
50 Jourdan, ‘Les Gaulois en Batavie: des relations diplomatiques machiavéliques’, 107; 
L. de Gou ed., De Staatsregeling van 1801, XX–XXIII.
51 Edwina Hagen, President van Nederland: Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, 1761–1825 
(Amsterdam 2012) 171, 182.
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local princes. Given the political weakness of the Emperor, these states 
were virtually autonomous. The Reichsdeputationshauptschluss ended this 
traditional, feudal, mode of imperial governance, which for decades had 
been a thorn in the eyes of enlightened critics. Another goal was to draw 
borders more logically and create less dispersed states. For the time being, 
only the Hanseatic towns of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck remained 
independent city-states, in addition to Augsburg, Frankfurt am Main and 
Nuremberg.52
Without a doubt, Prussia benefited from the restructuring. It received 
the northern parts of the former Duchy of Kleve (the parts on the left 
bank of the Rhine had been incorporated into France). In Northwest 
Germany the largest ecclesiastical state was the Prince-Bishopric of 
Münster. The Reichsdeputationshauptschluss secularized the region and 
divided it between the Duchy of Oldenburg (ruled by an uncle of the 
Tsar) and Prussia. Hanover was occupied by French forces. Two signifi-
cant new principalities were established in the Northwest: the Duchy of 
Arenberg-Meppen was created, to compensate the Dukes of Arenberg 
who lost all Rhenish possessions to the French, which was also the case 
with the principality of Salm, ruled by the House of the same name. The 
Prince-Bishopric of Osnabrück was awarded to Hanover. Therefore, the 
British king also benefited, even though he had not lost any possessions on 
the left bank of the Rhine whatsoever. More to the South-east, Prince 
William Frederick of Orange, the son of the former Stadholder, received 
the former ecclesiastical principality of Fulda and some (even smaller) pos-
sessions, as a territorial compensation for the losses of the House of 
Orange due to the Batavian Revolution and the enlargement of France. 
Much to the disappointment of William Frederick, who had become an 
admirer of Bonaparte, his family would not receive financial compensa-
tion, nor was he awarded a more substantial principality.53
At first, mediatization did not seem all that harmful to the Hanseatic 
cities since their constitutional status remained virtually unchanged. 
However, they failed to get their neutral status recognized internationally. 
In May 1803, war broke out again between Great Britain and France. 
Hanover was occupied by French forces in June 1803, a clear violation of 
the North German demarcation line. Commander Jean-Baptiste 
52 Michel Kerautret, ‘Les Allemagnes napoléoniennes’, in: T.  Lentz ed., Napoléon et 
l’Europe (Paris 2005) 325–328.
53 Jeroen Koch, Koning Willem I, 1772–1843 (Amsterdam 2013) 125–135.
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Bernadotte, future king of Sweden, was appointed Governor of Hanover. 
Prussia would briefly gain Hanover as a reward for not siding with the 
Russians and Austrians during renewed hostilities.54 The French violated 
the neutrality of the Hanseatic cities, by seizing the district of Ritzebüttel, 
upon which Britain blockaded the Elbe, Weser, and Eider. This proved 
disastrous for the economy. Nevertheless, collectively the Hanseatic city- 
states continued to display their neutrality and peacefulness, hoping to 
stay out of harm’s way.55
blueprintS for napoleonic governance in europe
French revolutionary expansionism was an expression of interconnected 
ideas on nation, universal rights and the state, but revolutionary warfare in 
Europe also blurred the lines between ‘liberation’ and ‘conquest’. The 
enlargement of France showed the difficulties of imposing rules and prac-
tices on hitherto foreign populations. The extent to which France had to 
impose itself was not determined. In the long term, Revolutionary France’s 
expansion showed multiple ways in which pays conquis could be incorpo-
rated and integrated. Which policies were effective and which were coun-
terproductive depended on local circumstances, but also on its 
implementation by various French actors. Thus, in an improvised manner, 
various types of governance blueprints were gradually conceived.
Europe was no tabula rasa. Well before Napoleonic interference, Dutch 
and Germans pondered how to improve state and society. Lack of consen-
sus, or lack of means, had long obstructed durable changes. However, 
both for the Netherlands and for the Hanseatic city-states can be said that 
many foundations for later reforms were laid before the French inter-
vened. The actions of Dutch Patriots, the open public sphere and discus-
sion culture in Hamburg, and the willingness of local governments to 
learn, made that (urban) governance was certainly not ‘archaic’. Differences 
were that the disputes in the Netherlands were more explicitly political in 
nature and more closely related to French developments. And, evidently, 
the question of centralization was much less prominent in Northwest 
Germany.
54 Wright, Napoleon and Europe, 48.
55 Aaslestad, Place and politics, 222–224.
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Meanwhile in France, Napoleon Bonaparte won people over to his 
cause and managed to secure the instruments for increased state-building. 
During the Consulate, he had assured Austrians and Prussians France 
would not to intervene in German affairs, in return for recognition of 
French rule on the left bank of the Rhine. And as long as neutral Prussia 
kept behind its side of the North German demarcation line, Napoleon 
allowed Prussian territorial expansion in the East. Also, Napoleon’s inter-
ventions in the Netherlands initially took place mainly in the background. 
For the time being, the First Consul seemed satisfied with indirectly influ-
encing other states by increasing the French sphere of influence. The his-
toric Reichsdeputationshauptschluss, and successive coup d’états in the 
Batavian Republic, restructured governance North of the Rhine suffi-
ciently, to his taste. Actual incorporation of Northern and Central Europe 
was not yet in France’s interest. But progressively, supposedly natural bor-
ders in Europe became less relevant, which made the status of the 
Netherlands and Northwest Germany far from certain. Concurrently, the 
military was assigned a more pronounced role in the territorial ambitions 
of Napoleonic France.
In Belgium and the Rhineland, the French learned that foreign sup-
porters were not ready to immediately accept all their beliefs. Given the 
drastic French measures, initially not too many locals were willing to col-
laborate. It had also become clear that hesitations could lead to delays. 
Winning the trust of the political elite was a pre-requisite, but also the 
general population could pose a threat, as became apparent when in both 
areas popular uprisings took place. In the first decade of the nineteenth- 
century, new institutions would rather successfully be introduced, and a 
new generation would grow accustomed to them. On their turn, ‘Belgian’ 
and ‘Rhenish’ Frenchmen would later be sent to the Netherlands and 
Northwest Germany to promote integration. But first, the North had to 
be conquered and incorporated. The manner in which Dutch and 
Northwest German autonomy was lost, and its consequences for the sub-
sequent implementation of Napoleonic governance, will be explored in 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
Conquest and Incorporation: Pays Conquis 
or Pays Réunies?
Abstract This chapter investigates how the (nominally) independent 
states in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany were slowly but surely 
seized by French troops, and subsequently incorporated by imperial 
decree. The conquest and incorporation of the northern lands brought 
about radical political changes, as well as dilemmas. How were new terri-
tories to be fitted in: as dependencies taken by force (pays conquis), or as 
new departments on equal footing (pays réunies)? And to which extent did 
‘on equal footing’ mean eradicating regional diversity within the Empire? 
Whether uniform structures were imposed too promptly, or not, was con-
tested. The Emperor sent confidants northbound, to investigate existing 
conditions. Vice versa, Northerners visited Paris, to exert influence on the 
status of their projected departments. For Dutch and German dignitaries 
it was of the utmost importance to acknowledge Napoleon’s droit de con-
quête, while lobbying for an integration form that did justice to local cir-
cumstances. Eventually, both areas were given a full status within the 
Empire, taking into account national peculiarities to a certain extent, but 
only as long as that did not harm the interests of Old France.
Keywords Right of war • Conquest • Incorporation • Imperialism
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Between CoerCion and Cooperation
Although Napoleon, during his final years exiled on Saint Helena, 
stressed the civic gains of his rule, such as his legal heritage, most 
Europeans vividly remembered the intrusion of military aspects in day-
to-day life as a defining feature of the Napoleonic state. Enlargement of 
Empire was not seldom preceded by warfare, with disastrous effects for 
the local populations. However, the transition to ‘modern’ governance 
in Europe (equating ‘modernization’ with ‘Francization’) would have 
been more difficult without preparatory work by the military. 
Significantly, military officials increasingly received governing tasks, 
which blurred the lines between civil and military aspects of Napoleonic 
governance.1 The conquest and incorporation of present-day Belgium 
and the German Rhineland had shown the French how foreign territo-
ries could be integrated into their state. Whereas the French Directory 
was led by the belief that Greater France had clear natural limits (in the 
north, the river Rhine), during the Consulate, after a brief period of 
consolidation, the French again looked beyond their borders. As 
Napoleon’s might grew, so did his desire for interventions in Dutch and 
Northwest German matters.
Transitions from one government to another, driven notably by inter-
national political considerations, coupled with the growing prominence of 
the Napoleonic system of governance. Its gradual introduction conflicted 
with local conditions. Age-old governing practices and the legitimacy of 
administrative traditions were challenged by the French. The establish-
ment of the Empire in 1804 intensified this process, eventually leading to 
the construction of the Kingdom of Holland and the dissolution of the 
Holy Roman Empire. A general wish for a stable, albeit less ‘democratic’, 
organization of state and society facilitated (coerced) acceptance of the 
Napoleonic system of governance. Cooperation appeared to be the most 
productive way of satisfying different actors’ needs under the given cir-
cumstances. For pragmatic reasons, attempts were made to render the 
French model applicable to Europe, which did not mean that extant ways 
of governing were easily put aside. This chapter shows how the Netherlands 
1 Alan Forrest, ‘La guerre, les perceptions et la construction de l’Europe’, in: F. Antoine 
et al. ed., L’Empire napoléonien. Une expérience européenne? (Paris 2014) 84–96.
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and Northwest Germany lost the remainders of their independence, focus-
ing on ideas about the status that the new areas should be given within 
the Empire.
emperors and Kings
On 18 May 1804 the French Empire was proclaimed via sénatus-consulte. 
Bonaparte, thanks to his charisma and successful propaganda, was seen by 
many as a guarantee of law and order. Two years earlier he had been pro-
claimed Consul for life. Significantly, Article 55 of the 1802 Constitution 
had already stipulated that Napoleon, when circumstances required, could 
place departments ‘outside’ the Constitution, which could be used to 
treat incorporated departments in a different manner. Proposals and sup-
port of the legislative chambers gave an air of legality to the gradual transi-
tion from republic to Empire. During the enlargement of Revolutionary 
France, the term ‘empire’ had come into use to designate French hege-
mony. Also, General Bonaparte became presented as imperator, a title 
awarded by the Romans to victorious generals. With Napoleon’s installa-
tion as Emperor, a new political constellation was created which combined 
revolutionary achievements with concepts from the ancien régime.2
The new imperial constitution did not bring much change to the exec-
utive, apart from a (theoretical) strengthening of the control of the 
Senate.3 However, one truly new feature of the new constitution would 
later affect the way in which Napoleon shaped his Empire, namely the 
introduction of the grandes dignités de l’Empire, the Grand Dignitaries, 
many of whom would later play a role in the enlargement of the Empire. 
Theses honorific titles where bestowed on important men in the close 
circle of Napoleon, such as his brothers (in-law). They received some (rep-
resentative) tasks, notably archichancelier Jean-Jacques-Régis de 
Cambacérès, who replaced Napoleon in official meetings was in the 
absence of the Emperor.4 Former Third Consul Charles-François Lebrun 
was appointed architrésorier.
2 Annie Jourdan, ‘Le Premier Empire: un nouveau pacte social’, Cités (2004) 51–64. 
https://doi.org/10.3917/cite.020.0051
3 Aurélien Lignereux, L’Empire des Français: 1799–1815 (Paris 2012) 86.
4 Nicole Gotteri, Grands Dignitaires, Ministres et Grands Officiers du Premier Empire. 
Autographes et notices biographiques (Paris 1990) 10.
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In 1805 the French government asked the Batavian ambassador in 
Paris, Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, to draft a new constitution and 
become Raadpensionaris (Grand Pensionary) of the Batavian 
Commonwealth. ‘President’ Schimmelpenninck’s reign left little room for 
popular sovereignty, but it was a guarantee for the Batavian autonomy, 
which was still the most important consideration. Moreover, Napoleon 
did not support a direct copy of the French constitution either in 1801 or 
in 1805. He was convinced, on the one hand, that the Dutch national 
identity was too different from the French, and on the other hand, that he 
had an interest in letting the European powers continue to regard the 
Batavian Republic as an independent state.5 Schimmelpenninck appointed 
both moderate and radical revolutionaries to prominent positions, among 
them Alexander Gogel as Minister of Finances. One of his achievements 
was the introduction of new fiscal legislation, drawn up by Gogel, which 
entailed economic reforms in the spirit of the revolution. A notable suc-
cess was the creation of a new system of primary education, based upon 
progressive pedagogical ideas. Both reforms would be long-lasting.6
Soon after, being dissatisfied with Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, 
Napoleon decided the Batavians had to ‘invite’ his brother Louis to 
become king. The foundation of the Kingdom of Holland was fraught 
with difficulties: a centuries-old republic, with a strong tradition of decen-
tralized institutions, had to be transformed into a hereditary monarchy. 
During the negotiations in Paris between the Batavians diplomats and 
Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, the Dutch had already argued that mon-
archy was incompatible with Dutch national identity. Louis Bonaparte was 
certainly no enthusiast of republicanism, and convinced that monarchy 
was a superior form of government. Louis stressed that the Dutch had to 
be persuaded to accept monarchism. He believed his government could 
unify the Dutch nation.7 Given the poor circumstances, Louis Bonaparte’s 
5 Martijn van der Burg, Nederland onder Franse invloed. Culturele overdracht en staats-
vorming in de napoleontische tijd, 1799–1813 (Amsterdam 2009). Cf. https://hdl.handle.
net/11245/1.272472
6 Matthijs Lok and Martijn van der Burg, ‘The Dutch case: The Kingdom of Holland and 
the imperial departments’, in: M.  Broers, P.  Hicks and A.  Guimerá ed., The Napoleonic 
Empire and the new European political culture (Basingstoke 2012) 100–111. https://doi.
org/10.1057/9781137271396_10
7 Martijn van der Burg, ‘Transforming the Dutch Republic into the Kingdom of Holland: 
The Netherlands between republicanism and monarchy (1795–1815)’, European Review of 
History 17 (2010) 164–165. https://doi.org/10.1080/13507481003660811
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reign was rather effective. By authoritarian means, he implemented and 
consolidated many reforms which dated from the revolutionary era, such 
as national cultural institutions. Also, he initiated new reforms, such as the 
codification of civil law, and introduced French institutions, and unifor-
mity in subnational administration. Often, French examples and Dutch 
tradition were aligned.8 Against all odds, Louis’ monarchy functioned, 
albeit not in the way the Emperor wished.
Simultaneously, Napoleon was initiating considerable transformations 
in Germany. In theory, most German lands still formed part of the Holy 
Roman Empire, but in actual fact, the age-old Empire was a hollow shell. 
Anticipating the dissolution of Germany, the Habsburg Emperor Francis 
II had created the Austrian Empire out of his Central European lands in 
1804. Napoleon had further rendered the Holy Roman Empire irrelevant 
by creating the Confederation of the Rhine, consisting of 16 sovereign 
German states, of which he became the ‘Protector’. Within two years, the 
Confederation doubled in member states.9 Emperor Francis II abdicated 
on 6 August 1806, which signified the dissolution of the Holy 
Roman Empire.
Between 1795 and 1805 Prussia had remained a neutral power. In 
return, Napoleon supported Prussian territorial growth in the East. 
However, internal power struggles, and growing problems with other 
states, led to escalation. Moreover, it became clear during peace- 
negotiations that Napoleon was willing to return Hannover to the British 
crown, even though Prussia had annexed Hannover. On 26 September 
1806, Frederick William III presented Napoleon with an ultimatum: 
French troops should leave German lands north of the Rhine immediately. 
But within three weeks, on 14 October, the inferior Prussian armies were 
defeated at Jena and Auerstedt (by Marshal Davout, the later Governor in 
Hamburg). People in Northwest Germany realized that now France could 
do as it pleased. The following year, Prussia was forced to sign the 
8 Martijn van der Burg, ‘Cultural and legal transfer in Napoleonic Europe: Codification of 
Dutch civil law as a cross-national process’, Comparative Legal History 3 (2015) 85–109. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/2049677X.2015.1041727
9 Michel Kerautret, ‘Les Allemagnes napoléoniennes’, in: T. Lentz ed., Napoléon et l’Europe 
(Paris  2005) 330–331.; Bernhard Struck and Claire Gantet, Revolution, Krieg und 
Verflechtung, 1789–1815 (Darmstadt 2008) 103.
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humiliating Peace of Tilsit; all territories in Northwest Germany came into 
French hands.10
On 21 November 1806, exactly one year after the destruction of the 
French-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar, which had made Great Britain the domi-
nant naval power, Napoleon implemented the Blocus continental 
(Continental System). The Continental System is essential for a proper 
understanding of Napoleon’s European politics. In essence, this trade 
embargo against Britain was a form of commercial warfare. Napoleon 
legitimized the Blocus by his interpretation of the droit de guerre, or droit 
de conquête.11 Although Napoleon often considered himself to be above 
the law, or at least was able to interpret legislation as he pleased,12 he did 
give weight to law during wartime, the jus in bello, and incriminated the 
British. His dominance on land was legitimized by (his conception of) the 
law of war. French troops respected the jus in bello, he claimed. In con-
trast, Great Britain was supreme on sea and therefore, in his view, did not 
adhere to the law of nations, as maritime dominance violated the freedom 
of the seas.13
Thus, Napoleon gave a new meaning to commercial warfare. Gradually, 
the Continental System was forced upon many peoples that did not belong 
to the Empire or states ruled by the Bonaparte family. Secondly, the 
Continental System had a distinctly offensive character. Eventually, all 
ships having stopped over in British ports, as well as their cargo, were con-
fiscated, regardless of their nationality, as the Emperor considered them to 
be ‘denationalized’.14 Apart from that, the Continental System can also be 
seen as an attempt to create a common European market of which the 
Empire could benefit. By boycotting British imports, Napoleon believed 
France could become the main economic center in Europe. But he prob-
ably overestimated the fragility of the British economy.15
10 Jeroen Koch, Koning Willem I, 1772–1843 (Amsterdam 2013) 165–168; Struck and 
Gantet, Revolution, Krieg und Verflechtung, 103–104.
11 Silvia Marzagalli, ‘Le Blocus continental pouvait-il réussir?’, in: T. Lentz ed., Napoléon 
et l’Europe (Paris 2005) 103–105.
12 Donald R. Kelley, ‘What pleases the prince: Justinian, Napoleon and the lawyers’, History 
of Political Thought 23 (2002) 288–302.
13 Bruno Colson, Napoleon on war (Oxford 2015) 28, 38.
14 Silvia Marzagalli, ‘Napoléon, l’Europe et le blocus continental. Application et réactions 
à partir de l’étude de trois villes portuaires: Bordeaux, Hambourg et Livourne’, in: 
J.-C. Martin ed., Napoléon et l’Europe. Colloque de la Roche-sur-Yon (Rennes 2002) 71–90.
15 Martijn van der Burg, ‘Napoleonic wars’, in: K. Hendrickson ed., The encyclopedia of the 
industrial revolution in world history 3 (New York 2015) 657–659.
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With the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, the question arose of 
what to do with the former free imperial cities. Legally, they had become 
sovereign states, but the new French Empire was to take over the consti-
tutional void.16 Hoping to preserve their independence, the Hanseatic 
towns joined forces and formed the Hanseatic federation. However, soon 
after, French troops took control of Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg.17 In 
the South of Germany, the free imperial cities were awarded to Napoleon’s 
allies: Augsburg and Nuremberg to the new Kingdom of Bavaria; Frankfurt 
am Main to the Principality of Aschaffenburg. Bremen, Hamburg, and 
Lübeck however, received the status of pays réservé, a territory of which 
the future status was still undecided. Merging the towns and their sur-
roundings into a single North German member state of the German 
Confederation was highly probable.18
Concurrently, Napoleon decreed a territorial restructuring of newly 
conquered Prussian lands between Rhine and Elbe. In the interim, the 
territories were reshuffled into five temporary administrative units, headed 
by a gouverneur or gouverneur général—as Napoleon tended to designate 
the Governors. Like the Hanseatic cities, the lands became pays réservés. 
The Governors, all generals, administrated from the towns of Braunschweig, 
Erfurt, Minden, Münster, and Fulda (taken from Dutch Prince William 
Frederick who had sided with his Prussian family members). Each was 
aided by an intendant who oversaw financial matters. Next to the pays 
réservés established on 23 October 1806, there were many more, some 
very short-lived, pays réservés in this period.19 Subsequently, as part of the 
creation of a new European state system, the Grand Duchy of Berg and 
the Kingdom of Westphalia were established. Both were mergers of the 
above-mentioned former bishoprics, Prussian territories or other minor 
(ecclesiastical) states.
16 Barbara Dölemeyer, ‘Frans recht in Noord-Duitsland. De inlijving van de noordwesteli-
jke gebieden van Duitsland bij het Franse keizerrijk’, in: A.  Berkvens, J.  Hallebeek and 
A.  Sirks ed., Het Franse Nederland: de inlijving 1810–1813. De juridische en bestuurlijke 
gevolgen van de ‘Réunion’ met Frankrijk (Hilversum 2012) 35, 41.
17 Katherine Aaslestad, ‘Lost neutrality and economic warfare. Napoleonic warfare in 
Northern Europe, 1795–1815’, in: R. Chickering and S. Förster ed., War in an age of revolu-
tion, 1775–1815 (Cambridge 2010) 379–380.
18 Swantje Naumann and Helmut Stubbe da Luz, Die französischen Besatzer in Hamburg. 
Zeugnisse zu den Jahren 1811–1814 (Hamburg 2013) 31.
19 Annie Jourdan ed., Correspondance générale. Tome dixième. Un Grand Empire, mars 
1810–mars 1811 (Paris 2014) annexes.
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Not respecting historical borders, new administrative entities were cre-
ated, meanwhile abolishing traditional corporations and feudal privileges. 
So-called intendants were appointed and studied extant systems of gover-
nance. Like in France, newly created departments received names based 
on mountains or rivers.20 Certainly ‘model state’ Westphalia, ruled by 
Jérôme Bonaparte, had to serve as a positive example of Napoleonic gov-
ernance in Germany. Jérôme, however, was unable to meet the high 
expectations of Napoleon, who came to prefer the more efficient system of 
the Grand Duchy of Berg, which was ruled by Marshall Joachim Murat.21 
Both new Napoleonic states were influential concerning the implementa-
tion of Napoleonic governance after 1810 since they bordered, and partly 
overlapped, the later Northwest German departments.
Remarkably, the former Prussian province of Ostfriesland, together 
with Jever, Varel and the neutral mini-state Kniphausen, was left to Louis 
Bonaparte. In 1808, it was added to the Kingdom of Holland as the 
department of Oost-Friesland. Prior to incorporation, Count Willem 
Gustaaf Frederik Bentinck, former Lord of Kniphausen and Varel was so 
presumptuous as to send the king a draft decree to regulate the relations 
between his seigniories and the Kingdom of Holland. Bentinck opted for 
a kind of separate status, and spoke of Kniphausen’s and Varel’s popula-
tion as ‘his subjects’. Louis, however, made him clear that he, as sovereign, 
exercised full authority over Holland in its entirety.22 The Dutch govern-
ment looked down upon the population of the East-Frisian Peninsula, 
therefore the local German-speaking population disliked the efforts of 
King Louis’ collaborators to impose Dutch culture and institutions. For 
instance, Dutch officials considered the regional dialect as an inferior 
langue intermédiaire: ‘the tongue of the East Frisians and Jeverans is actu-
ally a deformed and low Dutch’, they claimed.23
20 Ute Planert, ‘Resistance to Napoleonic reform in the Grand Duchy of Berg, the 
Kingdom of Westphalia and the South German states’, in: M. Broers, P. Hicks and A. Guimerá 
ed., The Napoleonic empire and the new European political culture (Basingstoke 2012) 149; 
Nicola P. Todorov, ‘The Napoleonic administrative system in the Kingdom of Westphalia’, 
in: M. Broers, P. Hicks and A. Guimerá ed., The Napoleonic Empire and the new European 
political culture (Basingstoke 2012) 174–175.
21 Todorov, ‘The Napoleonic administrative system’, 183.
22 Archives nationales, Paris, AF IV 1813, pièce 6.
23 Archives nationales, AF IV 1816, pièce 13.
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Last stronghoLds of repuBLiCanism
As the Holy Roman Empire fell into disrepair, the urban elites of the three 
Hanseatic cities started nourishing a Hanseatic regionalism. In September 
1806, urban representatives convened in Lübeck and founded a Hanseatic 
Federation. Nonetheless, they insisted that their association should be 
seen as a revival of the centuries-old ties between the three cities, based on 
their common history and interests, rather than a new political entity. But 
this made no impression on the French. On 6 November 1806 Napoleonic 
forces surrounded Lübeck, stormed the city gates, and defeated the 
fatigued Prussian troops in the streets. French soldiers plundered the neu-
tral town, burn down houses, and harassed citizens. Subsequently, Bremen 
and Hamburg surrendered without a fight. Napoleon ordered the occupa-
tion of the three Hanseatic cities, as well the surrounding North Sea 
shores.24 Historian Katherine Aaslestad labels these events ‘a turning point 
that brought the French Wars into [the Hanseatic] cities, harbors, ware-
houses, shops, and homes’.25 For instance, Hamburger lawyer Karl Gries 
wrote his traveling brother Johann Diederich that ‘Lübeck’s devastation 
has been our rescue […] I tell you, our city is miraculously saved from the 
horrific fate of that unfortunate town […] Where will it go with Germany, 
now that the last dam in which we had placed our hope to halt the thirst 
for power, is breached’.26
On 18 December 1806, Marshal Guillaume Marie-Anne Brune was 
appointed gouverneur-générale of the Hanseatic towns. Urban govern-
ments tried to maintain the appearance of political independence. They 
reassured each other that they were still in control, and the French gover-
nor was merely a military governor. In practice, the urban authorities were 
largely subordinate to the French, and foreign troops were constantly 
present.27 French (legal) reforms were initiated, but existing urban 
24 Katherine Aaslestad, ‘Paying for war: Experiences of Napoleonic rule in the Hanseatic 
Cities’, Central European History 39 (2006) 648–649. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0008938906000215; Georges Servières, L’Allemagne française sous Napoléon Ier, d’après 
des documents inédits tirés des Archives Nationales et des Archives des Affaires Étrangères (Paris 
1904) 88–90.
25 Aaslestad, ‘Paying for war’, 645.
26 Karl Gries to Dietrich Gries, 16 November 1806. Heinrich Reincke, ‘Aus dem 
Briefwechsel von Karl und Diederich Gries, 1796–1819’, Zeitschrift des Vereins für 
Hamburgische Geschichte 25 (1924) 244.
27 Burghart Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter der Französischen Revolution und Napoleons 
(1789–1813) (Hamburg 1998) 328–330.
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institutions were basically left intact. Quartering French soldiers was, of 
course, unpleasant; but it could have been worse, according to Karl Gries 
(now a member of the French judiciary). Also in daily life, the changes 
were not that dramatic, Gries claimed—apart from less feasts and luxury 
due to the circumstances.28 Quickly, Napoleon needed his soldiers else-
where; remaining occupying forces were mostly ‘good-natured Dutchmen’. 
According to Gries, the self-imposed austere lifestyle made way for a little 
more enjoyment of life.29 Yet, most citizens had a harder time than Gries, 
being forced to feed occupying troops, and provide officers with monetary 
allowances. And the financial burden increased.30
In the years 1808–1809 Napoleon’s attention was directed toward 
other parts of Europe. The Fifth Coalition War was convincingly won. 
The subsequent Treaty of Schönbrunn, which was signed on 14 October 
1809, placed Europe almost entirely under Napoleonic rule, either directly 
or indirectly. However, it did not seem Napoleon’s intention to deprive 
the Hanseatic cities of their semi-autonomous status and turn them into 
departments.
Napoleon was growing frustrated with the military weakness of Louis’ 
army and continuing illegal trade with England. After the failed British 
invasion of the island of Walcheren in the summer of 1809 (the British 
suffered great losses, mostly due to bad hygienic conditions and spoiled 
drinking water), Napoleon summoned his brother to Paris. Walcheren was 
incorporated in December 1809. Dutch territories south of the Rhine fol-
lowed in March 1810. Louis Bonaparte hoped this sacrifice would guaran-
tee the independence of his reduced kingdom.31 Napoleon had also forced 
his brother to allow French custom officials in his kingdom, and the troops 
of Marshal Nicolas Oudinot slowly advanced toward Amsterdam. The dis-
mantlement of the Kingdom of Holland came as no surprise. Some 
Dutchmen assumed they would be better off as imperial subjects. Perhaps 
incorporation could lead to improvements, such as the creation of a 
28 Karl Gries to Diederich Gries, 18 February 1807. Reincke, ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel’, 
246–248.
29 Karl Gries to Diederich Gries, 1 August 1807. Ibid., 248.
30 Aaslestad, ‘Paying for war’, 652.
31 Archives nationales, AF IV 1729, dossier 2, pièces 134–135; Nationaal Archief, The 
Hague, Staatsraad 1805–1810, inv. no. 107c.
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uniform judicial system, financial benefits, a large free trade area, and a 
lower tax burden.32
the inCorporation of the netherLands 
and northwest germany
When Louis Bonaparte abdicated and fled on 2 July 1810, Oudinot took 
control of the capital and Napoleon formally incorporated the remainder 
of the Kingdom of Holland a week later. Napoleon ordered his confidant 
Charles-François Lebrun to Amsterdam. As ‘Lieutenant General’, Lebrun 
was to take over the duties of Louis and oversee the transition to French 
rule.33 Lebrun initially objected to his appointment. He considered him-
self to be too old and pointed out that his acts as Governor in Genoa 
(where he had been gouverneur-général in 1805) had not been completely 
satisfactory to all parties.34 Napoleon waved aside Lebrun’s objections. 
Within a few days, Lebrun arrived in Amsterdam. Fifty years earlier, as a 
student, Lebrun was shocked that the once-dynamic port city had lost 
much of its glory.35
Charles-François Lebrun had to ensure the government and military 
swore allegiance to the Emperor, and keep an eye on the budget of the 
former Kingdom. The Decree of Rambouillet (8/9 July 1810), the official 
incorporation act, had been short. Provisionally, the structure of the 
Kingdom of Holland was largely kept intact. Lebrun supervised the for-
mer Ministers, who had to remain at their post until 1811, just like their 
subordinates. Amsterdam officially became the third imperial capital, after 
Paris and Rome. It was determined that there would be just a few immedi-
ate changes.36 Firstly, the Dutch customs was united with the French cus-
toms. Secondly, as a retribution for illegal trade, all (smuggled) colonial 
goods found were taxed 50 percent.37 Thirdly, feared by many, interest 
payments on the public debt were cut by two thirds (the so-called 
32 Johanna W. A. Naber, Overheersching en vrijwording : geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens 
de inlijving bij Frankrijk, juli 1810–november 1813 (Haarlem 1913) 23–24.
33 Napoleon to Lebrun, 8 July 1810. Jourdan ed., Correspondance générale X, no. 23927.
34 Auguste De Caumont la Force, L’architrésorier Lebrun, gouverneur de la Hollande, 
1810–1813 (Paris 1907) 2.
35 A.  E. M.  Ribberink, ‘Lebrun en de homines novi’, Nederlands Archievenblad XC 
(1986) 133.
36 Bulletin des lois, 4e serie XIII (Paris 1811) 331; Archives nationales, F17, 1098, pièce 133.
37 Naber, Overheersching en vrijwording, 25–26.
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tiërcering). Citizens would receive only one third of the interest they 
deserved. This would further contribute to the economic malaise of the 
Dutch departments. Although no interest on public debts had been paid 
since 1808, moneylenders, often merchants, lost their trust in the govern-
ment, further stagnating the economy.38
In this transitional phase, Lebrun had to prepare the Dutch depart-
ments for integration, keep Napoleon informed and make sure all imperial 
orders were executed. He received many instructions from the Emperor, 
sometimes three to four letters per day. Given the Emperor’s ambitions, 
Lebrun had to evaluate which of Napoleon’s ideas could be implemented 
swiftly.39 Also, the new subjects had to be reassured. Lebrun comforted 
disillusioned Dutchmen that, now that the Republic’s days of glory were 
over, integration in the Empire was the best alternative.40
As for Northwest Germany, Napoleon was pondering of appointing his 
loyal Marshal Louis Nicolas Davout to oversee the incorporation. 
Previously, Davout had been Governor of the Duchy of Warsaw, created 
in 1807 from former Prussian lands. So, like Lebrun, Davout had obtained 
experience in the Empire’s peripheries. Almost all of 1810, Davout had 
been in Paris in the circles of the Emperor and his ministers. He, therefore, 
had witnessed the dealings with the King of Holland. French troops in 
Germany were still scattered along the North Sea coast after defending 
Holland. With a reorganized army Napoleon wanted to assert his power 
in all German territories and eventually in Russia. In this plan, a key role 
was assigned to Davout.41 Marshal Davout had to coordinate his reorgani-
zation with the customs authorities in Germany to work efficiently and 
supervise any corrupt customs officers.42 When reforms did not go smooth 
enough to the Emperor’s taste, Davout was reminded all French troops in 
38 J. L. van Zanden and Arthur van Riel, The structures of inheritance: The Dutch economy 
in the nineteenth century. The Princeton economic history of the Western world (Princeton 
2004) 72–73.
39 A.-C. Lebrun, ‘Notice biographique’, in: A.-C. Lebrun ed., Opinions, rapports, et choix 
d’écrits politiques de Charles-Franc̜ois Lebrun, duc de Plaisance (Paris 1829) 131.
40 Annie Jourdan, ‘La réunion de la Hollande à la France: histoire d’un processus’, in: 
F. Antoine et al. ed., L’Empire napoléonien. Une expérience européenne? (Paris 2014) 142.
41 Ch. De Mazade ed., Correspondance du maréchal Davout, prince d’Eckmühl. Ses com-
mandements, son ministère, 1801–1815. Tome troisième (Paris 1885) 174–175.
42 Napoleon to Davout, 28 September 1810. Jourdan ed., Correspondance générale X, 
no. 24702.
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Germany were under his command and he was, therefore, responsible for 
the progress.43
In Northwest Germany, it had become clear that the French were 
increasing their presence. As in the Netherlands, this was not perceived 
unequivocally. In Hamburg, some took the view that the Senate should 
have resigned a long time ago, as it no longer possessed any genuine 
authority; others welcomed that the councilors held on to their office, but 
concluded that in the end there was no other option but to submit to the 
French. Despite the ever-increasing rumors, the news of the incorporation 
came as a surprise. On 7 December, Davout was first referred to by 
Napoleon as ‘gouverneur général des villes hanséatiques’.44 The popula-
tion, however, was informed as late as 18 December 1810.45 Changes had 
been expected, but not an incorporation. Some were mildly positive about 
the change in political system, hoping an improvement in economic pros-
pects within the Empire, or, in the case of religious minorities, more 
equality. But overwhelming majority of citizens regretted the loss of tradi-
tional autonomy, especially the urban lower classes reacted increasingly 
annoyed to the entailing negative economic and social developments. The 
strengthening of the military presence in Northern Germany and the 
implementation of the October Decrees marked the beginning of a new 
phase in Napoleon’s enforcement of the Continental System. Severe 
clashes took place between French gendarmes, who tried to confiscate 
goods, and the lowest social classes.46
Also, the concerned German princes had to be notified their principali-
ties would soon be disbanded. This involved little clashes or personal dra-
mas. Two categories of states were involved: Napoleonic vassal monarchies 
(Berg and Westphalia) and principalities ruled by the German Houses of 
Oldenburg, Arenberg, and Salm. The affected princes were politely 
informed of the loss of their country or a portion thereof. Concerning the 
former category: Napoleon saw the appropriation of parts of the domains 
belong to his family members as more or less a formality. In August 1810, 
Napoleon had prepared the taking of the German North Sea Coast. Not 
seeing his brother Jérôme Bonaparte as an equal, he considered that he 
43 Napoleon to Davout, 4 October 1810. Ibid., 24780.
44 Napoleon to Davout, 7 December 1810. Ibid., 25447.
45 Karl Gries to Diederich Gries, 28 March 1811. Reincke, ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel’, 255.
46 Schmidt, Hamburg, 327, 422–423.
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‘could do as he pleased’ with the Kingdom of Westphalia.47 The Emperor 
ordered his troops to occupy the north of the kingdom and his brother to 
withdraw Westphalian troops.48 Jérôme was not pleased, but did not stop 
his brother. Bordering Westphalia, the Grand Duchy of Berg was formally 
ruled by Napoleon’s nephew Napoléon Louis Bonaparte (son of former 
Dutch king Louis), but in effect, it was administrated by Jacques Claude 
Beugnot. Ceding a part of the Grand Duchy to the Empire was also a 
formality. Plus, because the previous ruler Murat had introduced high 
taxes, the local population looked forward to integration into France, with 
its relatively better fiscal climate.49
Equally straightforward was the taking of the possessions of the Duke 
of Aremberg, and the Princes of Salm-Salm and Salm-Kyrburg, enclaves 
within Hanover. Duke Prosper Ludwig von Arenberg, a brother-in-law of 
Joséphine de Beauharnais, was closely associated with the Empire. At that 
time, he was serving as an officer in the Grande Armée in Spain, leaving 
the actual governing of his Duchy to a Governor. As early as 1808 he had 
indicated he was willing to negotiate over the future of the Dutch of 
Arenberg. For his territorial losses, Von Arenberg was financially compen-
sated and received the French title of Duke.50 Prince Konstantin zu Salm- 
Salm and Prince Friedrich IV zu Salm-Kyrburg jointly ruled the Principality 
of Salm. Like von Aremberg, they were willing to relinquish their sover-
eignty. They were eventually compensated financially and admitted as 
dukes to the French nobility.51
The incorporation of the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, however, was 
politically sensitive. To begin with, Grand Duke Peter Friedrich Wilhelm 
was an uncle of the Czar and the French emperor had to inform his Russian 
counterpart as well. Due to mental illness of the Grand Duke, his cousin 
Peter Friedrich Ludwig acted as head of state. He was not intent on leav-
ing his country. After Peter Friedrich Ludwig had declined the first offer 
from Napoleon (namely Erfurt), Napoleon decided that the area had to be 
occupied. After diplomatic negotiations, Von Keverberg (a promising 
47 Napoleon to Champagny, 4 August 1810. Jourdan ed., Correspondance générale X, 
no. 24220.
48 Napoleon to Clarke, 18 August 1810; Napoleon to Jérôme Bonaparte, 18 August 1810. 
Ibid., 24346; 24351.
49 Antoinette Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk in Deutschland: Das 
Oberemsdepartement (1810–1813)’, Osnabrücker Mitteilungen 80 (1973) 44.
50 Ibid., 43–44.
51 Servières, L’Allemagne française sous Napoléon, 222.
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subprefect from Westphalia) was put forward, who completed the delicate 
task of persuading the duke, without endangering the Franco-Russian 
relations. Formally, the Grand Duchy ceased to exist on 28 February 
1811; the ducal family had left for Russia the day before.52
napoLeon’s Droit De Conquête
Napoleon’s view on the newly acquired northern territories is telling, spe-
cifically, his discourse on pays conquis or pays réunies. In the technical lan-
guage of the time, distinctions were made between pays conquis and pays 
réunies, the latter comprising territories integrated into France.53 Pays 
réunies should genuinely form part of the Empire and be treated on an 
equal footing with Old France, such as the system of governance. Pays 
conquis, however, were not considered to be integral parts of the Empire.
In Amsterdam, Charles-François Lebrun had been charged with the 
duty of selecting prominent Dutchmen to be sent to Paris to prepare the 
réunion. In August 1810, a committee of 15 Dutch notables (the ‘Conseil 
pour les affaires de Hollande’) went to Paris to provide the French gov-
ernment there with useful information and proposals to efficiently inte-
grate the Netherlands. Another 15 deputies—from the army, the Council 
of State and the municipal council of Amsterdam—were added to this 
committee.54 It inventoried the differences between Dutch and French 
governance, first and foremost the administration, but also many other 
aspects such as the judicial system, finances, police, and armed forces. 
Also, a decision had to be made about which Dutchmen should become 
members of central state bodies.55 During the daytime, there were long 
talks with the Emperor and his ministers. Each evening there were infor-
mal dinners and meetings. The Dutch diplomats regarded their French 
colleagues as more reliable partners than former King Louis Bonaparte. 
Now they could do business directly with the imperial government and 
stress that, in their opinion, a drastic imposition of French rule was 
52 Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk’, 44–45.
53 Geoffrey Ellis, The Napoleonic empire (2nd ed.; Basingstoke 2003) 90.
54 Th. Jorissen, ‘De commissie van 22 juli 1810 te Parijs’, Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche 
Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde Nieuwe Reeks deel IX (1877) 67.
55 Lebrun, ‘Notice biographique’, 130.
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unwanted. Many of the committee members would later be appointed to 
high posts.56
Napoleon’s attitude toward the Dutch was ambiguous. Napoleon 
noted that there was a major difference between the incorporation of a 
small territory and incorporating an entire nation. When incorporation 
concerned a single new department, Napoleon stressed that he could 
make no exceptions. However, he had received positive reports from 
Lebrun and other informants. Holland was not a pays conquis in Napoleon’s 
eyes. He congratulated the Dutch on having many good institutions, 
which did not have to be replaced. Integration could be taken gradually, 
paying attention to local customs. He clarified that he did not intend to 
send a great deal of French officials.57 Nor did all aspects of governance 
become strictly French. For instance, the Dutch commission successfully 
lobbied for preservation of Dutch as an administrative language.58 But 
Dutch should not be the dominant language, Lebrun emphasized: ‘the 
réunion will be imperfect when the published public acts continue to be 
written in a language different from ours’.59
However, the Emperor also looked down on Dutch administrators and 
politicians. On occasions, Napoleon was even aggressive. During an audi-
ence, the Emperor praised Dutch national identity but had contempt for 
many members of the elite. He frequently made committee members 
understand good and proper that he had every right to do as he pleased 
with his new subjects. In that sense, the Dutch had to be just as obedient 
as other conquered lands. Napoleon argued that since 1787, when 
Prussian armies had expelled the Patriots, Dutch independence was fic-
tion: ‘I hold you by right of conquest, and this is indeed the most sacred 
right; do not speak to me of independence; since the Prussians invaded 
your territory, your independence has been lost’.60 This right of conquest 
characterized Napoleonic diplomatic philosophy. Talleyrand legitimized 
the droit de conquête of the Emperor. In previous centuries, Talleyrand 
reasoned, the keeping of a balance of power in Europe was increasingly 
56 Marie Elisabeth Kluit, Cornelis Felix van Maanen. Tot het herstel der onafhankelijkheid, 9 
september 1769–6 december 1813 (Groningen 1953) 293–327.
57 Jorissen, ‘De commissie van 22 juli 1810 te Parijs’, 74–75.
58 D. van der Horst, ‘Cornelis Felix van Maanen, dienaar van vele heren’, Holland Historisch 
Tijdschrift 32 (2013) 8.
59 Archives nationales, F17 1092, dossier 1, pièces 29–30.
60 Jorissen, ‘De commissie van 22 juli 1810 te Parijs’, 76–77.
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kept not by negotiations and international treaties, but by warfare. The 
stability of Europe depended on it.61
Concerning the right of conquest, it is relevant to compare Napoleon’s 
attitude toward the Netherlands with his attitude toward Northwest 
Germany. Strikingly, in general, the French were less outspoken when it 
came to the German-speaking lands in the Northwest. Early October, 
Emperor Napoleon still referred to the region as provinces réservées over 
which Marshall Davout was charged with enforcing law and order.62 It 
seems the French authorities in Germany were more occupied with reor-
ganizing the German armies and other pressing military matters.
On 10 December 1810 Napoleon sent the Senate a message on the 
incorporation of the Netherlands and Northwest Germany. Foremost, it 
was presented as a defensive action against the politics of the British gov-
ernment. This region could also be useful to dig a canal to the Baltic sea, 
thus circumventing the British maritime presence.63 Minister of External 
Affairs, Jean-Baptiste de Nompère de Champagny (a hardliner concerning 
imperial expansion) also presented a picture that was opposite to that 
many Europeans had. According to him, the ‘conciliatory’ Napoleon 
Bonaparte had always given in on his conquests for the sake of peace 
between the major forces. Champagny underlined that earlier expansions 
of France, such as  the annexing of Belgium and the secularizations in 
Germany, had strengthened the power of Prussia and Austria, and in fact, 
it was France who had acted modestly in preceding years. He saw con-
quest as a reaction to foreign aggression. Incorporation of Northwest 
Germany was necessitated by circumstances. With that Champagny 
pointed at possible economic benefits of canalization, also to avoid the 
British fleet on the North Sea and thus re-establishing the ‘freedom of the 
seas’ which had been threatened by the British.64 
Three days later, spoke Senator Charles-Louis Huguet de Sémonville, 
former French ambassador in the Batavian Republic. As rapporteur par-
lementaire, he had reported on the legislation concerning the 
61 Emmanuel de Waresquiel, ‘Talleyrand, une vision européenne’, in: T.  Lentz ed., 
Napoléon et l’Europe (Paris 2005) 134–135.
62 Napoleon to Clarke, 4 October 1810. Jourdan ed., Correspondance générale X, 
no. 24764.
63 Napoleon to the Senate, 10 December 1810. J. Mavidal and E. Laurent ed., Archives 
parlementaires de 1787 à 1860. Recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des chambres 
françaises XI (Paris 1867) 3.
64 Champagny to Napoleon, 10 December 1810. Ibid., 3–5.
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incorporation of allied states into the Empire. In his eyes the northern 
regions had to choose between rival powers France and Great Britain. The 
North had been a ‘shallop’ between the grand warships of the French and 
British but now had sided with the Empire. The Batavians, who had suf-
fered so much, were reunited with their Belgian brothers. But De 
Sémonville had no elegant analogy for the German situation. Incorporating 
Northwest Germany was presented as a geopolitical fait accompli.65
Like the Dutch, the new Northwest-German subjects sent a joint delega-
tion to France, though not prior to the official incorporation, but afterward.66 
Davout advised the deputies to return home quickly, since their stay in France 
might still give rise to unjustified hopes. Spokesman, and former Syndicus, 
Hermann Doormann on 17 March 1811 paid tribute to Napoleon. When 
Doormann spoke of the Hanseatic cities as traditional competitors of England 
and friends of France, this was more his personal view than the general opin-
ion. Nevertheless, Doormann defended the interests of the Hanseatic cities, 
recalled their merits, and, between the lines, pleaded to preserve the positive 
achievements of the past.67 In his speech, Doormann pointed at the illustri-
ous history of the Hanseatic cities, as a civilizing force in Northern Europe. 
There were historical connections with France, dating back to Charlemagne. 
Doormann underlined that the Germans were willing to subject to the will of 
the Emperor, without seeing themselves as a territoire vulgaire, or acquisa-
tion obscure. They have good morals, a rich history and are industrious—all 
in ‘a fortunate mix of aristocracy without morgue, and democracy without 
storms. The main weakness of the Hanseatic cities was the deplorable state of 
commerce, therefore Doormann expressed the hope to start trading with the 
southern parts of the Empire, implicitly arguing against internal trade barri-
ers. He carefully presented this as a compensation.68
Emperor Napoleon replied that with the dissolution of the Holy Roman 
Empire, the status of the imperial cities had become unclear. Initially, he 
had wanted to unify then within a separate state, but without navy, it would 
be a defenseless independent state. Incorporation had to be seen within the 
context of European warfare, not as a long-wished imperial ambition. The 
Decrees of Berlin and Milan (an elaboration of the Decree of Berlin) 
65 Sémonville to Napoleon, 13 December 1810. Ibid., 20–21.
66 Napoleon to Davout, 12 March 1811. Jourdan ed., Correspondance générale X, no. 26202.
67 Schmidt, Hamburg, 460–461.
68 Doormann to Napoleon, 17 March 1811. Lewis Goldsmith, Recueil de décrets, ordon-
nances, traités de paix, manifestes, proclamations, discours, &c. […] 4 (London 1813) 
591–593.
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together formed the loi fondamentale of the Empire, the droit public de 
mon empire, Napoleon stressed. He opposed states that had the courage to 
defy these imperial fundaments. Although Napoleon’s words were reason-
ably friendly, he indirectly associated the Hanseatic cities with such states. 
He was willing to stimulate trade, so he said, but first, the maritime war 
had to end. The Germans had to wait the ‘general peace’, a common pre-
text of Napoleon when allied or incorporated nations make certain pleas. 
The Hanseatic cities were urged to actively cooperate with pacifying the 
seas by helping to enlarge the naval power of the Empire.69 So, in the short 
term, the Germans were not promised free trade.
Surely, public speeches such as the above, which were printed in the 
newspapers, had public relations purposes. Napoleon, a calculating prag-
matist, was not a man for manifestos. He favored the ‘système du 
moment’.70 Nevertheless, above arguments come close to a declaration of 
intentions with Northern Europe. Illustratively, Napoleon instructed 
Davout to send the Duke Friedrich Franz of Mecklenburg (the last princi-
pality that had joined the Confederation of the Rhine) a copy of his dis-
course, to make clear, that the Duke clear had to submit to the ‘system of 
France’.71 The Hanseatic representatives remained in Paris some time, 
attending formal ceremonies, but Davout quickly ordered them back. He 
feared that the activities of the improvised delegation, might have a bad 
influence on public moral.72 Indeed, the delegates do not seem to have 
been popular. For instance, Karl Gries considered suspected that Hermann 
Doormann headed the delegation perhaps more due to his knowledge of 
the French language, than his diplomatic capabilities.73
Napoleon’s words to members of both committees were amicable and 
severe. To grasp the relatively positive nature of his words, it is significant 
to compare them to Napoleon’s response to the delegation of the new 
Lippe departement, that largely consisted of the former Prince-Bishopric 
of Münster. This area, due to protests of the local elite, had been separated 
from the Dutch departments by Lebrun. The Emperor characterized the 
Northwest German region  rather  negatively. Münster had been in a 
69 Ibid., 593–594.
70 Annie Jourdan, L’empire de Napoléon (Paris 2000) 152–153.
71 Napoleon to Davout, 24 March 1811. Jourdan ed., Correspondance générale X, 
no. 26380.
72 Servières, L’Allemagne française sous Napoléon, 254–255.
73 Karl Gries to Diederich Gries, 27 March 1810. Reincke, ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel’, 
253–254.
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deplorable state of ignorance and superstition, Napoleon claimed. He pre-
sented its inclusion in the Empire, together with Holland and the 
Hanseatic departments, as an act of mercy.74
Pays réunies, under Conditions
The concepts of droit de guerre and droit de conquête progressively legiti-
mized French dominance. Any violation of the Blocus, being the Empire’s 
‘public law’, should serve as a legal justification for incorporation. In this 
argumentation, the Emperor was not an aggressor, but the one who stood 
up for nations that de facto had already lost their independence for a long 
time. In this light, it is tempting to highlight Napoleon’s, often positive, 
words for the Dutch and the relative French lack of interest for Northwest 
Germany, implying that the French only were preoccupied with winning 
over the Dutch at the start of the incorporation. Indeed, prominent Dutch 
politicians were sent to Paris for formal and informal discussions, and the 
need to take Dutch institutions and traditions into account was stressed—
elements less present in official discourse on Northwest Germany, which 
would suggest the German territories were more of a pays conquis in the 
Parisian minds. That Napoleon for some time referred to Northwest 
Germany as provinces réservées would also confirm this interpretation. 
However, this would be a gross simplification. Napoleon’s approach to the 
Northwest Germans definitely bears witness of a certain acknowledge-
ment of a Hanseatic ‘nation’, or regional identity that transcended the 
urban sphere. Undeniably, Napoleon looked down on individual northern 
merchants and officials, whom he considered to be conceited and arro-
gant. Yet, these feelings were not necessarily extrapolated to the peoples in 
general—certainly not by all Frenchmen in the North.
Accordingly, the ‘uniqueness’ of both Dutch and German regions was 
acknowledged, albeit in different ways. As for the Dutch, their national 
identity and ‘modernity’ were not put into question, yet, the fact that they 
needed to be part of the Empire (like, for instance, many Italians) was a 
given fact. As for Northwest Germany, the Napoleonic government made 
clear that its incorporation was less ‘logical’: inclusion of these former 
parts of the Holy Roman Empire was of a pragmatic nature, much more 
so than in the Dutch case. Geopolitical circumstances had necessitated the 
74 Napoleon to the delegation of the Lippe department, 18 August 1811 Correspondance 
de Napoléon Ier; publiée par ordre de l’empereur Napoléon III.  Tome 22 (Paris 1867) 
no. 18048.
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incorporation, it was argued. Nonetheless, Napoleon increasingly 
embraced the idea of an imperial system as guiding principle for Europe, 
in which he became the spiritual successor of the Holy Roman Emperors. 
In an Empire, a Dutch and Hanseatic nation could partially persist, as long 
as the interests of Old France were not harmed. In other words:  the 
Netherlands and Northwest Germany became pays réunies, under 
conditions.
What was not recognized at the time was that the actual integration 
process would be much more challenging. The genesis, composition and 
internal dynamics of the intermediary bodies of governance in Amsterdam 
and Hamburg that had to oversee the integration process, will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter.
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Abstract Following the phase of conquest, usually a temporary interim 
government was formed to supervise the incorporation of newly acquired 
territories. The timing of the incorporation, as well as the manner in which 
models from other parts of Europe were applied, influenced how 
Napoleonic governance worked out in practice. Importantly, the creation 
of so-called gouvernements généraux became a Napoleonic integration 
instrument. General-Governors Charles-François Lebrun in Amsterdam 
and Louis Nicolas Davout in Hamburg had similar tasks but made differ-
ent choices. Their relationships with other actors, local and French, dif-
fered as well. In this chapter the two intermediary bodies are discussed, in 
relation to other Napoleonic institutions and their main protagonists. 
Often, Napoleonic officials who had already proven their worth elsewhere 
were employed in these areas. Thus, institutional examples and personal 
experiences from other parts of the Empire, such as Italy, influenced the 
integration of the North. Yet, being remote from the imperial core, many 
officials competed for power and hence for control of the integration 
process.
Keywords Intermediary government • Incorporation • Integration • 
Charles-François Lebrun • Louis-Nicolas Davout
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From Conquest to InCorporatIon
During the autumn of 1810, Napoleon issued decree after decree to 
enlarge his Empire by incorporating conquered lands. In previous years, 
the treatment of new territorial acquisitions had been increasingly formal-
ized. Usually an ephemeral Governor was appointed, certainly when it 
concerned small areas. Larger additions received more durable transitional 
forms of governance.
This chapter discusses how such intermediary governments were set up 
in the Dutch and Northwest German departments. In Amsterdam and 
Hamburg high state representatives were appointed, a Grand Dignitary 
and a Marshal respectively, aided by numerous high officials, which dem-
onstrated that Napoleon was keen to integrate these lands firmly into the 
Empire. Both intermediary bodies of governance were given the task of 
implementing French institutions and procedures, but simultaneously had 
to establish working relationships with the former authorities. However, 
acts of French high officials, and the outcomes thereof, were all but uni-
form. Moreover, the governments were internally divided, and their rela-
tionships with other actors were equally complex.
Before investigating developments in the North, attention is paid to the 
expanding Empire on a larger scale. The introduction of the Napoleonic 
governance in lands that were conquered and occupied in 1810 could 
draw on earlier empire-building. These experiences served as stepping- 
stones for the réunion of the Netherlands and Northwest Germany. 
Whereas the former commissioners of the French Republic in the Belgian 
and Rhenish departments had essentially been civil servants, from 
Napoleon’s rule onward, generals were quasi-systematically appointed as 
administrators in occupied territories in the phase before incorporation or 
the creation of a vassal state. Indeed, many members of the extended 
Bonaparte family were military men, like Murat, Jérôme, and Louis.1 The 
practice was further institutionalized during the Empire. Specifically the 
creation of gouvernements généraux headed by an imperial Grand Dignitary 
was a Napoleonic instrument of incorporation.
1 Jean-Paul Bertraud, ‘L’armée au service de la politique extérieure de Napoléon’, in: 





The Napoleonic idea of a General-Government can be traced be to the 
French conquest of northern Italy, specifically Piedmont, Tuscany, and 
Liguria. The French had especially had great hopes of Piedmont and 
Tuscany. After the conquest, the matter of how to achieve a more stable 
form of governance became pressing. Napoleon was uncertain how to deal 
with Piedmont, but eventually decided on its incorporation into France. 
Initially, Piedmont was administered by an intermediary body of gover-
nance known as the Consultà, overseen by French Commissioner-General 
Jean-Baptiste Jourdan. Its responsibility was to help transform the region 
into a cluster of French departments. On 11 September 1802, the 
Gouvernement général des départemens au-delà des Alpes was created, 
whereby conquered Piedmont was formally incorporated and six, eventu-
ally five, new departments were created from it (Doire, Sésia, Pô, Marengo, 
and Stura). General Jacques-François de Menou acted as General- 
Governor of the Transalpin departments.2
Directly south of Piedmont lay the Ligurian Republic. Napoleon incor-
porated this vassal state in June 1805, and three new departments were 
created: Apennins, Montenotte, and Gênes. The western part of the for-
mer republic was added to the existing department Alpes-Maritimes. The 
introduction of the French administration took place under the responsi-
bility of Ministry of the Interior. But on the spot, from Genoa, Charles-
François Lebrun acted as General-Governor. He made serious efforts to 
create support among Italians. The Governor and his direct collaborators 
noted that seeking good harmony with the local elite was an effective inte-
gration strategy. Lebrun was critical of the French army, and also had 
conflicts with police minister Joseph Fouché. With the outbreak of the 
Third Coalition War, French troops were concentrated in northern Italy. 
However, a subsequent uprising in Piacentino, which threatened to spread 
to Genoa and surroundings, made Napoleon lose his confidence in 
Lebrun. Lebrun had suppressed the uprising but was mild in his punish-
ments, which irritated the Emperor enormously. Lebrun stood up for his 
2 Michael Broers, The Napoleonic Mediterranean: Enlightenment, revolution and empire 
(e-book ed.; London and New York 2019). https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350988958
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cause and defended his moderate stance.3 The Ligurian departments were 
thereupon added to the General-Government of the Transalpine 
Departments under the supervision of General Menou. Lebrun returned 
to France.
Several Italian territorial entities were thus merged into a Transalpin 
collective, which formed the blueprint for a new type of grand dignitaire. 
A sénatus-consulte organique created the gouverneur général as a state rep-
resentative next to the extant Grand Dignitaries. On 8 February 1808, in 
the Senate, member of the Council of State Jean-Baptiste Treilhard legiti-
mized the introduction of an additional Grand Dignitary—created specifi-
cally for the incorporated regions—as followed: ‘The institutions of 
peoples should always be useful to their position, to their current needs’. 
Experience  showed, Treilhard stressed, that every day the Grand 
Dignitaries prove the usefulness as ‘sublime intermediaries between the 
monarch and the peoples’. By creating the Grand Dignitary of gouver-
neur général of the Transalpine departments, Napoleon aimed to improve 
the bond between his person and his subjects, according to Treilhard. The 
deeds of the General-Governor, should lead to a better communication 
between ‘the father of the state and the children separated from him by 
long distances and natural obstacles’.4
Napoleon’s brother-in-law Camillo Borghese, married to Pauline 
Bonaparte, was appointed General-Governor of the Transalpin depart-
ments. The Emperor also created a Grand Dignitary-type gouver-
neur  général for Tuscany. From Florence, Napoleon’s Elisa Bonaparte 
governed this part of Italy, but her power as General-Governor and Grand 
Duchess over Tuscany (Arno, Ombrone, and Méditerranée) was very 
restricted by her brother. Likewise, Borghese had little success. Most 
Piedmontese nobles, still loyal to the Savoyard dynasty, did not rally to the 
French. Elisa had some more local goodwill, but too little influence in 
Paris to exert any serious power.5 After Camillo Borghèse and Elisa 
3 Adeline Beaurepaire-Hernandez, ‘Un modèle de notable européen? Les ‘masses de gra-
nit’ des départements liguriens et leur intégration au système impérial’, in: F. Antoine et al. 
ed., L’Empire napoléonien. Une expérience européenne? (Paris  2014) 349–356; Michael 
Broers, The Napoleonic empire in Italy, 1796–1814: Cultural imperialism in a European con-
text? (Basingstoke 2005) 95, 99; A.  E. M.  Ribberink, ‘Lebrun en de homines novi’, 
Nederlands Archievenblad XC (1986) 132–133.
4 Lewis Goldsmith, Recueil de décrets, ordonnances, traités de paix, manifestes, proclama-
tions, discours, &c. III (London 1813) 257–258.
5 Broers, The Napoleonic Mediterranean.
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Bonaparte, Charles-François Lebrun would in 1810 become the third 
General-Governor of this type.
Concurrently, numerous other territories were added to the Empire 
and many smaller intermediary governments briefly existed. A remarkable 
case are the Illyrian Provinces, formed in October 1809 from territories 
ceded from the Austrian Empire. Newly created Illyria was never fully 
integrated into the French Empire. Instead of departments, seven inten-
dances were created; some French institutions were introduced but legally 
it remained a distinct entity. Several generals were successively appointed 
Governor. Eventually, the geographical and mental distance to Paris was 
too great to achieve further integration.6 Equally remarkable are the short- 
lived Catalan departments that were formally incorporated in January 
1812. But in Catalonia the integration process had little time to take off. 
In the four Catalonian departments created on paper, the French effec-
tively exercised only control over the two enclaves Barcelona and Girona, 
and their immediate environs.7
In brief, intermediary bodies of governance became widespread during 
the Empire. Gradually regional systems of governance were harmonized, 
thus stimulating integration. Only the Illyrian provinces and Catalonia 
deviated from the trend, due to military factors at the end of the Napoleonic 
wars.8 On the whole, many of the intermediary governments worked with 
care, were intent on entrenching the system they imported by taking into 
account past institutions and soliciting local notables to ensure coopera-
tion. Nevertheless, outside of Old France it was sometimes necessary to 
bend the rules more than might initially have been considered desirable.9
Rule-bending was certainly the case in the North, which would lead to 
significant clashes within the state apparatus. From a constitutional point 
of view, the Dutch departments and those in Northwest Germany were 
incorporated into the French Empire on 13 December 1810 via a sénatus- 
consulte organique. Thus the imperial population increased by more than 
6 Josip Kolanović and Janez Šumrada ed., Napoleon et son administration en adriatique 
orientale et dans les Alpes de l’est, 1806–1814 (Zagreb 2005) 21–41.
7 Broers, The Napoleonic Mediterranean.
8 Helmut Stubbe da Luz, ‘Gouverneure, Prokonsuln, Satrapen, Vizekönige. Bemerkungen 
zur politischen Top-down-Substitution und -Delegation. Einführung’, in: H. Stubbe da Luz 
ed., Statthalterregimes—Napoleons Generalgouvernements in Italien, Holland und 
Deutschland (1808–1814) (Hamburg 2016) 10–11, 23–24.
9 Aurélien Lignereux, L’Empire des Français: 1799–1815 (Paris 2012) 356–357.
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three million inhabitants. However, the legal texts said little about the 
actual reorganization of the northern periphery.10
general-governors: lebrun and davout
Lack of clear provisions, evidently, gave the Emperor leeway to organize 
his Empire primarily by decree. Two months earlier, on 18 October 1810, 
Napoleon had already issued a decree organizing Dutch departments, lay-
ing the foundations for Napoleonic governance in the Netherlands.11 It 
was based on the organization of the Italian Transalpin departments, and 
envisioned a gouverneur général at the top, assisted by a number of high 
officials. The General-Government had to function as an intermediary 
between the Dutch departments and the central government in Paris—in 
accordance to the spirit of the Grand Dignitaryship of the General- 
Governor, as determined in 1808. The gouverneur général was to have 
almost absolute control over civilian and military affairs in the Dutch 
departments. Except for the Emperor, no one was higher in hierarchy. 
‘Holland’ was divided into seven departments which were to be organized 
along French lines. During the talks in Paris the Dutch had advised to 
include the departments south of the Rhine, which had belonged to the 
Kingdom of Holland up till March 1810. But this idea was rejected. The 
Rhine remained a mental border within the Empire.
As Lieutenant General, 71-year-old Charles-François Lebrun was cer-
tainly a man most suited for the job. Charles-François Lebrun had many 
years of political experience. He had started his career under Louis 
XV. During the French Revolution he took the Tennis Court Oath, and in 
1794 narrowly escaped death by guillotine. Lebrun was a financial expert. 
His skills and knowledge contributed to his elevation to Third Consul in 
1799, next to Bonaparte and Cambacérès. With the establishment of the 
Empire in 1804, Lebrun was appointed archi-trésorier (arch-treasurer) of 
the French Empire. Though his title was mainly ceremonial, Lebrun was 
most influential. Moreover, Lebrun had been gouverneur général in north-
ern Italy during the incorporation of the Ligurian Republic. As said, dur-
ing a time of popular uprisings, Lebrun had been willing to listen to the 
concerns of the local elite, which was not always appreciated by the 
10 J.  B. Duvergier, Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, réglemens et avis du 




Emperor, nor by the repressive forces in Italy, such as the police and the 
military.12
Lebrun mediated between France and the Netherlands. His task was to 
supervise Dutch high officials and to  improve communication. Charles- 
François Lebrun started an intensive and amicable correspondence with 
former co-Consul Cambacérès, who—when Napoleon was not in Paris—
acted as the head of the French government. Lebrun and Cambacérès 
discussed personal matters, but Cambacérès also kept Lebrun up-to-date 
on the state of the Empire.13 Apart from tapping into his Parisian network, 
Lebrun started corresponding with key figures in the Dutch executive, 
administration, and army. He saw his job—as he wrote to Vice-Admiral 
Jan Hendrik van Kinsbergen—as ‘rebuilding that what time and passions 
have destroyed’.14 Lebrun’s duties as Lieutenant  General more or less 
ended with Napoleon’s decree of 18 October 1810. Since initially the idea 
had been to ‘simply’  incorporate the former Kingdom of Holland, and 
then  implement Napoleonic governance without regard to local condi-
tions, Lebrun was hoping to return to Paris within a few months.
Lieutenant General Lebrun had never been very enthusiastic about his 
tasks in the Netherlands, but carried them out willingly. It must have been 
reassuring that the decree was silent on the matter who would be appointed 
General-Governor. Lebrun reminded Napoleon that his duties ended on 
1 January 1811, and stress that he was longing to retire. He feared being 
ridiculed or being viewed with pity if he would stay any longer in Holland.15 
But much against his will Lebrun was appointed gouverneur  général. 
Lebrun asked Napoleon to be relieved of his duties due to his old age: ‘life 
has no prize for me’.16 For several weeks, the newly appointed gouver-
neur général argued that he was too old, did not have the vigor, and would 
12 Ribberink, ‘Lebrun en de homines novi’, 132–133.
13 Johan Joor, ‘De behoefte aan een correspondentie ‘fidèle et sûre’. Een blik in de brief-
wisseling tussen Charles François Lebrun en Jean-Jacques Régis Cambacérès, 1810–1813’, 
in: G. Boink et al. ed., Een kapitaal aan kennis: Liber Amicorum Sierk Plantinga (2013) 
265–269.
14 Lebrun to Van Kinsbergen, 24 October 1810. A.-C. Lebrun, ‘Notice biographique’, 
in:  A.-C.  Lebrun ed., Opinions, rapports, et choix d’écrits politiques de Charles-Franc ̜ois 
Lebrun, duc de Plaisance (Paris 1829) 136.
15 Lebrun to Napoleon, 13 December 1810. H. T. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken der 
algemeene geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840. VI: Inlijving en opstand 1810–1813 
(’s-Gravenhage 1912) no. 155.
16 Lebrun to Napoleon, 17 December 1810. Ibid., no. 158.
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be very grateful if he would be relieved of the governmental burden.17 But 
Napoleon insisted.
Concurrently, the Hanseatic departments were incorporated.18 With 
the stroke of a pen, three departments were formed from the amalgam of 
territories in Northwest Germany. Contrary to the Netherlands, the decree 
did not mention a gouvernement, but it installed a commission de gouverne-
ment, which was tasked with preparing the three Hanseatic departments 
for integration and conserving ‘the interests’ of the Empire. The commis-
sion was to finish its work on 1 July 1811 (later extended to 1 January 
1812). Marshall Louis-Nicolas Davout was appointed as General- 
Governor. Compared to the establishment of the Dutch General- 
Government, the decree was rather short and Davout’s formal powers 
were more modest than Charles-François Lebrun’s. Davout was primarily 
responsible for commanding the French troops, and for general keeping 
of law and order. Procedurally, he presided the commission and signed all 
acts passed by the commissioners. Significantly, whereas High Dignitary 
Lebrun corresponded directly with the Emperor, Davout was expected to 
correspond with the Ministers of the Interior and Finances.19
Peculiarly, an imperial decree (26 December 1810) on the administra-
tive reorganization of Northwest Germany was never published in the 
Bulletin des lois, therefore it did not have force of law. Nevertheless, this 
decree, having many similarities with the Dutch decree, defined important 
aspects of the new system of governance like the demarcation of the new 
departments, its personnel, the introduction of conscription, the creation 
of a directeur de police, and the recognition of the German (and Dutch) 
language.20 In the course of 1811 this omission (or perhaps an intended 
procedural ‘error’) would lead to discussions whether the decree should 
be interpreted as a fixed law or, less strictly, ‘only as an instruction’.21 The 
17 Lebrun to Napoleon, 7 January 1811. Ibid., no. 162.
18 Journal de Paris (1810). 20 December 1810; Helmut Stubbe da Luz, ‘Statthalterstatute. 
Grundlegende Normenkataloge für Dependancen und Provinzen’, in: H. Stubbe da Luz ed., 
Statthalterregimes—Napoleons Generalgouvernements in Italien, Holland und Deutschland 
(1808–1814) (Hamburg 2016) 263–268.
19 For example, Ch. De Mazade ed., Correspondance du maréchal Davout, prince d’Eckmühl. 
Ses commandements, son ministère, 1801–1815. Tome troisième (Paris 1885); Annie Jourdan 
ed., Correspondance générale. Tome dixième. Un Grand Empire, mars 1810–mars 1811 (Paris 
2014) no. 2579.
20 Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universel (1810), 31 December 1810.
21 Antoinette Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk in Deutschland: Das 
Oberemsdepartement (1810–1813)’, Osnabrücker Mitteilungen 80 (1973) 33.
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concrete tasks of the commission and the decision-making discretion 
assigned to it were not precisely defined. All measures were to be com-
municated to Paris; the members of the commission de gouvernement were 
at the same time granted a certain liberty.22
Indeed, his memoires the French fiscal inspecteur d’arrondissement 
Alexandre Boudet de Puymaigre recalls the rather unorganized start of 
Napoleonic integration attempts in Northwest Germany. Boudet de 
Puymaigre considered this to have been a conscious choice. He implies 
that French authorities believed it was ‘more convenient to pressure the 
land under a military and exceptional regime’ and therefore purposely 
delayed the formal integration into the Empire.23 The imprecise legal basis 
seems to be have been deliberate, and attributed to the ad hoc nature of 
the initial incorporation and integration of Northwest Germany.
Louis-Nicolas Davout, 31  years younger than his counterpart in 
Amsterdam, did not have to be persuaded. Governor Davout’s abilities 
were generally recognized, and his loyalty to France was undisputed. At 
the same time, the Marshall was seen by many as arrogant and pompous, 
certainly among non-military men. According to inspecteur 
d’arrondissement De Boudet de Puymaigre, Davout demanded to be 
treated as a highness. His wide powers and status in a way made him a 
‘satrap’ or ‘pasha’.24 French subprefect De Barthélemy would write in later 
life that Davout ‘governed these provinces in an absolute way; living as a 
sovereign, having himself being addressed to as Altesse or Monseigneur’.25 
And the first impression of the President of the Imperial Court in 
Hamburg, Hercule de Serre, on arrival in Hamburg, was that Davout 
lived ‘like a Prince, having a veritable court and is placed above all other 
authorities’.26 But Davout undoubtedly had many admirers. Reports of 
the time suggest not all Frenchmen in Northwest Germany were that out-
spoken about him.27
22 Ibid., 35.
23 Alexandre Boudet de Puymaigre, Souvenirs sur l’émigration, l’empire et la restauration 
(Paris 1884) 127.
24 Ibid., 129.
25 Hyacinthe-Claude-Félix de Barthélemy, Souvenirs d’un ancien préfet (1787–1848) (Paris 
1886) 79–80.
26 De Serre to his mother, 19 August 1811. G. de Serre ed., Correspondance du comte de 
Serre (1796–1824). Tome premier (Paris 1876) 89.
27 Joseph Fiévée, Correspondance et relations de J. Fiévée avec Bonaparte, premier consul et 
empereur pendant onze années (1802 à 1813) (Bruxelles 1837) 159.
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the Intendants
Directly under the General-Governors came so-called intendants. On the 
one hand, intendant was a term from the Old Regime. It denoted an offi-
cial who was appointed by the king to perform a certain task in a desig-
nated part of the realm. Under Napoleon, on the other hand, intendant 
was used as an appellation of a specific civil functionary within the army.28 
So, the profile of Intendant was multi-interpretable, which may have con-
tributed to its usage in different circumstances.
Regarding the Netherlands, Napoleon had repeatedly stressed that he 
not want to send over too many French civil administrators, nor indiffer-
ently replace Dutch institutions. Governor Lebrun agreed that the only 
way to implement the Napoleonic system of governance accurately and 
quickly, was to rely on men who knew ‘the tradition of Dutch govern-
ment’, the language, and personnel. Otherwise, the French would waste 
much time, rendering their rule ineffective.29 However, introducing 
Napoleonic governance without the aid of French officials alto-
gether, would also be  inefficient. Take the figure of the douanier, who 
upheld the Continental System. Such men, Napoleon and Lebrun agreed, 
should primarily be French.30
The two main posts in Lebrun’s General-Government were those of 
intendant de l’intérieur and intendant des finances. Originally, the idea 
had been to create one intendancy for both the Interior and Finances, but 
within a few weeks it was decided that these important issues needed to be 
distributed over two separate intendants in Amsterdam.
A Frenchman was to be in charge of the introduction of the French 
administrative system. Lebrun was therefore assisted by intendant de 
l’intérieur François Jean-Baptiste Dalphonse, who, prior to his Dutch 
vocation, had been prefect in France—in 1800 of the Indre department 
and from 1804 onward of the Gard department. Although Dalphonse was 
member of the gouvernement général, he was accountable to the Minister 
of the Interior. He was strictly speaking not an administrator, but had an 
28 Kolanović and Šumrada ed., Napoleon et son administration, 26–27; Catherine Lecomte, 
‘De l’intendant au préfet: rupture ou continuité ?’, in: E. Pelisson ed., La loi du 28 pluviôse 
an VIII deux cents ans après : survivance ou pérennité ? (Paris 2000) 12.
29 Lebrun to Napoleon, 28 November 1810. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, 
no. 146.
30 Annie Jourdan, ‘La réunion de la Hollande à la France: histoire d’un processus’, in: 
F. Antoine et al. ed., L’Empire napoléonien. Une expérience européenne? (Paris 2014) 144.
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advisory and coordinating role. The prefects in the Dutch departments 
were therefore to send all correspondence that did not concern (adminis-
trative) integration directly to relevant French institutions in Paris. 
François Dalphonse turned out to be a vital connection. He passed orders 
from Paris on to the prefects, briefed ministers on the Dutch situation, 
and explained French legislation to the Dutch. Thus, he ensured that the 
French administrative system, and thereby, in a larger sense, the Napoleonic 
system of governance, functioned. He took great pains at getting to know 
local culture and traditions.31 Without Dalphonse the integration would, 
most probably, have been even more complicated.
The office of intendant des finances was held by Alexander Gogel, an 
experienced financial expert, who had worked out a modern progressive 
taxation system in 1806. Former revolutionary Gogel, an ideologically 
driven politician, had succeed in giving the Dutch state a sound financial 
foundation. He strove to transform the old federal Republic into a unitary 
state. Napoleon was impressed by Gogel and had made him member of his 
Conseil d’État. Initially, he was entrusted with both finances and internal 
affairs, but it made more sense to entrust the administrative integration of 
the Netherlands to an experienced French ex-prefect like Dalphonse. 
Alexander Gogel’s function as Intendant was intended to be temporary. 
He was given relatively much freedom, although he always remained sub-
ordinate to the Minister of Finance in Paris.32 He regretted the loss of 
Dutch independence, but considered integration to be the only option to 
prevent the progress made by the Revolution from being lost.33 He tried 
to promote Dutch interests as best he could, in his advisory and coordi-
nating role. Gogel advocated a slow fiscal integration. His motives were 
not ideological or ‘nationalistic’. His motivation was financial (new French 
taxes would be lower, thus put a strain on the budget) and practical (Dutch 
had to acquaint themselves with French fiscal legislation, and he feared 
‘inexperienced’ Dutch tax employees would be replaced by French 
31 J.  Roelevink, Onderzoeksgids bestuur en administratie van de Bataafs-Franse tijd, 
1795–1813 (Den Haag 2012) 265–267.
32 H. T. Colenbrander, Inlijving en opstand (Amsterdam 1913) 57; Johanna W. A. Naber, 
Overheersching en vrijwording: geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de inlijving bij Frankrijk, 
juli 1810-november 1813 (Haarlem 1913) 34.
33 Jan Postma, Alexander Gogel (1765–1821): grondlegger van de Nederlandse staat 
(Hilversum 2017) 275–276.
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officials).34 The French head of police in the Netherlands, Paul Étienne de 
Villiers du Terrage, was not positive about Intendant Alexander Gogel. De 
Villiers du Terrage suspected that Gogel tried to prevent integration. But 
since few people knew the fiscal ‘labyrinth’ as good as Gogel, his obstruc-
tion was tolerated, claimed De Villiers du Terrage.35 Gradually, Gogel 
were entrusted fewer tasks, and he had to do with a smaller staff.
Like his colleague in Amsterdam, Davout was aided by two intendants, 
but in his case an Intendant for the Interior and Finances, and one for the 
implementation of the French judiciary. Note that the latter function did 
not exist in the Netherlands. There, national legal harmonization had 
been initiated from the Batavian Revolution onward. King Louis Bonaparte 
had successfully reformed Dutch legal institutions, which could be adapted 
to French models without much trouble.36
The intendancy of the Interior and Finances was entrusted to Councilor 
of State René (Mouchard) de Chaban. Like many Frenchmen that were 
sent northbound, René de Chaban was a man of administrative experience 
in many part of the Empire. Historian Aurélien Lignereux has referred to 
him as a ‘veritable annexation specialist’.37 Having started in the French 
heartland, he had been subprefect of Vendôme (in his native department 
of Loir-et-Cher) in 1798. Subsequently, he had been appointed prefect of 
the Rhenish department Rhin-et-Moselle, and prefect of the ‘Belgian’ 
Dyle department. In 1808 he had been appointed member of the 
Napoleonic junta in Toscana, and as such had been co-responsible for the 
organization of the three départements de la Toscane.38 Like his counter-
part Dalphonse in Amsterdam, De Chaban was generally well-liked, cer-
tainly in comparison to his superior Governor Davout. Subprefect De 
Barthélemy would later write that De Chaban character was ‘gentle and 
moderate’, and thereby ‘corrected, to a certain extent, the consequences 
of the too authoritarian character’ of Davout. According to De Barthélemy, 
34 Jan Postma, ‘Alexander Gogel: bouwer van de eenheidsstaat’, Pro Memorie 12 
(2010) 56–86.
35 De Villiers du Terrage to Savary, 9 February 1811. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, 
no. 735.
36 Martijn van der Burg, ‘Cultural and legal transfer in Napoleonic Europe: Codification of 
Dutch civil law as a cross-national process’, Comparative Legal History 3 (2015) 85–109. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/2049677X.2015.1041727
37 Lignereux, L’Empire des Français, 354.
38 Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk’, 36–37; Stuart Woolf, Napoleon’s integra-
tion of Europe (London and New York 1991) 73.
 M. VAN DER BURG
79
De Chaban softened many measures that could have led to discontent 
among the Germans.39
Indeed, in his correspondence with Davout, De Chaban underlined 
that a moderate approach was needed: ‘The new subjects have to be per-
suaded’, therefore French officials should try to win public opinion, while 
still remaining firm.40 For instance, unlike Davout, De Chaban dreaded 
the French police’s ‘irresistible tendency’ to extend its authority: ‘Their 
surveillance is indispensable, but they have limits to which they must rig-
orously confine themselves’.41 But whereas Dalphonse was genuinely 
interested in Dutch culture, De Chaban had less affinity with the Germans. 
He considered Northwest Germany incomparable with other incorpo-
rated regions, he wrote the Minister of the Interior. The inhabitants did 
not know a common fatherland, but were said to be driven by personal 
interest. The French could help the inhabitants to reorient themselves.42 
Likewise, various contemporaries characterized De Chaban as well-loved, 
but also as somewhat patriachical.43 President of the Imperial Court in 
Hamburg, Hercule de Serre noted that De Chaban overshadowed other 
French officials and favored his own area of policy: the administration.44 
State Councilor Joseph Fiévée—who was skeptical about the commission 
de gouvernement—considered De Chaban as potentially having many 
good qualities. But since his position as commission member was, in 
Fiévée eye’s, ‘false’, given the awkward position of the commission, De 
Chaban was primarily concerned with his own job safety.45 Whether or not 
these characterizations are entirely truthful, De Chaban indeed enjoyed a 
large degree of autonomy concerning the implementation of Napoleonic 
governance. He was given relatively much freedom how to interpret the 
French model in a German context.46
39 Barthélemy, Souvenirs, 79–80.
40 Burghart Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter der Französischen Revolution und Napoleons 
(1789–1813) (Hamburg 1998) 494.
41 De Chaban to Davout, 16 April 1812. Georges Servières, L’Allemagne française sous 
Napoléon Ier, d’après des documents inédits tirés des Archives Nationales et des Archives des 
Affaires Étrangères (Paris 1904) 479–480.
42 Schmidt, Hamburg, 490.
43 Boudet de Puymaigre, Souvenirs sur l’émigration, 130, 134.
44 De Serre to his mother, 19 August 1811. De Serre ed., Correspondance du comte de 
Serre I, 89.
45 Fiévée, Correspondance et relations, 159.
46 Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk’, 36–37.
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The second intendant, Louis-Joseph Faure, was responsible for the 
reorganization of the judiciary in Northwest Germany, and more broadly 
the legal integration of Northwest Germany into the Napoleonic Empire. 
Intendant Faure was a jurist with much experience. He had been a lawyer 
during the old regime and had become politically active during the French 
Revolution. Faure had been member of the Council of Five Hundred, and 
after Napoleon’s coup d’état, of the Tribunate. With the dissolution of the 
Tribunate in 1807, Faure was appointed member of the legislative section 
of the Council of State. As a Counselor, he had worked on the codification 
of French criminal law, which had resulted in the Code pénal.47 Given his 
expertise, Faure was primarily concerned with, firstly, the implementation 
with French law in Northwest Germany, and secondly, the reorganization 
of the judiciary along French lines.48 Whereas Davout was primarily 
accountable to the Minister of War, and De Chaban to the Ministers of the 
Interior and Finances, Faure answered to the Minister of Justice.49 Louis- 
Joseph Faure seems to have been a hard, but quiet worker. Fellow jurist 
Hercule de Serre characterized Faure as ‘timid’ and certainly not the most 
influential member of the government in Hamburg.50 Joseph Fiévée 
described him as a ‘modest’ official, who was content with completing 
his tasks.51
ConFlICtIng mandates
The Governors and the Intendants were not the only high officials that 
were appointed in Amsterdam and Hamburg. Other representatives of the 
central state received their proper orders from Paris, but of course also had 
to take into account the policies of the intermediary governments. There 
were many conflicts of competence within the Napoleonic state machin-
ery. The Ministries of the Interior, General Police, War, Finance and 
Justice each strove to assert power over the farthest corners of the Empire. 
47 Jean Vidalenc, ‘Les ‘départements hanséatiques’ et l’administration napoléonienne’, 
Francia 1 (1973) 427; Swantje Naumann and Helmut Stubbe da Luz, Die französischen 
Besatzer in Hamburg. Zeugnisse zu den Jahren 1811–1814 (Hamburg 2013) 251.
48 Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk’, 36.
49 Ibid., 35.
50 De Serre to his mother, 19 August 1811. De Serre ed., Correspondance du comte de 
Serre I, 89.
51 Fiévée, Correspondance et relations, 157.
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These state bodies often did not cooperate well, and often had incompat-
ible ideas about integration of the North.
An influential Frenchman in Amsterdam was aforementioned directeur 
général de la police Paul Étienne de Villiers du Terrage who led the exten-
sive police force that was established in the Dutch departments in 1811. 
Before his appointment as General Director of Police De Villiers du 
Terrage, a protégé of Pierre-François Réal (Director of the first police divi-
sion), had served as General Commissioner in Boulogne-sur-Mer. De 
Villiers du Terrage was one of five Directors-General that were employed 
exclusively in incorporated departments: Turin, Rome, Tuscany, Hamburg, 
and Amsterdam. His tasks and duties were also modeled on the organiza-
tion of the Transalpin departments. De Villiers du Terrage put much effort 
in creating a loyal and repressive police force.52 His police formed part of 
a large and rather autonomous organization, accountable to the Minister 
of Police, Anne Jean Marie René Savary. De Villiers du Terrage was one of 
Savary’s most zealous servants, but constantly faced opposition from 
Lebrun and Dalphonse. It appears from his correspondence with col-
leagues in Paris that he suffered severely; Pierre-François Réal sent him 
positive letters hoping to encourage De Villiers du Terrage to continue his 
work.53 In his letters, De Villiers du Terrage called Charles-François 
Lebrun a ‘vieillard irascible’: a grumpy old man. It annoyed him that he 
was obliged show respect for Lebrun.54 While he and his colleagues did 
their utmost to implement the wishes of the emperor, De Villiers wrote, 
Governor Lebrun took ample time to speak to complaining Dutchmen 
and make all kinds of promises. Lebrun’s presence greatly curtailed his 
authority. De Villiers likened himself therefore to a ‘bird trapped by 
glue’.55 The feelings were mutual: Lebrun disliked De Villiers and refused 
to communicate directly with him.56
Charles-François Lebrun also worked with some less prominent 
directeurs that were associated with institutions in Paris, such as Directeur 
52 Martijn van der Burg, ‘La police napoléonienne dans les départements néerlandais: entre 
tradition et modernité (1795–1820)’, in: F. Antoine et al. ed., L’Empire napoléonien. Une 
expérience européenne? (Paris 2014) 261–263. https://doi.org/10.17613/wd7c-e226
53 Réal to Deviliers, 31 March 1811. Auguste de Caumont la Force, L’architrésorier 
Lebrun, gouverneur de la Hollande, 1810–1813 (Paris 1907) 272–273.
54 De Villiers du Terrage to Réal, 4 November 1811. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, 
no. 777.
55 De Villiers du Terrage to Savary, 12 March 1811. Ibid., 742.
56 Jourdan, ‘La réunion de la Hollande à la France’, 149.
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des ponts et chaussées Johan Hendrik Mollerus, Directeur de la caisse central 
Robert Voûte, and Directeur du Grand Livre de la Dette publique Cornelis 
Charles Six van Oterleek—all Dutchmen.57 Initially, the Dutch depart-
ments received a directeur-principal des douanes. Customs was, of course, 
an important matter for the Napoleonic authorities. Contrary to other 
branches of the state apparatus in Holland, this crucial task was not 
entrusted to Dutch collaborators; douaniers had to be Frenchmen.58 The 
erudite linguist and statistician Charles Étienne Coquebert de Montbret 
was appointed as Director. Coquebert de Montbret had held various dip-
lomatic functions in Hamburg in the 1770s and 1780s, primarily that of 
Consul General to the Hanseatic towns. Coquebert de Montbret had 
traveled Europe and was fluent in German.59 He was supposed to function 
as intermediate link between the Directorate General in Paris and the cus-
toms officials in the Dutch departments. Coquebert de Montbret lacked 
experience in this field, and resented the irregularities among customs offi-
cers, which he could not prevent as he had little powers compared to the 
authorities in Paris.60 From April 1812 onward the douaniers in Holland 
(with headquarters stationed in Amsterdam, Emden, Groningen, and 
Rotterdam) received their orders directly from France.61
The composition of the intermediary government in Northwest 
Germany did not exactly follow that of the Dutch departments. Apart 
from the Governor and the Intendants, the commission in Hamburg was 
formed by five auditeurs from the Council of State. Claude-Auguste Petit 
de Beauverger was appointed secrétaire-général. Jules David and Marie 
Louis François Constant Himbert de Flégny assisted Intendant De 
Chaban, and Dagobert de Salomon and Beckmann-Schore assisted 
Intendant Faure. After several months, most of them were employed as 
57 Roelevink, Onderzoeksgids, 253–280.
58 Jourdan, ‘La réunion de la Hollande à la France’, 144.
59 Aurélien Lignereux, ‘La langue des policiers: pratiques linguistiques, politique de 
recrutement et culture professionnelle dans les départements annexés’, in: F. Antoine et al. 
ed., L’Empire napoléonien. Une expérience européenne? (Paris 2014) 384.
60 Marie Du Mesnil, Mémoires sur le Prince Le Brun, Duc de Plaissance et sur les événemens 
auxquels il prit par sous les parlemens, la révolution, le consulat et l’empire (Paris 1828) 
370–371.
61 Johan Joor, De Adelaar en het Lam: onrust, opruiing en onwilligheid in Nederland ten 




prefect or subprefect to put the integration program of the commission de 
gouvernement into practice (see Chap. 6).
Louis-Philibert Brun d’Aubignosc, as directeur-générale de la police, 
was responsible for policing Northwest Germany. A skilled and committed 
servant, Aubignosc had long been active in the army. He was captured 
during Napoleon’s Egypt campaign, and later gained the trust of State 
Councilor Pierre Daru, who in 1806 became General Director of the 
Grande Armée led against Prussia. Aubignosc worked in the newly con-
quered Berlin, and distinguished himself by a well-founded report on 
Prussian finance. In 1809, at Daru’s instigation, he became general direc-
tor for occupied Hannover, and later for the Duchy of Lauenburg. From 
early on, Aubignosc was keen on enlarging the Empire, sending memo-
randums to recommend the incorporation of Northwest Germany. His 
activities contributed to his appointment in January 1811 Hamburg, was 
later promoted to directeur-générale.62
Whereas Amsterdam’s police director was on good terms with Minister 
of Police Savary, and not with the General-Governor, in Hamburg the 
situation was the other way round. Minister Savary had a low opinion of 
Aubignosc. Nevertheless, Aubignosc worked closely together with 
Davout. Davout repeatedly tried to convince Savary that Augbignosc was 
doing an excellent job, but eventually had to turn to the Emperor to 
express support for Aubignosc. Aubignosc complained about the lack of 
manpower and financial means. He had at his disposal a relatively limited 
number of employees. Also, he had to share police commissioners with the 
respective maires. Minister Savary was not very cooperative in overcoming 
these problems. Therefore, Davout’s troops actively assisted Aubignosc’s 
men. Aubignosc also encountered opposition from French officials sta-
tioned in Hamburg who not keen on enlarging Aubignosc’s powers, 
because they were involved in corruption.63
In Hamburg, Consul Jean-Jacques-Sébastien Le Roy, in a seemingly 
superfluous office, became correspondent for the French Foreign Ministry. 
Veteran Le Roy had joined the French naval forces as a young man, became 
a naval engineer in 1778, took part in the American War of Independence, 
and had been active as a diplomat in Constantinople. After taking part in 
62 Naumann and Stubbe da Luz, Die französischen Besatzer, 68, 274–275.
63 Burghart Schmidt, ‘Die französische Polizei in Norddeutschland: Die Berichte des 
Generalpolizeidirektors d’Aubignosc aus den Jahren 1811–1814’, Francia 26 (1999) 
93–114; Naumann and Stubbe da Luz, Die französischen Besatzer, 68, 274–275.
4 INTERMEDIARY BODIES OF GOVERNANCE 
84
Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt, he was assigned to the Foreign Ministry. 
And after the Consul Generalship in Cadiz, Le Roy was sent to Hamburg 
to report on everything going on in Northern Europe. Remarkably, 
alongside the hybrid military-civil authorities, a de facto representative of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was active, as if Northwest Germany 
remained a foreign state. There was enough to observe in the newly incor-
porated city that should not be left to the general director of the police, 
Aubignosc, alone. Importantly, Le Roy became a member of the Conseil 
spécial set up in Hamburg to monitor the Continental System.64 
Furthermore, the activities of the aforementioned persons touched those 
of Joseph Eudel, customs director in Hamburg. Eudel had already come 
to the Hanseatic cities in January 1807, together with his corps of customs 
officers.65
The above shows that Frenchmen that were sent to the North formed 
a heterogeneous group. They did not always get along, which was all the 
more difficult since their activities could overlap. Tensions within the 
Napoleonic state apparatus did not go unnoticed locally. According to 
Abraham Ampt, a police commissioner in The Hague, the Napoleonic 
government deliberately ‘encourages small skirmishes’ between adminis-
tration, army, and police. The central government hoped that conflicts 
would keep the people in the field sharp, Ampt observed. Moreover, it was 
thought these antagonisms would prevent administrators, policemen, and 
other officials from forming a local force against the central government.66 
For the Parisian authorities this state of affairs had another advantage: the 
separate threads of the web allowed the government to obtain information 
from varied sources, which provided a more complete view of the situation 
at the local level.67 This was especially welcome concerning new pays 
réunies.
64 Naumann and Stubbe da Luz, Die französischen Besatzer, 59–61.
65 Silvia Marzagalli, Les boulevards de la fraude: le négoce maritime et le blocus continental, 
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Early 1811, the first phase of integration was completed in the Dutch 
departments. Now, Charles-François Lebrun was able to delegate most of 
the day-to-day management to the intendants. Therefore, he was less tied 
to the third capital. With Napoleon’s permission, he relocated to Huis ten 
Bosch in The Hague—the former residence of the Oranges and briefly the 
palace of King Louis Napoleon. Between 1811 and 1813 he settled alter-
nately in Amsterdam and The Hague.68 Contemporaries remarked that 
Governor Lebrun increasingly played the role of ‘good old man’, on the 
background, to appease the Dutch.69 There may have been a link between 
Lebrun’s stay in The Hague and simultaneous severe actions of French 
military commissions against reluctant Dutch conscripts.70 Responding to 
this repression, Lebrun argued that true justice did not demand blood, 
but examples. Blood spilled ‘without absolute necessity’ would only pro-
duce more hatred and revolt.71
Throughout, Charles-François Lebrun was willing to listen to the con-
cerns of the Dutch. He had the ability to cope with Napoleon’s high 
demands and, if necessary, he did not hesitate to tell Napoleon the truth. 
For instance, ‘Gentle measures are needed’, Lebrun frequently  insisted 
with Napoleon, ‘those work wonders with the Dutch’.72 Yet, Lebrun always 
remained loyal to Napoleon and did not tolerate widespread opposition.
The shock Dutch republicans had experienced in 1806, now befell the 
inhabitants of the Hanseatic cities. Davout made it clear that the North 
Germans had to make no illusions—all autonomy was lost. Obviously, 
French influence had been considerable for years, but the definitive loss of 
republicanism fell heavily on citizens.73 Hamburger Karl Gries regretted 
that ‘out of Republicans we have become Subjects’. Proud citizens, were 
attached to their form of government, not least because it was so old, 
Gries claimed. But he admitted that, despite all the laudable efforts to 
preserve civic republican freedom, form of government had become 
68 Lebrun to Napoleon, 1 February 1811; Lebrun to Napoleon, 26 May 1811. Archives 
nationales, Paris, AF IV 1724, pièces 54, 298.
69 Maarten W. van Boven ed., Afscheid van de wereld. Het eigen levensverhaal van Boudewijn 
Donker Curtius, politicus, advocaat en rechter in de Bataafs-Franse tijd (Hilversum 2010) 116.
70 Bart Verheijen, Nederland onder Napoleon: partijstrijd en natievorming 1801–1813 
(Nijmegen 2017) 203.
71 Lebrun, ‘Notice biographique’, 144.
72 Lebrun to Napoleon, 2 February 1812. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 315.
73 Katherine Aaslestad, Place and politics: Local identity, civic culture and German national-
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archaic.74 Tellingly, one of the first acts of the Commission was abolishing 
the urban Senates, the backbone of the age-old Hanseatic governance sys-
tem. Davout was keen to dispose completely of the old urban form of 
government, but many of the civil servants were retained, also as a gesture 
toward the administrative elite.75 Reactions were mixed. According to 
Davout, the old officials settled with ‘resignation and submissiveness’. 
However, police accounts reported dissatisfied reactions from the popula-
tion, such as the nightly removal of posters with the Commission’s official 
ordinances. In the hinterland, popular responses seem to have been more 
moderate.76
When the organization plans finished, auditeurs Himbert de Flégny 
and Beckmann-Schore personally brought all documentation to Paris, to 
submit it to Napoleon. If the Emperor approved it before 25 June, the 
French government could enter into force punctually on 1 July 1811.77 
With an imperial decree, the workings of the intermediate government 
were finally determined. The Commission would continue its work from 
1 January 1812 onward as the gouvernement  général of the Hanseatic 
departments. The decree displayed many similarities with the manner in 
which the Dutch situation was regulated. For instance, a directeur-général 
de police was established, similar to the one in Amsterdam, which, in turn, 
was modeled on the Italian example. The Governor still was responsible 
for ‘high police’ and ‘exercises general supervision over all military, civil-
ian, and administrative authorities, but without the power to modify or 
suspend any order given by our ministers’78—unlike Lebrun, who in the 
chain of command stood directly under Napoleon.
In Hamburg, from September 1811 onward, French State Counselor 
Joseph Fiévée was active as member of a liquidation commission, which 
took care of the debts of former governments. Fiévée was critical of the 
intermediary government’s activities and its competences. There was no 
clear division of competences and tasks—all the more so because the 
Commission’s term of office had not yet come to an end when Fiévée had 
74 Karl Gries to Diederich Gries, 28–30 March 1811. Heinrich Reincke, ‘Aus dem 
Briefwechsel von Karl und Diederich Gries, 1796–1819’, Zeitschrift des Vereins für 
Hamburgische Geschichte 25 (1924) 17.
75 Schmidt, Hamburg, 437.
76 Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk’, 38.
77 Schmidt, Hamburg, 489.
78 Imperial decree of 4 July 1811. Duvergier, Collection complète des lois… XVII, 463–480.
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to start his work.79 He also pointed to a power struggle between the com-
mission and their superiors in Paris. Knowing their formal authority was 
questionable, members of the commission de gouvernement, in Fiévée’s 
eyes, struggled to ‘retain a portion of power’.80
During 1811, the Commission convened in 40 sittings, creating the 
basic structures for Napoleonic governance. Accordingly, it was consid-
ered appropriate to discontinue the Commission’s work at the turn of the 
year. The decree of 4 July had already transferred numerous powers to the 
prefects, with the General-Governor remaining as the higher supervisory 
authority. Even after the dissolution of the Commission, the General- 
Governor remained in charge of the military high command and exercised 
supreme supervision over ‘high police’ and all government bodies, pro-
vided he would neither amend or postpone ministerial decrees, nor exer-
cise influence on the administration of justice. Davout’s position 
emphasized that the territories still required special control.81 His primary 
task in Hamburg was the build-up of a strong military force, with the aim 
of conquering the Russian Empire. Rumor had it he was hoping to receive 
the title of King of Poland when, after defeating the Tsar’s troops. Davout 
left Hamburg with his army in March 1812, but was not formally released 
from his duties.82
Antoinette Joulia has explained the persistence of the Northwest 
German intermediary government after 1811 in terms of a shift of roles. 
Initially, preparing for integration was the primary task, but gradually it 
became clear this coordinating intermediate body contributed to the gov-
ernability of the area. Nevertheless, many ambiguities remained, as mul-
tiple lines of communication were chosen, just like in the Dutch 
departments. In principle, prefects primarily dealt with De Chaban or 
Faure, especially concerning integration difficulties, but in other cases, 
Paris was called upon as well.83
Another parallel can be drawn with the Dutch departments. In 
Amsterdam, Intendant Dalphonse’s role gradually changed in a similar 
way. Lebrun delegated more and more tasks to Dalphonse, thus maintain-
ing the Intendant of the Interior. For instance, Dalphonse became 
79 Naumann and Stubbe da Luz, Die französischen Besatzer, 106, 261–263.
80 Fiévée, Correspondance et relations, 156.
81 Schmidt, Hamburg, 498–499.
82 Naumann and Stubbe da Luz, Die französischen Besatzer, 227–228.
83 Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk’, 35, 38.
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responsible for the reform of poverty institutions, for managing the rela-
tions with the various church congregations in the Netherlands, and for a 
statistical analysis of the Dutch departments.84 Like Lebrun, Dalphonse 
was accepted rather quickly by the Dutch elite and never abused his pow-
ers. While traveling the Dutch departments, he sympathized with the 
Dutch, and reprimanded corrupt French officials. But he never alienated 
himself from his compatriots. The baron was loyal to Paris. Dalphonse, 
like Lebrun, did not tolerate Dutch disobedience.85
In Hamburg, Intendant Faure performed his duties swiftly. On 20 
August 1811, with the opening of the Imperial Court in Hamburg, under 
the presidency of Hercule de Serres, the whole of the legislation and legal 
system of the Empire came into effect in the Hanseatic departments. 
When Faure’s duties in Hamburg ended, Napoleon wanted him to return. 
Faure was sent to southern France to investigate the penitentiary system.86 
But Intendant De Chaban remained in Hamburg. Joseph Fiévée charac-
terized De Chaban as someone who became increasingly concerned with 
his own career. To secure his intendancy, and the substantial financial ben-
efits that came with it, De Chaban accustomed Governor Davout to del-
egate all matters to him, making himself indispensable, while Davout 
handled military affairs.87
Despite their relative proximity, little interactions occurred between the 
intermediary bodies in Amsterdam and Hamburg. References to each 
other were limited to incidents, such as in April 1812. As high military 
authority in the North, Davout had forbidden the municipalities located 
within the 31st military division, which included parts of both the present-
day Netherlands and Germany, from issuing passports for journeys outside 
their own department. In doing so, he curtailed the free movement of 
persons. Thereupon the General-Government in Amsterdam had the 
authorities in Paris intervene and undo the measures taken by Davout. 
When the gendarmerie, which employed other demarcations of Holland 
and Northwest Germany, continued to follow Davout’s line, Lebrun’s 
position in the hierarchy was decisive, and he overruled Davout.88 
Examples of such conflicts between Amsterdam and Hamburg are rare, 
84 Roelevink, Onderzoeksgids, 265–267.
85 Naber, Overheersching en vrijwording, 60–61; Simon Schama, Patriotten en bevrijders: 
revolutie in de Noordelijke Nederlanden, 1780–1813 (Amsterdam 1989) 714–715.
86 Naumann and Stubbe da Luz, Die französischen Besatzer, 251.
87 Fiévée, Correspondance et relations, 159.
88 Dalphonse to Lebrun, 11 April 1812. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 1254.
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but it is nevertheless striking that little or no cooperation took place. The 
intermediary governments constituted two separate spheres within the 
Empire, which became visible in conflicts where the lines between them 
were poorly demarcated, like Lippe and Ostfriesland.
between Center and perIphery
In Napoleonic Europe, intermediary governance bodies were plentiful, as 
potentially effective empire-building instruments. A distinction must be 
made between ‘regular’ gouverneurs généraux and the newly crated Grand 
Dignitaries in the form of a General-Governor. With the establishment of the 
gouvernement générale de la Hollande, Charles-François Lebrun was, again, 
awarded an honorary title of Grand Dignitary. This answers the rarely asked 
question why the intermediary government in Amsterdam did not come 
with an ‘end date’, like the one in Hamburg. The General- Government was 
intrinsically linked to the person Charles-François Lebrun as Grand Dignitary. 
Arguably, the Dutch departments, as a formally distinct entity within the 
Empire, would not be disbanded until the decease of Lebrun. Otherwise, the 
Grand Dignitary would be deprived of his ‘fief’ (to put it somewhat anach-
ronistically). Given the different status of Davout and his commission, as well 
as their more restricted duties, this was not the case in Northwest Germany.
During the Empire’s expansion in these years, Napoleon preferred to 
act by decree. The two  intermediary  governments in the North could 
build on imperial precedents, but were still quite distinct. The processes 
by which the respective governments were shaped differed, starting with 
the choice of Governor. At the time of incorporation, the Emperor was 
well aware of Lebrun’s mild approach to ensuring obedience. Yet, he 
apparently considered Charles-François Lebrun to be the right man for 
the Dutch departments. Napoleon was satisfied enough with Lebrun’s 
earlier achieved results, that in December 1810 he definitely entrusted 
Lebrun with supervising the Netherlands. Or, he could not find anyone 
else who the Dutch would trust to a similar degree. In any case, Napoleon 
had no immediate reasons to doubt Lebrun’s abilities and the successful 
completion of the integration process.
Both intermediary bodies of governance were to some extent impro-
vised, but evidence suggests that specifically the incorporation of 
Northwest Germany intentionally turned out rather unstructured, even 
chaotic. In Hamburg, the loyalty of hardened soldier Davout was undis-
puted, but there were doubts about the region’s integration in the short 
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term. Antoinette Joulia has explained the ‘somewhat peculiar form of gov-
ernment’ in Northwest Germany in several ways. Napoleon’s imperial 
aspirations, as spiritual heir to the German emperors, is accredited to have 
played a role. Above all, she has pointed to the perceived ‘otherness’ of the 
region (at least from a French perspective), as well as the high degree of 
heterogeneity of the region.89
Notwithstanding all sorts of inconsistencies during the incorporation, 
the intermediary governments were composed with care. The appointed 
officials were selected mainly because of their competences. In the 
Netherlands, the framework that was developed and the personal back-
grounds of high officials, implied that the Dutch would be given a certain 
say. French entrusted more tasks to local collaborators than in Northwest 
Germany, since it was possible to build on a Dutch system of territorial 
governance. Comparable administrative bodies were largely lacking in the 
German territories. Napoleonic officials were more prominent in the 
Hanseatic departments, there, the involvement of the local personnel was 
mainly at lower levels.
For a large part of their term of office, the Governors-General were in 
the background and left the tasks to their subordinates. Both Lebrun and 
Davout could rely on highly skilled intendants. Nevertheless, it were the 
governors who chose to support certain persons, or not. Davout and 
Lebrun made individual choices. The two governors in the North hardly 
ever joined forces, nor were there permanent close contacts between each 
other’s direct staff.
Major stumbling blocks were located outside the gouvernements 
généraux. The functioning of the intermediary governments in the 
North was much more complicated than it would have been, if there had 
been better cooperation, and a clearer division of tasks between various 
Napoleonic institutions. The governments were hindered in their work by 
the fact that administrators, policemen, gendarmes, tax inspectors and 
prosecutors each corresponded with their own Minister in Paris, and con-
sequently there was no single coherent scheme of integration. This was 
especially the case in Hamburg, where from the start on many ambigui-
ties were.
All considered, the gouvernements généraux derived their strength from 
being able to mediate between the needs of the periphery and the demands 
89 Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk’, 32.
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of the imperial core. However, this entailed that, so remote from Paris, 
many actors competed for influence and thus for the control of the inte-
gration process. And, of course, integration was not confined to Amsterdam 
and Hamburg alone. The prefects in de Dutch and Northwest German 
departments would therefore become important players; they are the pro-
tagonists of the next chapter.
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Abstract This chapter is concerned with the introduction of the prefec-
toral system in the North. The introduction of préfets was an expression of 
the desire to create a modern civil administration answerable to the central 
government. Attention is paid to its implementation, the selection and 
circulation of prefects, and their relationships with other actors. Napoleonic 
territorial governance meant a significant break with tradition, but its 
implementation was far from perfect. Although French legislation itself 
was not altered, in practice, many issues hindered the functioning of the 
prefectoral system in the incorporated departments, such as redrawing 
geographical borders and lack of understanding of Napoleonic governing 
practices. Creating support was difficult when no consideration was given 
to local circumstances and wishes—a challenge delegated to prefects. 
Stimulating personal mobility between different parts of the Empire was a 
possible means of accelerating integration. The case of the prefects in the 
Netherlands and Northwest Germany shows how the flow of imperial 
models, officials, and knowledge contributed to the interconnectedness of 
the different parts of the Napoleonic Empire, or conversely, how the lack 
thereof hindered integration.




The creation of the gouvernements généraux marked merely the beginning 
of the challenge of introducing Napoleonic governance in the Netherlands 
and Northwest Germany. Napoleon Bonaparte’s so-called fundamental 
law of 28 Pluviose VIII (17 February 1800) had established a framework 
of préfets, sous-préfets, and maires, who respectively administrated the 
départements, arrondissements, and communes. This system of territorial 
governance was also to be implemented in the newly incorporated north-
ern departments. It personified the desire for ‘modern’ (in the sense of 
‘French’) territorial governance and was seen as effective in asserting state 
power throughout Europe. Prefects were in charge of the day-to-day run-
ning of their respective department. Decisions were made at the central 
level, to be carried out by prefects without criticism. Information from the 
lower levels had to flow back to the ministries in the reverse manner. In the 
process of putting Napoleon’s wishes into practice, prefects played a piv-
otal role. Stuart Woolf has therefore referred to them as one of Napoleon’s 
‘tools of conquest’.1
Remarkably, long, prefects were portrayed rather one-dimensionally. 
Historians saw them either as virtually autonomous ‘Little Emperors’ or as 
compliant state servants.2 Although decisions were taken in the imperial 
core, and prefects, as agents of the central state, were meant to follow 
instructions to the letter, historians are showing that prefects not seldom 
followed their own path. As the embodiment of the state, maintaining 
good working relations with other actors was essential for the proper exe-
cution of prefectoral tasks. This position profile in itself indicates that the 
presumed rigidity of the Napoleonic state is not completely accurate.3 
Prefects went to great lengths to align the desires of the central state, of 
regions and themselves. Hence they played a complex and sometimes con-
tradictory role within the Napoleonic state apparatus. Studying the 
introduction of prefectoral rule thus gives insight into the daily interac-
tions between the Napoleonic state and society.
1 Stuart Woolf, Napoleon’s integration of Europe (London and New York 1991) 74–85.
2 Gavin Daly, “Little Emperors?’ Investigating prefectoral rule in the departments’, in: 
P. Dwyer ed., Napoleon and his Empire. Europe, 1804–1814 (Basingstoke 2007) 58.
3 Annie Jourdan, L’empire de Napoléon (Paris 2000) 260–263.
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recruiTing PrefecTS
Whereas during the French Revolution local communities often elected 
officials, First Consul Bonaparte preferred a top-down system with 
appointed administrators who were closely connected to the central state.4 
Prefects were responsible for the flow of information, the maintenance of 
law and order, the monitoring of agriculture and religious communities, 
the appointment of lower government officials, and much more—basically 
all things pertaining to the maintaining of the Empire’s social order. 
Therefore, the official recruitment policy was not to appoint prefects from 
the region they administrated.
Selecting candidates was a complicated task. Informal patronage net-
works, family ties (by marriage) and previous political experience all played 
an important role. In particular the High Dignitaries Cambacérès and 
Lebrun were influential in the selection of prefects, the former for south-
ern departments, the latter for northern departments.5 Many prefects 
selected by the entourage around Bonaparte had a moderate revolution-
ary background, or were not very politically outspoken. The share of aris-
tocrats among the corps of prefects increased over time, which is partially 
explained by the larger share of the nobility in the incorporated depart-
ments.6 The complex process of patronage, enquiring, and reassessing is 
evident from the Interior Ministry’s archival records, which, as Isser 
Woloch has aptly put it, consists of ‘oversized worksheets for collating 
information [on potential (sub)prefects, and a] mass of supporting letters 
and petitions either recommending individuals or soliciting positions in 
one’s own behalf’.7
Significantly, the corps of prefects ‘professionalized’ over time. A sys-
tem of formal education and training, developed by Napoleon, was the 
auditoriat of the Council of State. As an auditeur, potential (sub)prefects 
could gain knowledge and experience in the Council of State and in time 
be assessed by seniors to what extent they were suitable for an 
4 Isser Woloch, The new regime. Transformations of the French civic order, 1789–1820s (New 
York 1995) 54.
5 Louis Bergeron, L’épisode napoléonien. Aspects intérieurs: 1799–1815 (Paris 1998) 70.
6 Gavin Daly, Inside Napoleonic France. State and society in Rouen, 1800–1815 (Aldershot 
2001) 42–43.
7 Isser Woloch, Napoleon and his collaborators: The making of a dictatorship (New York 
2001) 54.
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administrative career.8 On average, a Napoleonic prefect served just over 
four years, then posted elsewhere.
Newly appointed prefects quickly gathered information on all poten-
tially relevant topics. The prefect was assisted by a conseil de préfecture, 
comprising important dignitaries of the department, usually five, who 
settled administrative, fiscal, and legal disputes. Additionally, each depart-
ment had a so-called conseil général du département, consisting of 16–24 
members, who met annually to discuss the distribution of taxes and give 
financial advice. The conseils de préfecture and conseils généraux had a cer-
tain influence. The notables were taken seriously when they submitted 
their views to Paris, in case of disagreement with the prefect.9
Moreover, prefects had at their disposal a Secretary-General who had 
largely administrative functions. But in the absence or illness of the prefect 
they acted as his deputy, for instance, maintaining the correspondence 
with subprefects. As such they were more than just clerks. Understandably 
secretaries-generals were carefully appointed by the central government.10 
Prefects were also keen on maintaining informal contacts with local advi-
sors for their knowledge and skills in matters of local interest.11 In fact, all 
15 Secretaries-General who were appointed in the Netherlands and 
Northwest Germany were such locals.
Before incorPoraTion
Well before the Netherlands were incorporated, Batavian revolutionaries 
had criticized old decentralized structures, particularly the provinces with 
their traditional autonomy.
In 1798, the first constitution of the Batavian Republic ended provin-
cial autonomy, and introduced hierarchical-centralist principles. Like in 
France, new departments were formed that no longer followed the his-
toric boundaries and took their names from rivers. With the moderate 
Dutch constitution of 1801, departments regained old provincial borders 
8 Edward A. Whitcomb, ‘Napoleon’s prefects’, The American Historical Review (1974) 
1114–1116. https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/79.4.1089
9 Jacques Godechot, Les institutions de la France sous la Révolution et l’Empire (Paris 1951) 
511–514; Woloch, The new regime, 55–57.
10 Daly, Inside Napoleonic France, 54–56.
11 Marie-Cécile Thoral, ‘The limits of Napoleonic centralization: Notables and local gov-
ernment in the department of the Isère from the Consulate to the beginning of the July 
Monarchy’, French History 19 (2005) 469–473. https://doi.org/10.1093/fh/cri048
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and a small part of their powers, but the unitary state was kept intact. 
There was no question of a return to pre-revolutionary provincial 
autonomy.12
Territorial governance had been further reformed during the Kingdom 
of Holland. Louis Bonaparte’s reforms placed authority at all levels of 
government in the hands of an individual subordinate to the state. Louis 
considered Dutch governance to be characterized by ‘inertia’. At the head 
of a department came a landdrost, whose main tasks were to carry out 
government orders, and supervise administration and police. In the kwar-
tieren (the equivalents of the arrondissements) so-called kwartierdrosten 
carried out the orders of the landdrost and oversaw the municipalities. 
Nonetheless, according to Dutch legislators, a moderately independent 
council of assessoren (assesors) would have to be set up alongside the land-
drost. Preferably, departmental officials would come from the region. 
Louis was able to diminish the role of the assessors, but they remained a 
power factor, unique to the Dutch system.13 And although Louis had 
wished to rearrange the departments, also sacrificing their traditional 
names for geographical neologisms, departments continued to follow 
their old borders and retained their names.
Overall, Dutch territorial governance was a mix of Dutch and French 
elements. Louis Bonaparte desired feedback on it and consulted Jean 
Guillaume Locré de Roissy, Secretary-General of the Council of State. 
From a Dutch perspective, the organization was top-down and regulated, 
but Locré preferred a more hierarchical and strict organization. Though 
Louis had in 1809 succeeded in pushing through the decision that in the 
near future assessors were replaced by departmental councils, according to 
Locré the departments were still too autonomous and powerful. Locré 
reminded Louis that administrators were mere ‘instruments’, and advised 
to further hierarchically reorganize territorial governance, limiting the 
powers of the departments.14
Whereas Dutch territorial governance had many features in common 
with the French system, that was not the case in Northwest Germany. It 
was much more diverse. In Northwest Germany, a limited tradition of 
12 J.  Roelevink, Onderzoeksgids bestuur en administratie van de Bataafs-Franse tijd, 
1795–1813 (Den Haag 2012) 9.
13 Joke Roelevink, ‘Louis Bonaparte aux prises avec l’inertie hollandaise’, in: A. Jourdan 
ed., Louis Bonaparte, roi de Hollande (Paris 2010) 125–127.
14 Locré to Louis Bonaparte, 22 June 1810. Archives nationales, Paris, AF IV 1814, 
pièce 2–4.
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territorial governance existed. Small principalities, like Arenberg, Münster 
or Osnabrück, had been ruled by local Princes or Prince-Bishops, there-
fore lacked an elaborate system of ‘subnational’ governance. And the three 
Hanseatic city-states were ruled by urban collegial bodies. Nevertheless, 
there were also regions accustomed to territorial governance.
Firstly, these were areas with a Prussian past. In Prussian regions, the 
so-called Kriegs- und Domänenkammern were in place, which had been 
established in 1723 for the purpose of governing territories distant from 
Berlin. These provincial bodies were responsible for the levying of taxes 
that served to maintain Prussia’s standing army, as well as for the day-to-
day administration of lands outside Prussia proper—hence the words 
Krieg (war) and Domänen (domains) in their title. This system of gover-
nance, while recognizing the primacy of the central state, was not a uni-
form or centralized model comparable to the Napoleonic one. In Prussian 
Northwest Germany, Münster, Aurich, and Minden were home to a 
Kriegs- und Domänenkammer. All Kriegs- und Domänenkammern were 
subordinate to the General-Direktorium (General-Directory) in Berlin, 
and its members (called Kriegs- und Domänenrat) often were people from 
outside the region. Although rather progressive administrative reforms 
were implemented in 1807, these did not apply to Northwest Germany, 
which by then was already outside Prussia’s sphere of influence.15
Secondly, the Hanseatic departments comprised areas previously 
belonging to a Napoleonic vassal monarchy, the Kingdom of Westphalia, 
or the Grand-Duchy of Berg, which both had been subdivided into 
French-style departments. For instance, in Westphalia, borders did not 
follow old territorial divisions and Westphalian departments too had 
geographical names. However, the local political elite tried to temper 
the restructuring of institutions and territorial subdivisions. It demanded 
a substantial role and respect for its privileges; in fact, about half of 
the prefects and subprefects in the Kingdom of Westphalia belonged to 
the nobility.16 Certain districts of the three northern departments of the 
Kingdom were merged with the new Hanseatic departments. Notable 
15 Margaret F.  Reid, ‘Public administration in Germany: Continuity and change’, in: 
A. Farazmand ed., Handbook of comparative and development public administration (2nd ed.; 
New York 2001) 202–203; Julian Wright and Christopher Clark, ‘Regionalism and the state 
in France and Prussia’, European Review of History 15 (2008) 285. https://doi.
org/10.1080/13507480802082607
16 Nicola Todorov, ‘Adhésion, obstruction, participation. Les Allemands face au modèle 
administratif français’, Beihefte der Francia 79 (2016) 141. https://perspectivia.net/pub-
likationen/bdf/boudon_clemens_horn/todorov_adhesion
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arrondissements were Osnabrück and Minden (both transferred to Ems-
Supérieur), and Stade and Lüneburg (to Bouches-de-l’Elbe). And some of 
the northern districts of the Grand Duchy of Berg were merged into the 
department of Lippe—most importantly the city of Münster. Thus, prior 
to 1811, about a quarter of the Northwest-German arrondissements (not 
counting ‘Dutch’ Ostfriesland) was familiar with French-style territorial 
governance.
The DuTch SouTh of The rhine
The first prefects in the Netherlands were Nicolas Frémin de Beaumont 
and Patrice de Coninck. The first was appointed prefect of the newly cre-
ated department of Bouches-du-Rhin, in April 1810, the latter, in May, as 
prefect of Bouches-de-l’Escaut. These departments had been reluctantly 
handed over to the Empire by King Louis Bonaparte, after the short-lived 
British occupation of the island of Walcheren the year before.
Nicolas Frémin de Beaumont came from a distinguished Norman fam-
ily and had started his career under Louis XVI. Shortly before the 
Revolution he was appointed to the position of Mayor of Coutances, 
which he held until 1790. After several judicial offices, he was appointed 
subprefect of Coutances under the Consulate and was a member of the 
Legislative Corps for the Manche department, where he was considered 
an expert in financial matters.17 Frémin de Beaumont was a protégé of 
Charles-François Lebrun, who had played a part in his appointment.18 
Initially, the prefect was positive. Generally, inhabitants had been coop-
erative, especially the clergy. To his satisfaction, local administrators had 
become well informed about Napoleonic governance, albeit things did 
not yet run as smoothly as in France. However, he was worried about 
obstruction from the town of Nijmegen. Its elite disliked the merger with 
former ‘Staats-Brabant’ (ruled from The Hague). Frémin de Beaumont 
pointed out a contrast between the Protestant, originally Orangist, elite of 
Nijmegen, and the more French-oriented citizens of préfecture’s- 
Hertogenbosch (Bois-le-Duc). Frémin de Beaumont contributed this to 
the higher level of education of Nijmegen’s notables, who had vivid 
17 Dictionnaire des parlementaires français III (Paris 1891) 64.
18 Marie-Rose Thielemans, Goswin, baron de Stassart 1780–1854. Politique et Franc-
maçonnerie (Bruxelles 2008) 135.
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memories of the relative independence of their city in Republican times.19 
During his time of office, Nijmegen continued to worry the prefect 
because possible rebellious sentiments from north of the Rhine could be 
transferred to his department.20 The people in the districts in former 
Brabant, who until 1795 had been second-class inhabitants in the Dutch 
Republic, generally accepted Frémin de Beaumont, who was known as a 
moderate administrator.21
From May to December 1810, the Fleming Patrice de Coninck acted 
as prefect of Bouches-de-l’Escaut, as the historical Province of Zeeland 
was now called. Originally, the idea had been to add this entire area to 
Deux-Nethès, governing it from Antwerp. When the emperor was in 
Middelburg in May 1810, mayor Jacob Hendrik Schorer managed to per-
suade Napoleon to abandon this plan and establish the separate depart-
ment of Bouches-de-l’Escaut.22 Little is known about De Coninck’s brief 
stay in Middelburg, except that supposedly ‘he was very esteemed here’.23 
He was then transferred to Hamburg to become prefect of the new 
Bouches-de-l’Elbe department. Patrice de Coninck will be further dis-
cussed below in the section on the Hanseatic prefects.
De Coninck’s successor was another Fleming, Pierre Joseph Pycke, 
who previously had been mayor of his native town of Ghent. Pycke coop-
erated well with the central government, without antagonizing the locals 
too much.24 According to prefect Pycke, the former political elite had dif-
ficulty accepting its new role. There was little overt opposition, but never-
theless widespread dissatisfaction. To impose French rule, the diligent 
Pycke established a secret police and reported personally to police chief 
Réal about public order.25 Pycke frequently called the people of Zeeland 
‘docile’ and ‘submissive’. Gradually, when Napoleonic institutions and 
19 ‘Bouches du Rhin.  – Comptes administratifs, 1811–1812’. H.  T. Colenbrander ed., 
Gedenkstukken der algemeene geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840. VI: Inlijving en 
opstand 1810–1813 (’s-Gravenhage 1912) no. 517.
20 Frémin de Beaumont to De Montalivet, 28 March 1813. Ibid., no. 520.
21 G.  J. W.  Koolemans Beijnen ed., Historisch gedenkboek der herstelling van Neêrlands 
onafhankelijkheid in 1813. Vierde deel (Haarlem 1913) 422.
22 J. A. M. Y. Bos-Rops, J. G. M. Sanders, and A. P. van Vliet ed., Noord-Brabant in de 
Bataafs-Franse Tijd, 1794–1814: een institutionele handleiding (’s-Hertogenbosch  and 
Hilversum 2002) 32.
23 P. J. Blok and P. C. Molhuysen ed., Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek. Deel 8 
(Leiden 1930) 306–307.
24 Ibid., 1259–1260.
25 Pycke to Réal, 30 January 1812. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 784.
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measures were slowly accepted, Pycke became more positive. The popula-
tion would not readily admit it, but became used to being French, Pycke 
claimed.26 Undoubtedly, the often, perhaps overly, positive comptes admin-
istratives emphasized the ‘tranquility’ in the originally Dutch lands, yet, 
the relatively well-functioning system of conscription indeed partly sup-
ports the claims of prefects such as Pycke. In retrospect, one inhabitant of 
Zeeland wrote that, compared to other parts of the Netherlands, they had 
been reasonably fortunate with both prefects.27
PrefecTS in The Départements De la HollanDe
North of the Rhine, when the Kingdom of Holland was incorporated into 
the French Empire. Provisionally, existing territorial governance was 
retained, albeit with French terminology. Landrosten were renamed préfets, 
and kwartierdrosten became sous-préfets. Similarly, at the municipal level 
the single head of authority became the maire.
Despite similarities between former Dutch departments and the French 
prefectoral system, the decision to introduce a system of one-headed gov-
ernment at every level of the administration was a sharp break with Dutch 
tradition.28 The Dutch commission in Paris had recommended leaving ter-
ritorial divisions the same. Consequently, the borders of the departments 
North of the Rhine relatively coincided with those of the former depart-
ments of Holland. Since French departments tended to be larger, the 
Dutch departments of Amstelland and Utrecht were merged, as well as 
Groningen and Drenthe. Starting on 1 January 1811, imperial depart-
ments were to be in place.
In the former Kingdom of Holland, the selection of prefects had of 
course to take into account the views of Lebrun, who was more inclined 
to rely more on Dutch collaborators than many of his French colleagues. 
The General-Governor feared that replacing incumbent officeholders 
would discourage the new subjects. Maintaining (a part of) the Dutch 
administrative corps could help to create support for Napoleonic gover-
nance. Moreover, this would enable his General-Government to tap into 
the knowledge of Dutch collaborators.
Two landdrosten could continue their work in the same place, now in 
the capacity of prefect, namely Hendrik Ludolf Wichers in Groningen, 
and Petrus Hofstede in Zwolle. Hendrik-Ludolf Wichers was native to 
26 ‘Bouches-de-l’Escaut. – Comptes administratifs, 1811–1812’. Ibid., no. 532.
27 Olivier Groeneyk, Kronijk van Zierikzee (Zierikzee 1821) 214.
28 Roelevink, Onderzoeksgids, 376–377.
5 PREFECTS: ‘TOOLS OF CONQUEST’ 
102
Groningen. Trained as a jurist, he did not hold an office between the 
Revolution and 1802.29 It seems Wichers was initially rather cooperative, 
which made measures such as the conscription not too problematic. 
Wichers’ correspondence with the General-Government shows that he 
grew concerned about the needs of the population. For example, early 
1813, municipalities had been instructed to ‘voluntarily’ provide horses 
and fully equipped horsemen (so-called cavaliers montés). Prefect Wichers 
and subprefects decided that the local communities should provide about 
100 horses. In agriculture, no man could be missed. Wichers thought it 
would be better to demand twice as many horses, without horsemen. He 
suggested to compensate villagers in the hope of sparing the poorest peo-
ple. Intendant Dalphonse replied that this was Wichers’ concern since he 
had decided to reinterpret orders.30 This should not have come as a 
 surprise. A year earlier, he had made a similar request to financially aid 
poor women and children of soldiers, which Dalphonse had also rejected.31
Prefect of Bouches-de-l’Yssel, Petrus Hofstede, was born in the 
Southern Netherlands, but came from a family native to the region of 
Drenthe. His father had been stationed in Tournai, in one of the forts of 
the Dutch Republic that acted as a buffer against France. It was in Drenthe 
that Hofstede started an administrative career. As an Orangist he was 
evicted from his posts during the Batavian Revolution and was office-less 
for almost seven years. Louis Bonaparte appointed him as landdrost of the 
Department of Drenthe, and subsequently of Overijssel.32 Hofstede was 
reluctant to implement drastic reforms. For example, in the case of pov-
erty care, prefect Hofstede pointed at the limits of harmonization and 
centralization. New institutions may well be better, Hofstede wrote, but 
the present was difficult enough, even without reforms, ‘as long as war 
continues to exert such a cruel influence on almost every part of society’.33
29 P. J. Blok and P. C. Molhuysen ed., Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek. Deel 3 
(Leiden 1914) 1417–1418.
30 Wichers to Dalphonse, 3 February 1813. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 1587; 
Dalphonse to Wichers, 15 February 1813. Ibid., no. 1594 .
31 G.  J. W.  Koolemans Beijnen ed., Historisch gedenkboek der herstelling van Neêrlands 
onafhankelijkheid in 1813. Eerste deel (Haarlem 1912) 375.
32 P. J. Blok and P. C. Molhuysen ed., Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek. Deel 4 
(Leiden 1918) 764–765; J. H. Wigger, ‘De préfecture in het Département des Bouches-de-
l’Yssel, een Frans bestuursorgaan in Overijssel in de jaren 1811–1813’, Overijsselse Historische 
Bijdragen 115 (2000) 73–75.
33 Hofstede to Dalphonse, 9 August 1811. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 1622.
 M. VAN DER BURG
103
Petrus Hofstede deviated from the official line when he disapproved of 
it. In February 1813, widespread desertion was feared. Formally, prefect 
Hofstede instructed his subordinates to pursue deserters and tell the pop-
ulation that assistance to fugitives would not be tolerated. Nevertheless, 
Hofstede did not threaten with the severe punishment of quartering sol-
diers in the parental home of a deserter. Punished families would then 
have to provide for the soldiers, which was a hated and costly sanction. 
Hofstede tried to postpone this punitive measure. However, reluctance 
among conscripts persisted. Hofstede was required to report in detail on 
the progress of the investigations and reprimand defectors’ families. He 
made little effort and preferred quartering gendarmes instead of soldiers. 
However, the number of gendarmes in the department was limited and 
they were also needed throughout the department to ease the conscrip-
tion process. Moreover, when it became clear the parents of a reluctant 
conscript could not cover maintenance costs, Hofstede decided that the 
family’s possessions had to be publically sold—a considerably milder pun-
ishment. Hofstede felt harsher sanctions were impracticable and 
counterproductive.34
Two landdrosten switched department: Regnerus Livius van Andringa 
de Kempenaer went from Friesland to former Gelderland, while Johan 
Gijsbert Verstolk van Soelen made the opposite journey. Van Andringa de 
Kempenaer came from a lineage of Frisian aristocrats. In 1795 he, like 
many, had been evicted from all posts. After the reconciliation of Dutch 
revolutionaries and Orangists in 1801, he was appointed member of the 
Legislative Body. Under Louis Bonaparte he was appointed landdrost of 
his native Friesland.35
On 4 February 1812, a major disturbance took place on the occasion 
of the handing back of the restored Sint-Walburgis Church in Arnhem to 
its Catholic inhabitants. For years it had been used as an arsenal. Since 
authorities feared that old tensions between Protestants and Catholics 
would flare up, on the day of the consecration, next to the regular police, 
also the urban militia and the gendarmerie were present. During the cer-
emony, attended by officials like the prefect, citizens gathered outside the 
church. However, things escalated between various law enforcers. When a 
34 Johan Joor, De Adelaar en het Lam: onrust, opruiing en onwilligheid in Nederland ten 
tijde van het Koninkrijk Holland en de inlijving bij het Franse keizerrijk (1806–1813) 
(Amsterdam 2000) 362–363.
35 Blok and Molhuysen ed., NNBW 8, 960.
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gendarme refused to carry out orders from an urban militia officer, the 
latter pulled his sword and threatened the gendarme. This promptly 
resulted in a fight between the (mostly French) gendarmes and local militia 
members. Also, bystanders, incited by the militia members, joined in the 
fight. When the noise of the clattering of arms and shouting was heard in 
the church, the police rushed to separate the parties. Prefect Van Andringa 
de Kempenaer dismissed the disturbance as unimportant and did not 
inform the General-Government. Of course, Lebrun and Dalphonse 
learned of it and reprimanded the prefect.36
The General-Government kept its eye on prefect Van Andringa de 
Kempenaer. Intendant Dalphonse wrote the prefect: ‘people complain 
that you do not welcome the French enough and that you give too much 
preference to Dutchmen […] it is advisable that you seek to make a fusion 
of the Dutch spirit with the French spirit, and that you bring together 
Frenchmen and Dutchmen’.37 And like his fellow prefect Wichers, Van 
Andringa de Kempenaer was critical of certain measures, such as the cava-
liers montés demanded by Paris. Van Andringa de Kempenaer undertook 
the desired action, but only after reporting it to Dalphonse, underscoring 
that he considered the legal basis of the demands to be insufficient.38 
Nevertheless, the prefect was compliant enough in French eyes. A later 
biographer wrote that the fact that the prefect was maintained by the 
Emperor, even when he was in bad health, ‘perhaps pleads against his 
independence’.39 Van Andringa de Kempenaer died on 3 December 1813 
while Prussian troops besieged Arnhem.
In the department Frise, former landdrost of Gelderland was installed 
as prefect. Johan Gijsbert Verstolk van Soelen came from a family of 
Rotterdam patricians. Verstolk van Soelen was known as a diplomatic man, 
a quality that during the post-Napoleonic period would earn him the posi-
tion of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He largely endorsed the ideas behind 
Napoleonic governance, but advocated a moderate approach, much like 
the intermediary government. Verstolk van Soelen could navigate between 
the needs of the central state and those of his department. He was not 
hated by the people, nor was he reprimanded from above, being able to 
meet the minimum requirements of cooperation regarding unpopular 
36 Joor, De Adelaar en het Lam, 185–186.
37 Dalphonse to Van Andringa de Kempenaer, 15 May 1812. Colenbrander ed., 
Gedenkstukken VI, no. 1554.
38 Van Andringa de Kempenaer to Dalphonse, 10 April 1813. Ibid., no. 1599.
39 Blok and Molhuysen ed., NNBW 8, 959–960.
 M. VAN DER BURG
105
measures like conscription.40 Also, his collaboration with other Napoleonic 
actors, such as the French troops, went rather well. For instance, when the 
French commander-general in Leeuwarden complained to Governor 
Lebrun about local members of the National Guard (‘three quarters are 
laborers, workers, bad subjects and drunkards, always doing foolish things 
and even insulting their officers’) Verstolk van Soelen was willing to come 
up with a solution.41 And in cases of popular resistance, he did not hesitate 
to call upon the gendarmerie, military or departmental guard.42
Apart from Dutch natives, two experienced French prefects, both from 
the Southern Netherlands, were sent to introduce Napoleonic governance 
North of the Rhine. Former préfet of the Vaucluse, baron de Stassart, 
became prefect of Bouches de la Meuse and Count De Celles (formerly 
préfet of Loire-Inférieure) became the prefect of Zuyderzée. Thus, the 
most significant Dutch departments, which together made up the old 
provinces of Holland and Utrecht, were controlled by Napoleonic officials 
of ‘Belgian’ origin. Charles-François Lebrun initially reported quite posi-
tively on the arrival of the experienced men.43 Soon, however, it became 
evident that their appointment was counterproductive. The idea that the 
prefects from the former Southern Netherlands would function better due 
to their background, was clearly a misconception. They regarded them-
selves as being French through and through and had little affinity with 
the Dutch.44
Goswin de Stassart, as prefect of Bouches-de-la-Meuse working from 
The Hague, had been subprefect of Orange, and subsequently in Avignon 
prefect of the Vaucluse department. Previously, thanks to his knowledge of 
German (as a child having lived in Austria) he had been intendant in Tirol 
and Vorarlberg. In 1806, he was entrusted with the task of administrative 
inspections in Belgium and the Rhineland, and between 1806 and 1808 
had been Intendant in several Prussian territories. Based on his many years 
of experience in Prussia, Belgium and the Rhineland, he was convinced he 
knew how to approach the Dutch. ‘The main basis of my political thinking 
has been to develop the idea of a strong and vigorous administration, 
because I believe that is a very important point for the people of the 
40 Arend Pietersma, ‘Johan Gijsbert Verstolk van Soelen, prefekt fan it departemint Fryslân, 
1811–1813’, It Beaken. Tydskrift fan de Fryske Akademy 51 (1989) 14–27.
41 Devaux to Lebrun, 20 November 1811. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 1234.
42 Joor, De Adelaar en het Lam, 374–375, 658.
43 Lebrun to Napoleon, 11 February 1811. Archives nationales, AF IV 1724, pièce 84.
44 Thielemans, Goswin, baron de Stassart, 135.
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north’, he told Indendant Baron Dalphonse.45 Prefect De Stassart was 
known for his zeal and meticulousness, but also his temper. He was eager 
to settle pending matters ‘sur le champ’ (‘without delay’). De Stassart was 
on bad terms with the Napoleonic police, in particular Director-General 
Devilliers Duterrage in Amsterdam and the Commissioner-General in 
Rotterdam, De Marivault. De Stassart complained repeatedly to Minister 
De Montalivet, that De Marivault showed little respect.46
De Stassart’s relationships with his Dutch subordinates, and with the 
General-Government, were also troublesome. In a confidential report that 
perplexed the Minister of the Interior, De Stassart accused nearly all his 
subordinates of Orangism. Moreover, De Stassart felt that the subprefect 
of Rotterdam was arrogant, the subprefect of Leiden incapable, that of 
Dordrecht lazy, and Brielle’s subprefect vain. As for the maires, the mayor 
of The Hague was supposedly too vain and that of Rotterdam too old. 
Lastly, Secretary-General Caan had little firmness and to too much self- 
esteem, the prefect concluded.47 Intendant Dalphonse criticized De 
Stassart’s self-confident actions. In Dalphonse’s eyes, the prefect should 
‘serve His Majesty as he wishes, as to avoid anything that may cause dis-
content and produce unrest and anxiety among the people’.48 Instead of 
softening his tone, De Stassart denounced the General-Government, to 
which Dalphonse replied: ‘I know many trustworthy prefects, but I do not 
know any who has been given the freedom you are asking for’; the inten-
dant added that he would report De Stassart’s undesirable behavior to the 
minister in Paris.49
Antoine de Celles, the new prefect of the large Zuyderzée department, 
was born in Brussels and had made a career in the Napoleonic army and 
administration. Prior to his position in Amsterdam, he was posted in 
Loire-Inférieur, and was known as a diligent and experienced administra-
tor. De Celles, however, could react aggressively, was overly punctilious, 
and had little interest in local traditions. Like De Stassart, seeking prompt 
integration into the French Empire, De Celles had bad relationships with 
45 De Stassart to Dalphonse, 29 August 1811. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, 
no. 1513.
46 C.  F. Gijsberti Hodenpijl, ‘De Fransche overheersching I-X’, Elsevier’s Geïllustreerd 
Maandschrift (1910) II, 257–258; V, 257.
47 Thielemans, Goswin, baron de Stassart, 152.
48 Dalphonse to De Stassart, 6 February 1813. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, 
no. 1588.
49 Dalphonse to De Stassart, 10 February 1813. Ibid., no. 1590.
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numerous other Napoleonic officials.50 De Celles could also be very criti-
cal of subordinates, such as certain subprefects. Both De Celles and De 
Stassart were determined to vigorously impose conscription. Their deci-
siveness and repressive actions, made a great impression on the public, 
contributing to hatred toward the French.
A recurring issue were De Celles’ disagreements between with the 
maire of Amsterdam, Willem Joseph van Brienen, who got along well with 
General-Government members.51 In contrast, De Celles’ relations with 
the police were excellent; Devilliers du Terrage supported De Celles in his 
conflicts with the General-Government. When Napoleon heard of the dis-
putes, Lebrun explained that Devilliers and De Celles were close acquain-
tances and the police exaggerated the situation. Lebrun argued conflicts 
had arisen due to the clash of two different political cultures. Also, the 
‘great affection between the police and the prefecture […] must be taken 
into account when assessing its accusations’.52 Additionally, Dalphonse 
pointed out that French governance was very different from Dutch tradi-
tion, and simply time was needed for the Dutch to accommodate.53 When 
disagreements between the ardent prefects and subordinates escalated, 
Lebrun intervened and through his connections in Paris recalled decisions 
made by De Celles and De Stassart.54
in BeTween The neTherlanDS anD germany
The Dutch-German border region consisted of Ems-Oriental (Ostfriesland 
and Jeverland) and Lippe (Münster and surrounds). Because Ems-Oriental 
fell under the supervision Charles-François Lebrun, appointing a prefect 
endorsed by Lebrun would have been logical. Lebrun considered former 
landdrost Willem Queysen an upright and competent man. He therefore 
regretted that the prefectship of Ems-Oriental was awarded to Frenchman 
50 Johanna W. A. Naber, Overheersching en vrijwording: geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens 
de inlijving bij Frankrijk, juli 1810–november 1813 (Haarlem 1913) 62–65.
51 Martijn van der Burg, ‘Local administration in the Napoleonic empire: The case of 
Napoleon’s third capital’, Napoleonica. La Revue 25 (2016) 123–141. https://doi.
org/10.3917/napo.025.0123
52 Lebrun to Napoleon, 2 February 1812. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 315.
53 Dalphonse to De Montalivet, 10 April 1812. Ibid., no. 1413.
54 Maarten W. van Boven ed., Afscheid van de wereld. Het eigen levensverhaal van Boudewijn 
Donker Curtius, politicus, advocaat en rechter in de Bataafs-Franse tijd (Hilversum 
2010) 28–29.
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Sébastien Louis Joseph Jannesson. Lebrun argued that replacing Queysen 
would discourage Dutch officials, which could be counterproductive.55 
However, according to French informant Gateau, Queysen was a staunch 
supporter of the House of Orange, which disqualified him.56 Appointing 
a non-Dutchman was nonetheless a smart move because Ostfriesland and 
Jeverland in 1807 had not been enthusiastic about becoming Dutch, and 
the subsequent imposition of Dutch institutions.57 Lebrun in August 
1810 advocated using the German language in Ostfriesland, as he consid-
ered it a ‘great burden’ to treat inhabitants as if they were Dutch.58 German 
became an official language in Ems-Oriental—similar to the Hanseatic 
departments, a few months later. And from November 1811 Ems-Oriental 
onward resorted under the Imperial Court in Hamburg, instead of 
The Hague.59
Joseph Jannesson, born in Saverne, in the Alsace, had earlier been sub-
prefect of Zweibrücken in the department Mont-Tonnerre, and member 
of the conseil de préfecture of Haut-Rhin. Subprefects in this district often 
came from military circles. Jannesson owed this appointment to General 
George Mouton, who was the brother-in-law of Jannesson’s brother-in- 
law Charles-Philippe d’Arberg. Before, as subprefect in the Rhineland, 
Jannesson had a problematic relationship with  locals who preferred a 
native-German subprefect.60 However, in Ems-Oriental, he seems to have 
been well-liked, being open to the opinions of people of all backgrounds. 
And Jannesson was not known to intervene extensively in all matters, 
unlike other prefects.61 This ‘egalitarian’ approach seems to have dis-
pleased Lebrun. According to Lebrun, Jannesson ‘made choices that 
resemble those of the worst years of the revolution’; for instance, he 
appointed jury members who were ‘innkeepers, craftsmen, people with 
55 Lebrun to Napoleon, 13 December 1810. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, 
no. 155.
56 ‘M. Gateau - sur plusieurs Hollandais marquans’, 30 July 1810. Ibid., no. 35.
57 Archives nationales, AF IV 1816, pièce 13.
58 Auguste de Caumont la Force, L’architrésorier Lebrun, gouverneur de la Hollande, 
1810–1813 (Paris 1907) 51.
59 Naber, Overheersching en vrijwording, 62.
60 Gordon D. Clack, ‘The politics of the appointment and dismissal of the prefectoral corps 
under the consulate and empire. The example of the department of Mont-Tonnerre’, 
Francia 11 (1983) 492. https://doi.org/10.11588/FR.1983.0.51262
61 Tileman Dothias Wiarda, Neueste Ostfriesische Geschichte 10: von 1806 bis 1813 (Leer 
1817) 660.
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almost no property. I have already told Your Majesty that this man had 
neither the means nor the moral principles of these times’.62
Further South, the Lippe department comprised the heart of the for-
mer Prince-Bishopric of Münster, which had fallen in Prussian hands in 
1802 and subsequently been divided between other German principalities. 
Initially, all lands between the old borders of the Kingdom of Holland and 
the rivers Lippe and Ems had been added to several Dutch departments. 
But this encountered difficulties. There was uncertainty about the exact 
boundaries and the German administrators communicated poorly with 
their superiors in the Dutch department capitals.63 Eventually, at the 
request of the local elite, the borders of old principality, were partly 
restored in 1811, in the form of the separate Lippe department. Judicially, 
it was labeled a ‘Rhenish’ department since the region fell under the 
Imperial Court in Liège.64
Jean-Charles-Annet-Victorin de Lasteyrie du Saillant was appointed 
prefect in Münster. De Lasteyrie du Saillant, born in the village of Le 
Saillant in the Limousin, descended from old nobility from Southern 
France. Also a military man, De Lasteyrie du Saillant belonged to emi-
grants who took part in the royalist Army of Condé.65 Being in close con-
tact with Austrian fellow-officers, he must have acquainted himself with 
the German language. After the failed counterrevolutionary episode, he 
acquired the favor of Napoleon in the fight against the English, following 
the invasion of Walcheren in 1809. De Lasteyrie du Saillant has been char-
acterized as a prefect determined to carry out the Emperor’s wishes; yet, 
also as attentive to the population.66 President of the Imperial Court in 
62 Lebrun to Napoleon, 1 July 1811. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 264.
63 Wigger, ‘De préfecture’, 71–72.
64 Barbara Dölemeyer, ‘Frans recht in Noord-Duitsland. De inlijving van de noordwesteli-
jke gebieden van Duitsland bij het Franse keizerrijk’, in: A.  Berkvens, J.  Hallebeek and 
A.  Sirks ed., Het Franse Nederland: de inlijving 1810–1813. De juridische en bestuurlijke 
gevolgen van de ‘Réunion’ met Frankrijk (Hilversum 2012) 38.
65 Peter Burg, ‘Präfekten an Rhein und Weser. Das biografische Profil der napoleonischen 
Regionalverwaltung in eroberten Gebieten’, in: V.  Veltzke ed., Napoleon. Trikolore und 
Kaiseradler über Rhein und Weser (Köln etc. 2007) 192.
66 Pierre Henry, Histoire des préfets: Cent cinquante ans d’administration provinciale, 
1800–1950 (Paris 1950) 46; Monika Lahrkamp, Münster in napoleonischer Zeit: 1800–1815. 
Administration, Wirtschaft u. Gesellschaft im Zeichen von Säkularisation u. franz. Herrschaft 
(Münster 1976) 193–194.
5 PREFECTS: ‘TOOLS OF CONQUEST’ 
110
Hamburg, De Serre characterized him as a generous ‘homme de qualité’.67 
The General-Government in Amsterdam continued to monitor the 
department intermittently; reports or inspection rounds often 
included Lippe.
PrefecTS in The hanSeaTic DeParTmenTS
The administrative reorganization of the Hanseatic departments largely 
followed procedures developed during the integration of the Rhineland. 
Territorial divisions were decided upon in Paris, but exact subdivisions 
were determined on the spot. During March 1811, Intendant René de 
Chaban systematically sought to work out a new territorial division of 
Northwest Germany, as until then the borders of the departments had 
only been roughly mapped out. Few detailed topographical maps were 
available. As a former prefect, De Chaban knew well how inadequate 
demarcations could complicate the work. The division into arrondisse-
ments was largely in accordance with French law and, as a result, the popu-
lation and the territory were distributed relatively evenly among the 
departments. Where possible, De Chaban tried to take into account ‘local 
interests’ and ‘old habits’. For lands previously part of Berg or Westphalia, 
the existing district borders were used as a basis.68 
All three Hanseatic prefects came from ‘new’ Belgian of Rhenish 
departments. Intendant De Chaban doubted whether they should be 
granted full powers immediately, or that (like in Italy) the army should be 
given a certain degree of control, considering the German population 
knew ‘no fatherland’, and thus was guided by ‘personal advantage’ alone.69 
Indeed, military circles were an important source of candidates, as had 
been the case with De Lasteyrie du Saillant. De Chaban increasingly dis-
liked that his powers over the prefects were limited. He criticized the lack 
67 De Serre to his mother, 28 April 1813. G. de Serre ed., Correspondance du comte de Serre 
(1796–1824). Tome premier (Paris 1876) 282.
68 Burghart Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter der Französischen Revolution und Napoleons 
(1789–1813) (Hamburg 1998) 466–469; Bernd Wunder, ‘L’administration territoriale des 
départements allemands annexés par l’Empire napoléonien’, in: M.  Pertué ed., 
L’administration territoriale de la France (1750–1940) (Orléans 1998) 352–353.
69 Schmidt, Hamburg, 489–490.
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of centralization to properly ‘direct’ prefects; the introduction of 
Napoleonic governance was thereby hampered, he argued.70
Charles-Philippe d’Arberg, from the Belgian town of Jemappes, was 
made prefect of Bouches-du-Weser, operating from préfecture Bremen. 
He was a son of a general and a lady of the court of former Empress 
Joséphine. In other ways, too, he was related to prominent state officials: 
D’Arberg’s sisters were married to General Louis Klein and General 
George Mouton. As auditeur of the Council of State he was charged with 
diplomatic missions, such as the Peace of Tilsit in July 1807, and made a 
military career. In 1808, as Governor, he had to watch over the abdicated 
Spanish king, who was obliged to reside in the Castle of Valençay. As a 
man with both diplomatic and military backgrounds, he was an excellent 
candidate for the post in peripheral Bremen. Known are d’Arberg’s inter-
ventions in public health, and his actions against rebellious movements in 
his department.71
Karel Lodewijk van Keverberg, or Karl Ludwig von Keverberg, was 
appointed prefect of Ems-Supérieur, working from Osnabrück. Von 
Keverberg was born in Haelen in the Dutch-speaking part of the Prince- 
Bishopric of Liège, near the borders with the Dutch Republic and Prussian 
regions. Von Keverberg was talented, a member of a prominent Rhenish 
noble family, and familiar with German society. He had studied at Prussian 
universities with the intention of making a career there. The French 
Revolution temporarily interrupted his ambitions; with Napoleon’s coup- 
d’état, he quickly climbed all the sports of the French administrative lad-
der, beginning as the maire of his birthplace, working his way up to 
subprefect of Cleve. Von Keverberg requested to be appointed prefect of 
a department along the Rhine, but this would not be in keeping with the 
official policy of appointing as few administrators as possible from the 
region. Moreover, a polyglot like Von Keverberg could be useful else-
where. With the incorporation, Von Keverberg, supported by his prefect, 
70 De Chaban to Davout, 16 April 1812. Georges Servières, L’Allemagne française sous 
Napoléon Ier, d’après des documents inédits tirés des Archives Nationales et des Archives des 
Affaires Étrangères (Paris 1904) 479–481.
71 Biographie nouvelle des contemporains… Tome premier (Paris 1820) 228; Helmut Stubbe 
da Luz, ‘Franzosenzeit’ in Norddeutschland (1803–1814). Napoleons Hanseatische 
Departements (Bremen 2003) 157, 291.
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pleaded with Minister De Montalivet, emphasizing his deep knowledge of 
German society.72
The sharp-minded Von Keverberg quickly realized that rigidly intro-
ducing Napoleonic governance would encounter problems and advocated 
a less strict implementation. Especially the wide range of traditional-local 
governance in Northwest Germany differed from the principles of French 
administrative regulations. Although the Commission in Hamburg under-
stood Von Keverberg’s objections, he was urged to stay close to the French 
example.73 During his term of office, Von Keverberg tried to reconcile 
French and German interests, and urged Napoleonic officials to be com-
passionate as inhabitants’ dissatisfaction with reforms came not out of 
anti-French feelings, but ‘out of love for their native country’. Ministers in 
Paris were susceptible to his arguments.74 Von Keverberg became increas-
ingly critical. He resented the repressive measures following the unrest in 
the Hanseatic departments, early 1813, its populations had been placed 
under a state of emergency. The prefect complained to Davout that inhab-
itants had made enough sacrifices in previous years.75
Lastly, Patrice de Coninck, from the Flemish town of Bruges, became 
prefect of Bouches-de-l’Elbe. He had substantial administrative experi-
ence, as mentioned earlier, having been prefect of Jemappes and Bouches- 
de- l’Escaut. De Coninck’s name had not been on the list of prefectoral 
candidates presented to the emperor by the Paris Minister of the Interior. 
Given the profile of De Coninck, and his provenance, it can be assumed 
that De Coninck had been proposed by Charles-François Lebrun. In 
Hamburg, De Coninck was a skillful administrator and pursued a moder-
ate policy, but was considered, especially by the army, as neither very ener-
getic nor particularly diligent.76 Also, Davout and De Chaban had their 
reservations about De Coninck—in their eyes, in this extraordinary border 
region, outstanding prefects were needed. But De Coninck was not viewed 
72 Antoinette Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk in Deutschland: Das 
Oberemsdepartement (1810–1813)’, Osnabrücker Mitteilungen 80 (1973) 39–41; Michael 
Rowe, From Reich to state: The Rhineland in the revolutionary age, 1780–1830 (Cambridge 
and New York 2003) 94.
73 Antoinette Joulia, ‘Les institutions administratives des départements hanséatiques’, 
Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 17 (1970) 890–891.
74 Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk’, 65–66.
75 Stubbe da Luz, ‘Franzosenzeit’ in Norddeutschland, 221, 291.
76 Swantje Naumann and Helmut Stubbe da Luz, Die französischen Besatzer in Hamburg. 
Zeugnisse zu den Jahren 1811–1814 (Hamburg 2013) 293–294.
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as an exceptionally hard worker, nor very perceptive. The prefect wanted to 
keep everyone happy, according to Davout, who tried to replace De 
Coninck.77 De Coninck, in a letter to the Minister of the Interior in Paris, 
stressed that the Government Commission was doing too little to gain the 
general confidence of locals, which was not beneficial for their loyalty to 
the Empire.78 When in February 1813 rumor spread that the Russians 
were about to take Hamburg, De Coninck, just having sent a letter to 
Paris affirming the loyalty of his department, attempted suicide, which was 
thwarted in time by a civil servant.79
circulaTion of préfets
As a part of empire-building, numerous former landdrosten had been sent 
to France. The landdrost of the dissolved Utrecht department, Jan Hendrik 
van Lynden van Lunenburg, was compensated with membership of the 
Corps législatif in Paris—just like his fellow landdrost Willem Queysen of 
Oost-Friesland.80 Plus, two landdrosten were promoted to prefect and 
exchanged places with French colleagues. Carel Gerard Hultman from 
The Hague went to Avignon, be take over the prefectship of Vaucluse 
from De Stassart. And Jan van Styrum exchanged Amsterdam for Nantes, 
to succeed De Celles in Loire-Inférieure. The latter quickly acquired the 
reputation in Nantes of a generous and friendly man who did his utmost 
for the community, so it is said. His son, Jan van Styrum jr., had traveled 
with him to France and had been made auditeur, with the prospect of a 
fine career within the Empire. But son Jan died on 8 May 1812, which 
weighed heavily on the parents. Eventually, Van Styrum had to resign in 
February 1813, when he came into conflict with the central government 
over conscription matters.81
77 Schmidt, Hamburg, 494.
78 Silvia Marzagalli, ‘Administrer à la française une ville allemande: Les difficultés au quoti-
dien vues de Hambourg’, Beihefte der Francia 79 (2016) 104–105.
79 Hyacinthe-Claude-Félix de Barthélemy, Souvenirs d’un ancien préfet (1787–1848) (Paris 
1886) 81; Alexandre Boudet de Puymaigre, Souvenirs sur l’émigration, l’empire et la restau-
ration (Paris 1884) 148–149.
80 Blok and Molhuysen ed., NNBW 3, 802.
81 Alphonsine Delaroche to her husband André Marie Constant Duméril, 19 October 
1812. S’écrire au XIXe siècle. Correspondance familiale, 1810–1819 (2010). http://corre-
spondancefamiliale.ehess.fr/index.php?1589; Irène Diet, Jules et Alice Sauerwein et 
l’anthroposophie en France (1999) 21; J. R. Persman, ‘Mr. Jan baron van Styrum, landdrost 
van Amstelland, 1807–1810’, Holland Historisch Tijdschrift 8 (1976) 27–36.
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Vaucluse’s prefect Carel Hultman, in contrast, remained on good terms 
with the central government. Hultman born in Zutphen, was a former 
moderate revolutionary, who had gained diplomatic experience at the 
Prussian court during the Batavian Republic. Under Louis Bonaparte sev-
eral distinguished posts were awarded him. That Hultman was a man from 
the center made him a good candidate for the French. Impartiality and 
honesty were seen as his qualities.82 In Avignon he is said to have made 
himself popular through ‘wise and fair administration’, and then to have 
returned to the Netherlands at his own request.83 Carel Hultman’s request 
came timely. Napoleon could make good use of an experienced Dutchman 
since two Dutch prefects were dismissed, namely Hofstede and Wichers. 
These had been quickly distrusted by the French, such as police official 
Réal, who considered them to be ‘weak’, both mentally and physically. 
Consequently, both Wichers and Hofstede were relieved of their duties on 
12 March 1813. Newspapers reported euphemistically that  they were 
‘called to other functions’.84 Hofstede’s loyalty was questioned. For 
instance, Réal was unpleasantly surprised that Hofstede’s sons did not 
serve in the army.85 His reluctance to fight desertion angered superi-
ors as well.
Hultman filled the gap left by Hofstede in Bouches-de-l’Yssel. Interior 
Minister De Montalivet desired a confidential correspondence with 
Hultman, so that the prefects (who, in his own words, had become ‘véri-
table français’) could gather ‘interesting details’ for Paris. Hultman was 
positive about the efforts and willingness of the territorial administrators, 
but was critical of their knowledge of the French prefectoral system. 
Particularly the Secretary-General, still clanged on to ‘old methods and 
forms’, wrote Hultman. There were also too few administrators who had 
a good command of the French language. Hultman indicated that 
improvements would take some time.86 Hultman kept repeating this argu-
ment for quite some time—which is surprising since the presumed ‘nov-
elty’ of prefectoral rule can be questioned, by the end of 1813.87
82 ‘M.  Gateau  - sur plusieurs Hollandais marquans’, 30 July 1810. Colenbrander ed., 
Gedenkstukken VI, no. 35.
83 Galerie historique des contemporains, ou nouvelle biographie… V (Bruxelles 1819) 348.
84 Gazzetta di Genova, 7 April 1813.
85 ‘Rapport du conseiler d’État Réal sur sa mission en Hollande’, July 1811. Colenbrander 
ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 274.
86 Hultman to De Montalivet, 20 June 1813. Ibid., no. 719.
87 Hultman to De Montalivet, 30 September 1813. Ibid., no. 720.
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For many years, only one prefect from Old France had been active in the 
Netherlands, namely Nicolas Frémin de Beaumont, from Coutance. But 
when the Napoleonic Empire came under increasing tension, a person from 
Old France was sought to strengthen the grip of the state. Ems- Occidental’s 
prefect Wichers, being ‘too old’ and too concerned with the needs of the 
local population, was replaced with Claude-Auguste Petit de Beauverger. 
Petit de Beauverger, born in the Bourgogne, had been the Secretary-General 
of Government Commission in Hamburg, working under Davout and De 
Chaban. Before that, he had been a departmental councilor in Paris, and 
member of the Legislative Corps. He was a brother- in- law of Nicolas 
Frochot, who from 1800 to 1812 had been prefect of the important Seine 
department. Shortly before, Frochot’s son Étienne had been appointed sub-
prefect in Oldenburg, within Petit de Beauverger’s sphere of influence. Petit 
de Beauverger has been characterized as a compliant follower of Napoleon.88
The General-Government in Amsterdam took a reserved attitude. 
When Petit de Beauverger arrived in Groningen, General-Governor 
Lebrun informed him that Intendant Dalphonse might have a consultative 
role, but his views were widely appreciated. And Lebrun also warned 
against the very positive newspaper articles, which could be interpreted as 
flattery by the Dutch. Lebrun also objected to negative reports on the 
previous prefect.89 So relations between the General-Government and 
Petit de Beauverger were strained, and contrary to fellow-new-prefect 
Hultman, Petit de Beauverger was considerably more pessimistic on the 
progress. He saw little enthusiasm among the population. Moreover, 
according to the prefect, there were few dedicated people among civil 
servants and other state officials. Petit de Beauverger did not encounter 
any open opposition, but he did observe inertia and tacit resistance. 
Nevertheless, taxation and conscription encountered few problems, 
according to the prefect.90
In Northwest Germany only one staff-change occurred, namely follow-
ing the uprisings of early 1813 and subsequent fall of prefect Patrice de 
Coninck. Charles-Achille-Stanilas-Emile le Tonnelier de Breteuil, De 
Coninck’s replacement, brought with him imperial know-how. Originally 
88 Dictionnaire des parlementaires français I (Paris 1889) 231.
89 Lebrun to Petit de Beauverger, 1 May 1813. A.-C.  Lebrun, ‘Notice biographique’, 
in:  A.-C.  Lebrun ed., Opinions, rapports, et choix d’écrits politiques de Charles-Franc ̜ois 
Lebrun, duc de Plaisance (Paris 1829) 142–143.
90 Petit de Beauverger to De Montalivet, 29 September 1813. Colenbrander ed., 
Gedenkstukken VI, no. 724.
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from Paris, Breteuil had studied at the École Polytechnique, together with 
Charles de Choiseul-Praslin, married Le Tonnelier de Breteuil’s sister 
Charlotte, and become high officer of National Guard in Paris. Charlotte 
Le Tonnelier de Breteuil maintained a network to promote her brother’s 
career. The ardent prefect had earlier held the position of Intendant of 
Styria and Lower Carniola, in the Illyrian Provinces. On 30 November 
1810, he was appointed prefect of Nièvre, from where he was transferred 
to Hamburg in March 1813.91 As one of the emperor’s staunchest sup-
porters, he quickly recognized the difficult task he was facing, as he wrote 
to his minister: ‘I see clearly that we are hated […] I hope we will force 
[the inhabitants] to love the Emperor and serve him as faithful subjects’.92 
In retrospect,  tax inspector Boudet de Puymaigre characterized Le 
Tonnelier de Breteuil as highly influenceable. According to Boudet de 
Puymaigre, he was exceptionally loyal to Napoleon.93 Such an obedient 
figure was exactly what Paris wanted, considering the circumstances, but it 
is doubtful whether the prefect’s appointment was beneficial to integration.
Maps 5.1 and 5.2 show the origins and geographical mobility of people 
who were appointed prefect, respectively in the Netherlands and Northwest 
Germany.94 Black lines visualize the individual administrative careers, 
which gives insight into the circulation of prefects within the Empire. 
Orange circles represent birthplaces; the larger their size, the more often a 
person from that location was appointed to a new post—or persons, in the 
case of shared places of birth.
Most prefects in the Dutch departments originally came from the Low 
Countries, either the former Dutch Republic or the Southern Netherlands. 
Only two came from Old France. Nevertheless, as the maps shows, 
‘Belgian’ prefects were in charge of virtually the entire Dutch coastline: 
De Coninck and Pycke in Zeeland, De Stassart in South-Holland, and De 
Celles in North-Holland and the West Frisian Islands. Hardliners De 
91 Étienne Léon de Lamothe-Langon, Biographie des préfets, depuis l’organisation des pré-
fectures, 3 mars 1800, jusqu’à ce jour (1826) 94–96; Servières, L’Allemagne française sous 
Napoléon, 485–487.
92 Jean Vidalenc, ‘Les ‘départements hanséatiques’ et l’administration napoléonienne’, 
Francia 1 (1973) 440–441.
93 Boudet de Puymaigre, Souvenirs sur l’émigration, 160.
94 For more information on the visualisation data see next chapter, as well as the dataset: 
Martijn van der Burg, Napoleonic prefects and subprefects in the Netherlands and Northwest 
Germany (Palladio project), Humanities Commons, 17 September 2020. https://doi.
org/10.17613/9zn2-r331
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Celles and De Stassart controlled the densely populated western parts of 
the Netherlands. Prefects of Dutch descent were generally  not mobile; 
they seldom traveled further than two departments. Hultman was the 
exception to the rule, having a continuous and mobile Napoleonic career.
Prefects in the Northwest German departments originally came from 
‘Old’ France and the former Southern Netherlands, except for ‘Dutch/
Prussian/Rhenish’ Van/Von Keverberg. Prefects posted in Northwest 
Germany were rather mobile, having served throughout the Empire, spe-
cifically the French heartland. This difference between the  Napoleonic 
Map 5.1 Circulation of the Napoleonic prefects in the Dutch departments
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officials in the Dutch departments and those in the German departments 
will become even more apparent in the next chapter on the subprefects.
Prefects of French descent in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany 
often continued their work in a post-Napoleonic French department, 
think of Frémin de Beaumont, Petit de Beauverger, and Le Tonnelier de 
Breteuil. Lippe’s prefect Lasteyrie du Saillant fled to France in late 1813. 
The sources are silent about what happened to him afterward, apart from 
his death in 1833 in Saint Rabier in the south of France, not far from his 
native soil. When the Cossacks advanced, Ems-Oriental’s prefect Jannesson 
Map 5.2 Circulation of the Napoleonic prefects in the Northwest German 
departments
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did not manage to flee in time and was imprisoned. After the war, he went 
back to his properties in Alsace. But many French officials remained 
administratively active during the Restoration.95
Prefects of Dutch descent often were appointed gouverneur in the 
newly established Kingdom of the Netherlands, or another administrative 
post. This was also the case for ‘well-liked’ Belgians, De Coninck and 
Pycke, who in the years after Waterloo became Dutch gouverneur in 
Antwerp, and Ghent respectively. Van Keverberg became gouverneur in 
Antwerp and Ghent, changing places with De Coninck and Pycke. The 
other Belgian prefects De Celles and De Stassart held no public offices 
until 1821. Briefly, during the Hundred Days, De Stassart was member of 
Napoleon’s Council of State. After 1821 both men became oppositional 
members of the Second Chamber of the Dutch Estates-General. Both 
would play a leading role in the Belgian Revolt in 1830.
naPoleonic PrefecTS comPareD
Stuart Woolf rightly noted that prefects have been ‘tools of conquest’, dur-
ing Napoleon’s ‘integration of Europe’ (to again quote Woolf). Arguably, 
‘tools of incorporation’ would have been an apt label. Following the phase 
of conquest, prefects embodied the pursuit of binding departments to the 
central state and had a pivotal function between the actual taking of a ter-
ritory and more elaborate attempts at its integration. As the Empire 
expanded, talented young men were systematically trained to represent the 
state at subnational level. However, not only personal qualities played a 
role to obtain a prestigious post. A balance had to be sought between 
selecting the most competent persons and those who had the best contacts.
Across Europe, prefects encountered problems when the uniform 
Napoleonic system of territorial governance came into contact with local 
and regional governing practices. Prefects individually had to make assess-
ments, which had repercussions on the effectiveness of the prefectoral sys-
tem. While prefects did not take equal consideration of the wishes of all, 
they undeniably had a high degree of self-determination. The incorpora-
tion process therefore, to some extent, took existing situations into 
account. For pragmatic reasons, and a certain willingness to recognize 
regional diversity, boundaries of the Dutch departments largely followed 
95 For the post-Napoleonic careers of imperial officials, see Aurélien Lignereux, Les impéri-
aux: administrer et habiter l’Europe de Napoléon (Paris 2019).
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traditional provincial and departmental borders. For example, Friesland 
(Frise) could retain its old name, and Zeeland, at the request of locals, was 
granted a department of its own (Bouches-de-l’Escaut). Likewise, the cre-
ation of the German Lippe department shows the preparedness to listen to 
local elites’ wishes. Strikingly, precisely in the ‘intermediate’ departments 
of Ems-Oriental and Lippe, feelings of regional uniqueness developed in 
opposition to the Dutch—within a French context.
A difference between the Netherlands and Northwest Germany was the 
novelty of Napoleonic territorial governance. During the Batavian 
Revolution, the Dutch had already become acquainted with ‘depart-
ments’ as replacements for the Provinces. And under Louis Bonaparte, the 
usefulness of a prefect-like character, in the form of the landdrost, was 
recognized. Many Dutch officials could therefore continue their work 
within the French state. Some Dutchmen were even considered compe-
tent enough to become prefect in France. Northwest Germans, in con-
trast, were never appointed to high posts in other parts of the Empire. Nor 
had Northwest Germany had precursors to the prefectoral system, apart 
from the ex-prefects from the Kingdom of Westphalia, and, to a much 
lesser extent, the Prussian Kriegs- und Domänenräte.
The Dutch prefectoral corps North of the Rhine, was a mixture of 
‘Belgians’ and Dutchmen. Most of them, coming from the circles around 
Lebrun and his acquaintances, preferred a mild approach. De Stassart and 
De Celles were exceptions, but influential ones, who controlled the strate-
gic and densely populated coastal departments. By contrast, prefects of 
Dutch origin—often former Orangists or former revolutionaries of mod-
erate signature—developed various strategies to deal with their superiors. 
That Dutch prefects were outspoken, or were not Napoleon’s most ardent 
supporters, was not an insurmountable problem, but failing to carry out 
orders altogether was an issue. Less fervent prefects tried to keep different 
parties satisfied. Some of them faithfully followed the directives of 
Ministers, but did not do anything extra, whether or not without explicitly 
expressing their reservations. Others carried out instructions as they 
received them from higher up, but gave their own interpretation to them, 
in the hope of softening measures. Frequently, delays occurred in the exe-
cution of orders, or information flow from below. This could buy time for 
prefects to operate at their own discretion. Many native prefects empha-
sized, sometimes for years, the novelty of the French system, which would 
be the cause of inadequacies.
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The prefects in Northwest Germany came predominantly Old France, 
except Fleming De Coninck and Van/Von Keverberg—the latter cannot 
be categorized as either ‘Belgian’, Dutch, or Prussian. And the more mili-
tary character of the prefectoral corps of Northwest Germany stands out, 
compared to the predominantly civilian character of the Dutch prefects, 
both north and south of the Rhine. The controversy over the appointment 
of Ems-Oriental’s prefect (a Dutch-civil administrator or French-military 
one?) is exemplary. Strikingly, family relations played a more important 
role in Northwest Germany than in the Netherlands. Prefect were more 
often related, not seldom via their sisters, to other high officials: Petit de 
Beauverger to the Frochot family; Jannesson and Arberg to Generals like 
Mouton and Klein; Breteuil to Charles de Choiseul-Praslin. This was also 
apparent outside the prefectoral corps.
It seems the influence of the General-Government in Amsterdam on 
‘its’ prefects was greater than Davout’s and De Chaban’s influence on pre-
fects in Northwest Germany, much to the disappointment of Intendant 
De Chaban. In Amsterdam, given his position, Lebrun had no daily con-
tact with prefects, yet he did occasionally intervene. Lebrun criticized pre-
fects for their behavior when he believed prefects did not strictly abide the 
law, or when prefects’ behavior did not contribute to good governance—
for example, when, in his eyes, they were too ambitious or too negative 
toward the Dutch. Intendant Dalphonse often entered into discussions 
with reluctant prefects, either French or Dutch. Dalphonse and Lebrun 
did not want to dictate the prefects’ entire behavior, but did expect pre-
fects to do their utmost to find a middle way between introducing the 
French system and respecting Dutch traditions. In the last year of 
Napoleonic rule, when doubts about the docility of the North grew 
sharply, Paris increased the share of French prefects in the northern 
periphery.
In the post-Napoleonic period, former prefects continued their activi-
ties in France, the Netherlands or, later, Belgium. None of them pursued 
a career in a part of Northwest Germany. As for national(ist) remem-
brance, Dutch and German eye-witnesses who subsequently wrote about 
the prefects were often rather mild in their judgment. Frequently, they 
noted that prefects had had an eye for local needs, or at least had sought 
to leniently apply orders from above. Most chroniclers agreed that ‘it 
could have been a lot worse’, compared to the minority of zealous pre-
fects. Prefects were generally not blamed for the excesses of the Napoleonic 
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period, even though prefects were undeniably co-responsible for the 
implementation of detested measures like conscription.
In sum, in both regions a balance was sought between, on the one 
hand, firming imperial grip via the strict implementation of Napoleonic 
governance, and, on the other hand, entrusting authority to locals and 
respecting traditions. In the Northwest German case, the former approach 
prevailed, in the Netherlands the latter was more present. Despite these 
regional differences, the prefectoral system functioned for the most part, 
which confirms the image of prefects as tools of incorporation. This did 
not mean that Napoleonic measures could be introduced without ques-
tion.  To further explore the subtleties of Napoleonic governance, it is 
worthwhile zooming in on the arrondissements (districts), where subpre-
fects were responsible for the integration process. These persons, as well as 
the difficulties they encountered, will be the focus of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
Subprefects: (Trans)Regional Tools 
of Integration?
Abstract This chapter examines the Napoleonic subprefects who have 
been in office in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany. Within the 
prefectoral system, these sous-préfets were the highest officials at arrondisse-
ment (disctrict) level.  Activities of subprefects, somewhat neglected by 
historians, give insight into how French tried to rally the locals, and how 
this affected the daily functioning of the Empire. Discussed are subpre-
fects’ sociocultural backgrounds, imperial careers, and perception of 
Napoleonic governance. Subprefects had to balance national, local, and 
personal interest. Integration at district level was hard when the letter of 
the administrative legislation and the precise instructions from above were 
rigidly adhered to. Subprefects traveling the Empire linked events in the 
Netherlands and Northwest Germany to developments elsewhere, pro-
moting integration into the Empire. Circulation patterns reflect different 
ideas on the required level of integration. It is argued that the figure of the 
subprefect was a potential ‘tool of integration’. That subprefects were 
close to the ground could contributed to the effectiveness of Napoleonic 
governance. But subprefects also coped with demanding prefects, and 
interference of other agents of the central state. Reversely, unwilling sub-
prefects were in a position to hinder the integration process.




The preceding chapter explored the role of prefects in the integration of 
the Netherlands and Northwest Germany. Further down the chain of ter-
ritorial governance were additional administrative entities. Each French 
department was divided into arrondissements (districts), usually three to 
five, which were headed by a sous-préfet (subprefect). Whereas the 
Napoleonic prefects had to position themselves vis-à-vis the central 
authorities and other high state representatives, subprefects had the deli-
cate task of being in direct contact with local communities. Even if these 
figures were not the most noticeable ones, the filling of their posts was of 
importance. For example, a subprefect had to ensure conscription was 
observed, municipal administration ran smoothly, and taxes were correctly 
levied. Under Napoleon, the role of subprefects further increased. 
Originally, it were the prefects who fulfilled the role of subprefect in the 
departmental capital, but from 1809 onward, an auditeur was appointed 
subprefect next to the prefect. Although this, of course, strengthened the 
grip of the central government, it was primarily a question of efficiency. 
Many prefects had indicated that they wanted to concentrate themselves 
on general matters of administration to speed up work.1
As potential checks and balances between the interests of core and 
periphery, subprefects were noteworthy agents of the central state. Even 
more than in the case of the prefects, it was desirable that subprefects were 
able to establish a working relationship with the locals, without sacrificing 
the core values of the Napoleonic state model. Knowledge of foreign lan-
guages and of administrative practices were welcome qualifications for 
subprefects, to adequately fulfill their duties. Scholars of Napoleonic 
Europe have shown that the central state could only successfully assert its 
power if it entered into a relationship with older social, economic, and 
cultural structures, even if old systems had been abolished.2 In many parts 
of the Grand Empire, bureaucrats and dignitaries came from the tradi-
tional socioeconomic elite. From their midst, experienced bureaucrats 
could be employed to staff the expanding imperial state apparatus. Without 
their knowledge and skills, the state could not function as well as it should. 
The pursuit of general support was called ralliement. Subprefects were 
1 Jean Tulard, Napoléon et 40 millions de sujets: La centralisation et le premier empire (Paris 
2014) 119–126.
2 Alexander Grab, Napoleon and the transformation of Europe (Basingstoke 2003) 208–209.
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potentially significant figures in the departments for the advancement of 
ralliement, certainly in the imperial periphery, where Napoleonic gover-
nance was contested, which led to numerous gradations of ralliement.3
Ideally, from a Napoleonic viewpoint at least, local elites would uncon-
ditionally accept French culture. This process was called amalgamation. 
The endeavor  was to mold new subjects into genuine Frenchmen.4 As 
shown earlier, amalgamation was by no means undisputed among French 
authorities. It is true that some French saw Germans as people ‘without a 
fatherland’, but not all aimed at a complete cultural assimilation. As for the 
Dutch, there was even less consensus on the extent to which ralliement 
should lead to amalgamation. Consequently, there were differences of 
opinion on the degree to which the new subjects could be allowed to gov-
ern themselves. Therefore, subprefects had to balance the interests of 
many actors.
Subprefects’ balancing skills were especially put to the test in early 1813 
when a revolt started in Hamburg. While the French retreated behind the 
Elbe, Russian troops took Hamburg, whereupon uprisings broke out in 
other northern areas. Also in the Dutch departments unease grew. French 
managed to retaliate within a few months. Northwest German towns were 
punished after being recaptured, and repressive actions in the Netherlands 
intensified. These developments had direct impact on the functioning of 
subprefects due to their wide geographical distribution, and close local 
contacts.
This chapter investigates the selection, appointment, careering, and 
functioning of subprefects in the Dutch and Northwest German depart-
ments. In total, 66 individuals have been employed in the prefectoral sys-
tem as subprefects in the northern imperial periphery, of whom 43 in the 
3 Gavin Daly, Inside Napoleonic France. State and society in Rouen, 1800–1815 (Aldershot 
2001) 64; Jeff Horn, ‘Building the new Regime: Founding the Bonapartist state in the 
department of the Aube’, French Historical Studies 25 (2002) 250–251. https://doi.
org/10.1215/00161071-25-2-225; Michael Rowe, ‘Between Empire and home town: 
Napoleonic rule on the Rhine, 1799–1814’, The Historical Journal 42 (1999) 651–652. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X9900850X; Michael Rowe, From Reich to state: The 
Rhineland in the revolutionary age, 1780–1830 (Cambridge and New York 2003); Stuart 
Woolf, Napoleon’s integration of Europe (London and New York 1991) 109–110; Leonard 
den Boef, De (on)macht van de elite. De inlijving van het arrondissement Utrecht bij het 
Napoleontische Keizerrijk (Thesis University of Amsterdam 2012).
4 Michael Broers, ‘Cultural imperialism in a European context? Political culture and cul-
tural politics in Napoleonic Italy’, Past and Present (2001) 154–155. https://doi.
org/10.1093/past/170.1.152
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Dutch departments and 23 in Northwest Germany.5 The provenance and 
sociocultural backgrounds of these subprefects will be discussed, and sub-
sequently their mobility. To what extent has the circulation of subprefects 
across the Empire been instrumentalized to promote integration? 
Furthermore, their participation in the integration process will be exam-
ined. Prefects might have been the ‘tools of conquest’, or ‘tools of incor-
poration’, in their turn subprefects were potential ‘tools of integration’.
recruiting suBprefects for the north
The subprefect recruitment policy resembled that of prefects. The Ministry 
of the Interior selected prospective subprefects among talented auditeurs. 
Family and friendship relationships also were factors in the selection pro-
cess. An impression of this can be found in the memoirs of Hyacinthe- 
Claude- Félix de Barthélemy, the son of a senator who was appointed 
subprefect of Lüneburg: ‘[Minister De Montalivet] welcomed me with 
great friendliness and offered me lunch; he congratulated me on my 
knowledge of German […] At that time the Ministry was thinking of com-
pletely organizing the prefectoral system in Germany, by placing there the 
auditors with a knowledge of the language; all my patrons unanimously 
urged me to try my fortune in this direction. Baron [Nicolas-Marie 
Quinette, State Councilor] himself gave the minister the letter in which 
my father asked the sub-prefecture of Lübeck for me’.6 Actually, auditor 
De Barthélemy was appointed subprefect of Lüneburg, Lübeck was 
awarded to Marie Louis François Constant Himbert de Flégny, who had 
even stronger family connections, being the son of the prefect of the 
Vosges department, Louis-Alexandre Himbert de Flégny. Likewise, their 
5 The prosopographical, casu quo network research is based on name lists as published in 
the annual Almanach impériale. Newspapers, such as the Allgemeine Zeitung, Journal du 
Soir, Journal de Paris, and Journal de l’Empire reported on newly appointed subprefects, 
thus providing insight into their personal mobility. These data have been enriched with bio-
graphical information from various (online) sources (e.g., www.biografischportaal.nl; 
Wikipedia, and http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/repertoriumambtsdragersambtena-
ren1428-1861). Findings are visualized geographically with the application Palladio, devel-
oped by Stanford University. See https://hdlab.stanford.edu/palladio/—the dataset is 
accessible online at https://doi.org/10.17613/9zn2-r331—entitled Napoleonic prefects 
and subprefects in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany (Palladio project), Humanities 
Commons, 17 September 2020.




direct colleague Armand de Salperwick, at that time subprefect of 
Montauban, was recommended to be posted in Bremen by his relative 
Félix Le Peletier d’Aunay, prefect of Tarn-et-Garonne.7 So, there was a 
well-defined pool of potential subprefects, namely the French auditors 
who were proficient in German, had an impeccable reputation, and were 
supported by high officials.8
In the Netherlands, Charles-François Lebrun, with his clientilist circle, 
was of course involved in suggesting possible subprefects. For the sake of 
creating support and continuity, it was obvious to retain skilled kwartier-
drosten (the subprefect-like administrators in the districts of the former 
Kingdom of Holland), plus recruiting a certain amount of Frenchmen. 
Nevertheless, French authorities in the Netherlands were not always in 
agreement. For instance, Intendant Dalphonse and prefect De Stassart 
had suggested to appoint the Frenchman Defontaine as subprefect of 
Dordrecht. This man originally came from Vivarais, was married to a 
Catholic and distinguished Dutch woman. General-Governor Lebrun, in 
contrast, opted for the incumbent kwartierdrost Johan Repelaer to serve 
as subprefect. However, Repelaer would not live up to expectations; 
Minister De Montalivet reprimanded him a few years later because he was 
said to be insufficiently diligent. Defontaine later became deputy mayor of 
The Hague.9 When a new series of subprefects was appointed in April 
1813, Lebrun and Dalphonse appear not to have been involved in the 
selection process—it seems to their regret.10
That for Northwest Germany ‘ambition’ and ‘high potential’ were cru-
cial factors, as opposed to the factors ‘affinity’ or ‘experience’ in the 
Netherlands, is reflected in the ages of appointees. There, younger and less 
experienced men were posted compared to their colleagues in the 
Netherlands. On appointment, the median age of subprefects in the 
Netherlands was approximately 36 years. For the Northwest German sub-
prefects, their median age was about 28 years. And whereas subprefects 
stationed in the Netherlands often already had started  a career in 
7 Jean Vidalenc, ‘Les notables des départements hanséatiques’, Revue d’histoire moderne et 
contemporaine 17 (1970) 789.
8 Napoleon to Davout, 12 March 1811. Annie Jourdan ed., Correspondance générale. Tome 
dixième. Un Grand Empire, mars 1810–mars 1811 (Paris 2014) 26202.
9 Dalphonse to Lebrun, 30 May 1811. H.T. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken der alge-
meene geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840. VI: Inlijving en opstand 1810–1813 
(’s-Gravenhage 1912) no. 1176; De Montalivet to Repelaer, 23 June 1813. Ibid., no. 571.
10 Lebrun to Napoleon, 16 April 1813. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 408.
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administration, in Northwest Germany, being subprefect was for many a 
first significant position. Historian Vidalenc has characterized many of the 
Hanseatic subprefects as career-driven: ‘a curious mixture of protégés and 
ambitious persons determined not to let themselves be forgotten in dis-
tant posts’.11 Historian Stubbe da Luz has pointed out that many of them 
belonged to the highest-ranking group of auditeurs de première classe, per-
mitted to attend Conseil d’État meetings presided by the Emperor.12
rallying the local elites
Dutch Locals
Approximately 70 percent (30 individuals) of all subprefects stationed in 
the Dutch departments were of local origin. This proportion was initially 
even higher as during the incorporation progressively more non-Dutch 
subprefects were appointed. Many had experience in subnational adminis-
tration of the Kingdom of Holland. A total of 11 kwartierdrosten were 
directly retained as subprefect. In many other cases comparable local 
administrators, such as mayors or departmental ‘assessors’, were called 
upon. And in one case, a former landdrost was appointed as subprefect.
The backgrounds of subprefects of Dutch origin were moderately 
diverse. When appointed, a Dutch subprefect was about 38 years of age. 
Politically, the group was a mixture of moderate revolutionaries and for-
mer Orangists. There was a blend of subprefects with a noble background 
and subprefects with a bourgeois background—as far as different sociocul-
tural groups could be distinguished. The Dutch Republic had never 
known a prominent nobility. Borders between wealthy citizens and noble-
men were blurred, even within families there were various branches of 
aristocracy and non-aristocracy. Nonetheless, a distinction can be made 
between the West and the East. In the urbanized West there were more 
non-aristocratic subprefects, in contrast to the rural East. In eastern dis-
tricts, subprefects from the regional nobility governed in the manner of 
the eighteenth-century landed gentry. Sometimes they even resided in 
11 Vidalenc, ‘Les notables’, 789.
12 Helmut Stubbe da Luz, ‘Franzosenzeit’ in Norddeutschland (1803–1814). Napoleons 
Hanseatische Departements (Bremen 2003) 80.
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their country houses, instead of governing, as intended, from their office 
in the district capital.13
Compared to subprefects elsewhere, there were surprisingly few exten-
sive family relationships. Only in two cases (sub)prefects carried the same 
family name: both the subprefect of Almelo, Reinout Gerard van Tuyll van 
Serooskerken, and his third cousin Jan Maximiliaan, subprefect of Utrecht, 
came from the distinguished, noble Van Tuyll van Serooskerken family. 
And Coenraad Wolter Ellents Hofstede, subprefect of Assen (Ems 
Occidental) was the son of Petrus Hofstede who had been appointed pre-
fect of the department Bouches-de-l’Yssel. This Coenraad Hofstede seems 
to have been an active subprefect, according to a military report on the 
progress of conscription.14 Both the limited number of family connections 
and the diversity in terms of political and sociocultural background can be 
explained by that, usually, districts built upon the existing political- 
administrative elite; groups that, given the federalistic past, were regional 
specific.
Given their provenance, Dutch subprefects were known as respectable 
administrators, but some did display undesirable behavior, upon which the 
government took firm action. Take Amsterdam’s subprefect, Jan Frederik 
Abbema, who was somewhat of an outsider. Arrondissement Amsterdam 
was in fact a district of little importance since the city itself, as the third 
capital of the Empire, fell directly under the prefect; Amsterdam’s mayor 
Van Brienen was higher in hierarchy than the subprefect. Abbema, for-
merly secretary of the cabinet of King Louis Napoleon, had recently been 
married to Louise de Narbonne-Lara, an illegitimate granddaughter of 
French King Louis XV, through her father Louis Marie de Narbonne- 
Lara, an aide-de-camp of Emperor Napoleon. Abbema’s father was a 
Dutch Patriot who had lived in exile in Paris during the French 
Revolution.15 Abbema was dismissed for ‘having taken the liberty of 
receiving payments prohibited by law’, incarcerated in Amsterdam’s house 
of correction.16 He was succeeded by a subprefect from an old Amsterdam 
family, Willem Cornelis de Witt.
13 Ton Reichgelt, ‘De rol van de onderprefect van Zwolle bij de centralisatie van het 
bestuur in de Franse tijd’, Zwols Historisch Jaarboek 6 (1989) 59, 67.
14 C.  F. Gijsberti Hodenpijl, ‘De Fransche overheersching I-X’, Elsevier’s Geïllustreerd 
Maandschrift (1910) VI, 136.
15 P. J. Blok and P. C. Molhuysen ed., Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek. Deel 4 
(Leiden 1918) 2–4.
16 Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 1244.
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The most significant arrondissement in the Dutch departments was 
Rotterdam. There, former landdrost of Drenthe, aforementioned Jan 
Adriaan van Zuylen van Nijevelt, was appointed subprefect. He regularly 
came into conflict with his immediate superior, prefect De Stassart of 
Bouches-de-l’Meuse. Van Zuylen van Nijevelt addressed the Interior 
Minister directly about the tone of Stassart’s correspondence, and his 
sometimes arbitrary behavior. Intendant Dalphonse mediated and indi-
cated Van Zuylen van Nijevelt detested having been demoted from land-
drost to subprefect. Dalphonse supported him, upon which Minister De 
Montalivet expressed his confidence in the subprefect.17
Zuyderzée’s prefect, Antoine de Celles, was also greatly annoyed by the 
Dutch subprefects in his department. De Celles urged Minister De 
Montalivet to reprimand the subprefects for being openly dissatisfied. For 
instance, he described the subprefect of Hoorn, Edzard Jacob Rutger 
Mollerus, as ‘a poorly brought up child’, and the subprefect of Haarlem, 
Ewout van Vredenburch, as weak.18 The prefect put great pressure on his 
subordinates. Amersfoort’s subprefect, Albert Carel Snouckaert van 
Schauburg, complained that De Celles demanded excessive labor for the 
recruitment of volunteers for the army and had behaved inappropriate 
toward him. Snouckaert van Schauburg tried to resign whereupon Lebrun 
intervened and reprimanded De Celles.19
Prefect De Celles had the most trouble with the subprefect of Utrecht, 
Jan Maximiliaan van Tuyll van Serooskerken, another Dutch subprefect of 
a distinguished lineage. Van Tuyll van Serooskerken had difficulty trans-
mitting harmful measures to the maire, while at the same time having to 
force them to provide him with information. The subprefect tried to align 
the needs of the French with those of the local community. When the 
maire of Utrecht continued to respond slowly to inquiries, Van Tuyll van 
Serooskerken wrote: ‘I [dare] to flatter myself, that I always work to divert 
the unpleasantness, to which you are often exposed [… ] I need your spe-
cial cooperation, as without it I am unable to answer the orders by higher 
authority’.20 Strikingly, in his correspondence with prefect De Celles, he 
seems to have kept up appearances, and to have done just enough to be 
17 De Montalivet to Van Zuylen van Nijevelt, 3 February 1813. Ibid., no. 1591.
18 De Celles to De Montalivet, 14 April 1813. Ibid., no. 635.
19 Lebrun to De Celles, 4 February 1813. Amsterdam University Library, manuscript col-
lection, inv. no. 50G 1; Gijsberti Hodenpijl, ‘De Fransche overheersching I-X’, I, 258.
20 Van Tuyll van Serooskerken to the maires in his district, 22 September 1812. Het 
Utrechts Archief, Onderprefektuur Utrecht. Cf. Den Boef, De (on)macht van de elite.
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taken seriously. Subprefect Van Tuyll van Serooskerken sent reports every 
two weeks that resembled previous ones, as if nothing extraordinary ever 
happened. According to him, local sentiments were consistently excellent 
and the population was extremely willing to meet French wishes. In fact, 
young men would enthusiastically perform their military service, and some 
taxpayers were grieved they did not earn enough to pay taxes to their 
beloved Emperor, the subprefect claimed.
Of course, the prefect understood Van Tuyll van Serooskerken’s actions 
were not beneficial to the imperial cause. As of 1813, the recalcitrant sub-
prefect of Utrecht was obliged to send De Celles six confidential letters 
each  month, on  all potentially important matters. Without result, 
because Van Tuyll van Serooskerken continued to write similar reports. 
This to the dismay of prefect De Celles, who insisted that subprefect 
‘should not limit [himself] to repeating incessantly that everything is 
peaceful’, and stop copying previous reports over and over again.21 Van 
Tuyll van Serooskerken felt grieved De Celles treated him like a ‘rascal’, 
and in April 1813 submitted his resignation. This was not granted as it was 
considered criminal to resign at that difficult moment.22
The above examples are mainly set in an urban context. In rural areas, 
subprefects often came from the provincial elite. Take the subprefect of 
the district Heerenveen, Tinco Martinus Lycklama à Nijeholt, in the 
department Frise. As a rural subprefect, staffing the prefectoral system was 
a concern. Throughout his term of office, he struggled to find competent 
local administrators. The French had brought with them many administra-
tive gremia, with many posts, in a relatively sparsely populated region. 
Quite some candidates for administrative positions refused. The subpre-
fect had to appoint persons in several municipalities simultaneously, other-
wise a shortage was imminent. Lycklama à Nijeholt’s correspondence with 
municipalities also shows aptly that, although the subprefect correctly 
passed on orders to the maires, he did hardly come back to matters very 
proactively or ask for further information. He did exactly what was mini-
mally expected of him, and nothing more.23 Heerenveen’s subprefect was 
hardly the only one who displayed this kind of behavior.
21 G.  J. W.  Koolemans Beijnen ed., Historisch gedenkboek der herstelling van Neêrlands 
onafhankelijkheid in 1813. Vierde deel (Haarlem 1913) 356–357.
22 Gijsberti Hodenpijl, ‘De Fransche overheersching I-X’, I, 258.
23 Gemeentearchief Heerenveen, Gemeente Heerenveen 1812-oktober 1816, inv. no. 155.
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German Locals
About a quarter of all Northwest German arrondissements, not counting 
‘Dutch’ Ostfriesland, had already been familiarized with French-inspired 
territorial governance via the Grand Dutchy of Berg and the Kingdom of 
Westphalia. Former subprefects from these states were consequently 
potentially well-suited to introduce Napoleonic governance in the newly 
incorporated departments. Six subprefects (26 percent of the subprefects 
posted in Northwest Germany) came from Germany. Of the six native 
German subprefects, four had previously served as subprefect in a 
Napoleonic vassal monarchy. The aristocrat Clemens von Oer became 
subprefect of Steinfurt. After a career in Münster’s army, he was, in the 
short time that Prussia governed Münster, Landrat of Beckum. With the 
establishment of the Kingdom of Westphalia he became subprefect of 
Coesfeld, likewise near Münster. Von Oer thus had local roots, a Prussian 
past, as well as Westphalian experiences. Also of Westphalian nobility was 
Otto von Gruben who became subprefect of Bremerlehe. Previously he 
acted as Westphalian subprefect of Bremervörde.24
Not from the nobility, but from the small bourgeoisie, was Johann 
Christian Friedrich Eisendecher. This Hanoverian had had a good educa-
tion, as he was fluent in French, and had made a career in Hanover’s 
bureaucracy. He had been subprefect of Nienburg prior to the incorpora-
tion of northern parts of the Kingdom of Westphalia. In 1811 he became 
subprefect of the Quackenbrück district. Eisendecher, was seen as a sin-
cerely committed person, who was active and maintained good relations 
with everyone.25
The fourth former Westphalian subprefect was appointed in May 1812, 
namely Clamor von dem Bussche. This former lieutenant in the Prussian 
army had been subprefect of Minden but was initially not continued after 
the incorporation, because he was said to be not  competent enough. 
Prefect Keverberg successfully lobbied for him nonetheless.26
24 Vidalenc, ‘Les notables’, 789.
25 Antoinette Joulia, ‘Les institutions administratives des départements hanséatiques’, 
Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 17 (1970) 886–887.
26 Antoinette Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk in Deutschland: Das 
Oberemsdepartement (1810–1813)’, Osnabrücker Mitteilungen 80 (1973) 69–70; Bärbel 
Sunderbrink, Revolutionäre Neuordnung auf Zeit: gelebte Verfassungskultur im Königreich 
Westphalen: das Beispiel Minden-Ravensberg 1807–1813 (Paderborn 2015) 322.
 M. VAN&#X00A0;DER&#X00A0;BURG
133
Among the native German subprefects, there were only two without 
experience with French-inspired territorial governance. The first  was 
Michael Anton von Tenspolde, a former Prussian Kriegs- und Domänenrat 
in Münster, who was appointed subprefect of Neuenhaus. The second 
was Adolf Christian Börries Otto von Grote, who came from old 
Hanoverian nobility and was appointed subprefect of Lingen.27 Prefect 
Von Keverberg was very appreciative of Von Grote who he considered to 
be ‘full of zeal and devotion to imperial service, one of the promptest and 
most outspoken men in the three Hanseatic departments for the 
government’.28
Despite the small share of native German subprefects, there was a cer-
tain continuity in the Northwest German bureaucracy, but mainly in the 
lower echelons. In addition, the departmental council and the district 
council included many established names. This local administrative elite 
was consulted by French authorities, not only as a sign of goodwill toward 
them, but also out to tap into their knowledge.29
appointing foreign suBprefects
Foreign Subprefects in the Dutch Departments
Regarding the origins of the minority (13 = 30 percent) of non-Dutch 
subprefects in the Dutch departments, six came from ‘Old’ France, five 
from ‘New’ France, and two subprefects had a German background.30 A 
few French subprefects had a longer record of service, such as the 50-year- 
old Louis Gaston de Bonnechose. Former page of Louis XVI and from an 
ancient noble Norman family, he had made a career as cavalry Lieutenant 
Colonel. During the Terror, De Bonnechose temporarily fled to the Dutch 
Republic and married a Dutch woman. De Bonnechose was appointed 
27 Joulia, ‘Les institutions administratives’, 886.
28 Vidalenc, ‘Les notables’, 783.
29 Burghart Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter der Französischen Revolution und Napoleons 
(1789–1813) (Hamburg 1998) 482–483; Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk’, 33.
30 Alexander Diederik van Omphal van IJzendoorn, born in Tournai in the Southern 
Netherlands, is classified as a Dutch subprefect, since troops from the Dutch Republic were 
stationed here between 1713 and 1781, including his father Major Anthony Frederik. Joan 
Carel Gideon van der Brugghen van Croy, born in Colombo (Ceylon) as the son of a colonial 
administrator is equally classified as a Dutchman.
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subprefect of Nijmegen and would later become subprefect of Yvetot.31 
Other Frenchmen started their careers in the Dutch departments. Charles 
Henri David De Gestas, from Paris, was 23 years old when appointed sub-
prefect of The Hague in April 1811. He stayed there until the collapse of 
French rule in November 1813, and would become subprefect of Reims 
after the Hundred Days. Twenty-five-year-old François Louis Joseph de 
Bonnegens, from Saint-Jean-d’Angle (Charente-Inférieure) gained expe-
rience as a subprefect in Dutch Gorinchem. In April 1813 he was able to 
take up that post in Quimperlé (department Finistère) and Gorinchem 
received another French subprefect: Talleyrand’s protégé Alexandre-Pierre- 
Amédée Godeau d’Entraigues, former subprefect of Lille, born four years 
before the Revolution in the Province of Berry.
The ‘Belgian’ subprefects had gained experience with the prefectoral 
system after the incorporation of the Southern Netherlands in 1795. Most 
came relatively late to the North, in 1812 or 1813. Although the Belgian 
subprefects were a minority, some key posts were assigned to them. In the 
departmental capitals, the préfectures¸ where besides the subprefect other 
important Napoleonic institutions were also present, a subprefect of a 
non-Dutch origin was often appointed next to a Dutch prefect. Many 
were from the Southern Netherlands: Edouard Charles Marie Ghislain de 
Carnin de Staden in Zwolle; Jean Patrice O’Sullivan de Grass in Arnhem; 
and Edmond Delacoste in Groningen. In Frise, several years prefect 
Verstolk van Soelen, for reasons unknown, had no (neo)-French subpre-
fect next to him, in contrast to most prefects in the North. This was not 
known in Amsterdam for a long time.32 The Belgian auditeur Philibert 
François Jean Baptiste Joseph Van der Haeghen de Mussain, from Mons, 
finally took up this post in July 1813; aged 52, he was considerably older 
than other subprefects from the Southern Netherlands.
Whereas prefects of Belgian origin encountered much resistance, and 
hence were not always able to fulfill their tasks properly, subprefects from 
the South operated more efficiently. Zwolle’s subprefect De Carnin de 
Staden, from an esteemed West Flemish family, was committed to the 
Napoleonic case. On two occasions he even received a gratuity for 
31 Annales de la littérature et des arts XXXI (Paris 1828) 351–352.
32 Johan Joor, De Adelaar en het Lam: onrust, opruiing en onwilligheid in Nederland ten 




demonstrated diligence during his conscription activities.33 Deventer’s 
subprefect Pierre Louis Joseph Servais van Gobbelschroy, originally from 
Louvain, also had a good name. Their fellow Belgian subprefect Edmond 
Delacoste in Groningen made similar efforts. Whereas the Dutch prefect 
and subprefects were reluctant to take action against men who dodged 
conscription, sous-préfet Delacoste ordered his mayors to forcibly appre-
hend runaways and hold accomplices responsible.34
In all probability, loyal subprefects contributed to the replacement of 
their ‘weak’ Dutch prefect. When necessary, Belgian subprefects were seen 
as instruments to ‘steer’ Dutch prefects. One example is Arnhem’s subpre-
fect Jean Patrice O’Sullivan de Grass, from Brussels, with Irish ancestors. 
When Napoleonic rule in the Netherlands slowly crumbled, Intendant 
Dalphonse reminded him of his specific position to monitor the prefect’s 
functioning and to secretly report any obstacles.35
Lastly, two subprefects with a German background were posted in the 
Netherlands. Their activities were very limited though. Firstly, Johann 
Gerhard Druffel, from Münster, had in Prussian times been Geheime 
Staatsreferendar, and had become acquainted with the prefectoral system 
as a Secretary-General in former Grand Duchy of Berg. Subsequently, in 
the short period Münster was part of the Dutch departments, Druffel 
acted as subprefect of Almelo (Bouches-de-l’Yssel), but quickly returned 
to his native town to become Secretary-General of Lippe.36 Secondly, 
Gerhard von Lommessem, subprefect of Aachen in the Rhenish depart-
ment of the Roër, was in April 1813 appointed subprefect of Goes 
(Bouches-de-l’Escaut). The auditeur Von Lommessem replaced deputy 
Pieter Adrianus Ossewaarde, a native of Goes, who, according to the com-
missioner general of police, was not devoted enough, nor on good terms 
with the local military commander.37 But Von Lommessem showed little 
interest in Goes, was often absent and delegated his powers to local 
employees. Under the guise of being ill, he returned to Aachen. When, in 
33 Reichgelt, ‘De rol van de onderprefect’, 59–63.
34 Koolemans Beijnen ed., Historisch gedenkboek IV, 375–376.
35 Dalphonse to O’Sullivan de Grass, 7 October 1813. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken 
VI, no. 1612.
36 Johannes Katz, Das letzte Jahrzehnt des Fürstbistums Münster. Unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Tätigkeit des Geheimen Staatsreferendars Johann Gerhard Druffel 
(Digital reprint of 1933 doctoral dissertation, 2019) 140. https://www.lwl.org/hiko-
download/HiKo-Materialien_016_(2019).pdf
37 Donny to Savary, May/June 1811. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 755.
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October 1813, prefect Pycke summoned him back, Von Lommessem 
politely refused.38
Foreign Subprefects in the Northwest German Departments
Contrary to the large proportion of locals in the Dutch departments, sub-
prefects stationed in Northwest Germany largely came from Old France. 
Of the 23 subprefects in Northwest Germany, no less than 17 were of 
French origin (74 percent). Not surprisingly, they often came from border 
regions such as the Alsace, but not seldom also from the French heart-
land.39 For example, Marie Louis François Constant Himbert de Flégny 
was among the first wave of French to be sent to Northwest Germany, 
initially as employee of Intendant De Chaban, and soon as a subprefect of 
Lübeck. Himbert de Flégny came from an old noble family, as earlier men-
tioned, his father was prefect of the Vosges department.40
These French subprefects were given a more challenging task than their 
colleagues in the Netherlands, or their counterparts in earlier incorporated 
German areas, such as the Rhineland. In Northwest Germany, the French 
language and culture were less prominent. Moreover, Napoleonic France 
of 1810 was more demanding and repressive than the revolutionary France 
with which the German-speaking southern Low Countries and the 
Rhineland had had to deal. The distance between the Northwest German 
population and the French government was accordingly greater. Thus, 
lower-ranking German administrators, who had grown up without central 
state control, felt their freedom curtailed by superiors such as subprefects, 
which led to annoyances.41
The sometimes difficult relationships between the French and the 
Germans are exemplified in egodocuments of Lüneburg’s subprefect De 
Barthélemy. At the start of his term, he wrote his father: ‘We are little 
38 P. Scherft, De archieven der Prefectuur van het Departement der Monden van de Schelde 
en der onderprefecturen van de arrondissementen van Middelburg en Goes 1810–1814 
(’s-Gravenhage 1968).
39 No place of birth is recorded for some lesser-known subprefects, but on the basis of the 
family name, it
can be concluded that they, or their direct ancestors, originated from northeastern France. 
To simplify, one French-speaking subprefect of Swiss origin, Jacob Bouthillier de Beaumont, 
is counted here as a Frenchman.
40 Stubbe da Luz, ‘Franzosenzeit’ in Norddeutschland, 113.
41 Vidalenc, ‘Les notables’, 778.
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pasha’s here’, the population treated him with great respect. However, the 
maire of Lüneburg, 53-year-old Georg Ludwig Kruckenberg, looked 
down on the subprefect, and refused to correspond with a young man like 
De Barthélemy. The maire directly addressed the prefect, who, however, 
pointed out mayors had to answer to the subprefects. This caused quite a 
stir. Consequently, Governor Davout had to underline the authority of the 
subprefect toward the old administrative elite. Apart from clashes between 
locals and foreigners, subprefect De Barthélemy also noticed the delicate 
relationship between French themselves. The subprefect was critical of 
misbehaving French soldiers, but was keen on remaining on good terms 
with the military authorities.42
Not all French subprefects in Northwest Germany were necessarily bril-
liant officials in the making. Take the young nobleman Alfred Louis Jean 
Philippe de Chastellux, who was appointed subprefect of Hamburg. De 
Chastellux, son of a well-known Marshal of the same name, was supposed 
to serve in the army but managed to obtain a rare exemption from military 
service. During the evacuation of the Bouches-de-l’Elbe in March 1813, 
the General-Government had retreated to Osnabrück for two months. De 
Chastellux, however, cautiously withdrew to Paris claiming he wanted to 
put himself at the Minister’s disposal. He only slowly returned to his post 
at the insistence of the Minister and the new prefect Le Tonnelier de 
Breteuil, who was surprised not to find him in Osnabrück. As compensa-
tion, he joined the army and was employed in the recapture of Hamburg. 
Briefly, he was reappointed subprefect, but Le Tonnelier de Breteuil was 
glad to be able to send him back to France after a few months.43
It could be expected that exchanges of subprefects occurred between 
the Netherlands and Northwest Germany, given the relative geographical 
proximity, mutual intelligibility between Dutch and Low German, and 
recent common experiences. Arguably, an experienced former Dutch 
kwartierdrost could have helped to bridge the gap between traditional 
political culture and Napoleon governance in a nearby German district. 
Remarkably, however, the Netherlands and Northwest Germany were 
entirely separate clusters within the imperial prefectoral network. Not a 
single subprefect in the years under scrutiny was stationed both in the 
Netherlands and in Northwest Germany. The separate spheres are further 
42 Barthélemy, Souvenirs, 75–76.
43 Stubbe da Luz, ‘Franzosenzeit’ in Norddeutschland, 79–81; Vidalenc, ‘Les nota-
bles’, 789.
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exemplified by looking at German-speaking Ostfriesland (Ems-Oriental), 
which was formally supervised from Amsterdam, but tellingly did not 
count subprefects of Dutch descent. Ems-Oriental’s subprefects resem-
bled the profile of subprefects in the other German departments. Emperor 
Napoleon had, in fact, explicitly ordered his Minister of the Interior to 
appoint subprefects from Old France in Ems-Oriental, providing they 
spoke German.44 There was quite a bit of anti-Dutch sentiment among the 
population. Jan Remees Modderman, Dutch subprefect of 
Winschoten  (Ems-Oriental), reported discontent in the border region 
Reiderland/Rheiderland, a former Prussian area that had been added to 
the Dutch department of Groningen in 1807. Like other parts of the for-
mer Province of Ostfriesland, Dutch rule had not been warmly welcomed. 
Modderman reported  that  old military Prussian songs were sung, and 
that there was a desire to return to the German language and old forms of 
government.45
circulation of suBprefects across the empire
Besides the distinction between native and non-native subprefects, it is 
also relevant to explore the circulation of subprefects, in other words, the 
personal mobility within the Empire. Of the 23 subprefects who have 
been active in Northwest Germany, 10 were also appointed in other parts 
of the Empire (43 percent) at other moments. In contrast, in the 
Netherlands, of the 43 subprefects who have been active, 11 also were 
posted outside the Dutch departments (26 percent).
Maps 6.1 and 6.2 show the origins and geographical mobility of people 
who were appointed subprefect, respectively in Northwest Germany and 
in the Netherlands. Black lines visualize the individual administrative 
careers, which gives insight into the circulation of subprefects within the 
Empire. Orange circles represent birthplaces; the larger their size, the 
more often a person from that location was appointed to a new post—or 
multiple persons, in the case of shared places of birth.
Map 6.1 shows that subprefects active in Northwest Germany traveled 
over great distances and circulated between Catalonia, Italy and Northwest 
Germany. The majority originated from Central France. In particular, a 
group of primarily Old French officials played a surprising linking role 
44 Napoleon to De Montalivet, 14 May 1811. Jourdan ed., Correspondance générale 
X, 27060.
45 Modderman to Wichers, February 1813. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 1592.
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between the southern periphery of the Empire and the Northwest German 
departments.
To begin with, the young Pierre Emmanuel Frochot was appointed sub-
prefect of Oldenburg. Frochot was the son of prefect of the Seine depart-
ment, Nicolas-Thérèse-Benoît Frochot, a protégé of Charles- François 
Lebrun. Early 1811, the young Frochot was appointed subprefect of 
Angers, but held that post for only a few months as he applied for a position 
as special envoy (service extraordinaire) in Barcelona, which was about to 
Map 6.1 Circulation of the Napoleonic subprefects in the Northwest German 
departments
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be formally incorporated into the Empire.46 His Catalan achievements con-
tributed to his promotion to auditor first class, and subsequently his assign-
ment in Oldenburg. A French contemporary there remembered him as a 
‘rather spoiled young man, hot-tempered and distrustful’; in the national-
colored German memory he became ‘a well-thinking, finely-built young 
man’. It seems, Frochot preferred the path of gradual integration, like 
46 Jean Sibenaler, Les premiers préfets du Maine-et-Loire: naissance d’un département fran-
çais (2000) 34, 159–160.




many protégés of Lebrun, aiming at true ralliement. When in March 1813 
French troops tactically withdrew, Frochot had to flee Oldenburg. The 
subprefect passed on his authority to a committee of five renowned local 
dignitaries, who called on the population to keep the peace. However, 
when Oldenburg was recaptured, their attempts to keep the peace were 
interpreted by the returning military authorities as a call to rebellion. 
Frochot was unable to protect the locals from a show trial by the army. Two 
of them, Christian Daniel von Finckh and Albrecht Ludwig von Berger, 
were shot, the others imprisoned.47 In the last year of French rule in 
Northwest Germany, Frochot’s freedom of action must have been limited.
In Minden, Constantin Marie Louis Léon de Bouthillier-Chavigny was 
installed as subprefect. De Bouthillier-Chavigny came from a distinguished 
old French military family with close ties to the Bourbons. After the 
French Revolution, he fought against revolutionary France in the royalist 
Army of Condé, just like Lippe’s prefect Lasteyrie du Saillant. During this 
close cooperation with Austrian troops, De Bouthillier-Chavigny most 
likely became (somewhat) proficient in the German language. With 
Napoleon’s seizure of power, he considered the time ripe to return to his 
fatherland, where he lived for several years without official function. 
Financially, he was forced to seek a position, on which he was appointed in 
Autouillet (department of Yvelines), then subprefect in Alba (department 
of Stura, in Piedmont).48 He may not have been a loyal supporter of 
Napoleon, but his military upbringing and international experiences must 
have contributed to his relocation from Alba to newly incorporated Minden.
Late 1811, Jules David, eldest son of painter Jacques-Louis David, was 
appointed subprefect of Stade. David had started his career in 1805 as 
vice-consul in Civitavecchia (Papal States) and three years later in Otranto 
(Kingdom of Naples). This considerable experience in Italy contributed to 
Intendant De Chaban’s calling David to Northwest Germany, first as an 
employee of the General-Government, and then to managing the integra-
tion process in Stade.49
Less is known about other subprefects circulating between Southern 
Europe and Northwest Germany. Louis Zoé Ducros, former subprefect of 
47 Stubbe da Luz, ‘Franzosenzeit’ in Norddeutschland, 190–191.
48 Biographie des hommes vivants, ou histoire par ordre alphabétique de la vie publique… I 
(Paris 1816) 460–461; Joulia, ‘Les institutions administratives’, 886.
49 Stubbe da Luz, ‘Franzosenzeit’ in Norddeutschland, 239–242; Vidalenc, ‘Les nota-
bles’, 789.
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Spoleto (capital of the Trasimeno department), was appointed subprefect 
of Emden (capital of Ems-Oriental). Ducros came from a wealthy family, 
and was on the Breton island of Belle-Isle-en-Mer.50 In the district of 
Lingen Jacob Bouthillier de Beaumont was appointed as subprefect. This 
Swiss-born came from the old Geneva bourgeoisie. Bouthillier de 
Beaumont started his career as subprefect in Geneva, before traveling to 
Northwest Germany via Tortosa, a town in the very south of Catalonia.51 
A little-known figure, François Maurice Billig (likely from the Alsace), had 
been subprefect in Solsona, in the interior of Catalonia. His new task was 
to act as subprefect in Nienburg.
Map 6.2 reveals that most subprefects active in the Netherlands came 
from the Low Countries, the majority from the Provinces that had formed 
the Dutch Republic. The visualization of their personal mobility shows 
that many of them were relatively less mobile, compared to their col-
leagues in Northwest Germany. Subprefects of Dutch descents seldom 
traveled over great distances. This is partly explained by the denser urban 
network in the Netherlands. Also, the General-Government’s wish for 
continuity and ralliement has to be taken into account. In this way, the 
appointment policy reflected different views on integration.
Illustratively, the limited circulation across the Empire of subprefects 
active in the Dutch departments was a thorn-in-the-eye for some—take 
prefect De Celles of the department of Zuyderzée. In a letter to high 
police official Réal, De Celles wrote the French were right to rally many 
Dutchmen, but stressed that fusion could be accelerated if the French 
custom of circulating state officials was fully embraced. ‘The inhabitant of 
the South is transported to the North, that of the East to the West, and in 
a department one finds very seldom natives’, De Celles stated, ‘I would 
further observe that the Dutch employees in the various administrations 
have preserved ancient, and rude forms’. Here, De Celles shows the typi-
cal Napoleonic preoccupation with ‘modernization’, wanting to replace 
‘archaic’ institutions.52 Another example is the subprefect of Zierikzee, 
Alban de Villeneuve-Bargemon, born in the southern French town of 
50 Michael Broers, The Napoleonic empire in Italy, 1796–1814: Cultural imperialism in a 
European context? (Basingstoke 2005) 203; Aurélien Lignereux, Les impériaux: administrer 
et habiter l’Europe de Napoléon (Paris 2019) 207.
51 Lignereux, Les impériaux, 34.
52 De Celles to Réal, 18 February 1813. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, no. 835.
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Grasse.53 The loyal Villeneuve-Bargemont had been sent to Zierikzee to 
replace a Dutch subprefect (Samuel Boeye) who was suspected of smug-
gling.54 He enjoyed the privilege of corresponding directly with the 
Minister of the Interior. Zierikzee’s subprefect was unpleasantly surprised 
by the lack of cooperation from the old elite families. Although the popu-
lation was generally obedient and law-abiding, he believed increasing the 
share was Frenchmen was necessary.55
Alban de Villeneuve-Bargemon also complained about the lack of 
French officials with his superior Pycke, prefect of Bouches-de-l’Escaut. 
Early 1812, he argued that although Zeeland had already been incorpo-
rated for a year and a half, and that many institutions had been successfully 
introduced, the long-term project of integration needed a different 
approach: ‘More than eighteen months have passed today since Zeeland’s 
reunion with the Empire. […] But the regeneration of a corrupt people 
cannot be the work of a few years. […] To entrust this country for a long 
time only to French civil servants or employees [will hasten the return of 
political morals and give a more secure guarantee to the government]’.56 
Villeneuve-Bargemon would receive a new post five weeks later, on 12 
February 1812. He was promoted to prefect of the new Catalan depart-
ment of Bouches-de-L’Èbre—one of the few (sub)prefectoral movements 
between the Dutch departments and Catalonia departments. This indi-
cates Villeneuve-Bargemon’s Dutch experiences were seen as valuable for 
the integration of Catalonia into the Empire. And in his place came, sig-
nificantly, not a Dutchman but a Frenchman, Joseph Laurent Hippolyte 
de la Boissière, originally from Vivarais, who had been appointed the year 
before as subprefect of Neufchâteau in the Vosges.
potential tools of integration
From a strictly institutional viewpoint, the implementation of the French 
arrondissement framework was reasonably successful; in essence, the 
Napoleonic model was adopted in the North. Nevertheless, behind this 
seemingly well-organized structure, numerous problems were hidden, 
53 A.  Rampal, ‘Le comte de Villeneuve-Bargemon. Préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône 
(1815–1829)’, Provincia. Revue trimestrielle d’histoire et d’archéologie provençales 9 (1929) 
141–172.
54 Napoleon to De Montalivet, 16 April 1811. Colenbrander ed., Gedenkstukken VI, 
no. 225.
55 De Villeneuve-Bargemont to De Montalivet, 6 August 1811. Ibid., no. 533.
56 De Villeneuve-Bargemont to De Montalivet, 8 January 1812. Ibid., no. 534.
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such as imprecise territorial demarcations, unclear and slow information 
flows, and a recurring shortage of competent local staff—especially in 
rural areas. In times of adversity, subprefects were also the first to be under 
attack from below. This required diplomatic, linguistic, and technical skills 
to make the pursuit of ralliement truly a success. Within this context, a 
successful subprefect could demonstrate his qualities extensively, therefore 
the office was a sought-after step in an imperial career.
The filling in of the corps of subprefects in the Netherlands shows that 
the existing political-administrative elite was preserved where possible, 
supplemented with Old and New Frenchmen, who ideally had a certain 
affinity with the Dutch. Subprefects in Northwest Germany, on the other 
hand, were mainly ambitious young auditors from Old France. 
Consequently, the subprefects in the Netherlands were generally older and 
more experienced: a mixture of well-to-do urban citizens and rural noble-
men. They carried out their work, but usually did not excel in their dili-
gence. In some cases, there was so much ‘inertia’ that conflicts broke out 
with French superiors or colleagues. This was less the case in Northwest 
Germany. There, eager and skilled Frenchmen were a good choice, to 
build the prefectoral system from scratch. Few subprefects were of German 
origin; Germans had to make do with lower positions. Over time, the 
Dutch situation became more like the Northwest German situation as the 
central government appointed more subprefects of (neo-)French descent.
An explanation for the differences in the composition of the corps of 
subprefects is that a French-inspired system of territorial governance 
already existed in the Netherlands. The kwartierdrosten could quite easily 
be absorbed into the Napoleonic system. Also, Governor Lebrun was one 
of the most outspoken supporters of maintaining local officials. In con-
trast, the proportion of Germans with similar experiences was limited to a 
small number of former Westphalian subprefects. Moreover, the interme-
diary government in Hamburg pursued the policy to selecting many 
Frenchmen. And when ralliement was pursued, this did not mean that 
local subprefects were given equally important posts. In general, the more 
important a district was, the greater the chance that an experienced Old 
French subprefect was appointed, especially when the department’s pre-
fect was of non-French origin.
Just as with the prefects, distinctive patterns in the circulation of sub-
prefects can be distinguished in the northern part of the Napoleonic 
Empire. There are striking differences between both regions under 
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scrutiny. In the Netherlands, highly mobile subprefects were a minority. 
Nor was there much personal mobility between the Netherlands and other 
outlying imperial areas. However, in Northern Germany, officials from 
elsewhere were much clearly present in the prefectoral system. Subprefects 
posted in at some time in Northwest Germany, often traveled over great 
distances. Connecting different parts of the Empire, such subprefects were 
truly ‘transregional’ actors helping to hold together the Empire.
Strikingly, the Dutch cluster and the Northwest German cluster within 
the imperial network of subprefects were entirely unconnected. It seems 
that, for instance, the distance between Emden and Spoleto (1250 kilo-
meters) was more easily bridged than the distance between Emden and 
Groningen (45 kilometers). And, for example, Lingen and Tortosa (1400 
kilometers apart) were, for a Napoleonic subprefect, closer to each other 
than Lingen and Almelo (47 kilometers apart). These circulation patterns 
have been congruent with the opinions on integration, as reflected in ego 
documents. Circulating Napoleonic high officials often held more pro-
nounced ideas on powerfully integrating the northern departments réunies. 
Also, subprefects in the Northwest German departments, more often than 
in the Netherlands, had a military background. Thus, differences in the 
composition, and mobility, of the subprefects’ corps bear evidence of con-
flicts within the Napoleonic state machinery concerning the advancement 
of integration and ralliement—and thereby effectively reveal conflicts 
about the nature of Napoleonic governance itself.
Just as prefects have been Napoleon’s ‘tools of conquest’, as Stuart 
Woolf pointed out (or perhaps ‘tools of incorporation’), subprefects were 
potential tools of integration. The actual implementation of measures of 
all kinds often depended on the commitment of subprefects. Subprefects 
were able to directly monitor mayors and interfere personally in case a for 
the local community harmful policy was not fully implemented. And sub-
prefects could operate independently of the prefect if, in their view, the 
prefect did not adhere to the official line. As such, a skilled and loyal sub-
prefect was invaluable to the central government in Paris.
All this was also the Achilles heel of the system of (trans)regional sub-
prefects. Higher authorities were quite dependent on the willingness of 
individual subprefects. To do justice to the official ralliement efforts, pre- 
existing political elites had to be persuaded to cooperate, but in doing so, 
state-power was partly surrendered. As with other parts of the Napoleonic 
administration in the northern periphery, there was no overarching figure 
or authority who could genuinely oversee the entire area that had been 
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incorporated in 1810. Consequently, regional variations were consider-
able, both between the Netherlands and Northwest Germany, as well as 
within each area. The lack of coordination and uniformity led to a degree 
of integration that differed from district to district, depending on the pro-
file, the balancing skills and the network connections of the subprefect in 
question.
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Abstract This study set out to provide insight into the integration of the 
Netherlands and Northwest Germany into the Napoleonic Empire, 
through the implementation of Napoleonic governance, distinguishing 
several phases. This concluding chapter puts the research findings into a 
larger context. After exploring the collapse and legacy of Napoleonic rule, 
the successive stages of conquest, incorporation, and integration are 
reflected upon. Both areas experienced similar tensions between the 
Napoleonic desire for uniformity and diverse traditions. Either a ‘harsh’ 
approach or a ‘mild’ approach was chosen, depending on the actors 
involved and the interaction between core and periphery. Interests and 
actions were not aligned, and in more extreme cases, there was downright 
animosity between Napoleonic officials. Therefore, in neither the 
Netherlands nor Northwest Germany complete integration was achieved. 
However, there was no definite blueprint for integration, as different 
groups had conflicting ideas on the desirable level of, and path to, integra-
tion. Ultimately, integration was incomplete, but the degree of incom-
pleteness depends on the divergent norms set by the various parties.




The vast Napoleonic Empire has captured the imagination of generations 
of historians. Whether proponents or opponents of Bonaparte, historians 
often portrayed the French state as a continent-wide monolith, tightly 
directed by the Emperor. But the past few decades have seen an upsurge 
in innovative studies that, taking a bottom-up view, distance themselves 
from traditional interpretations. Now, the Empire’s diversity is acknowl-
edged and attention drawn to regions and peripheries. The present study 
examined two of such peripheral regions. It has sought to provide insight 
into the integration of the Netherlands and Northwest Germany into the 
Empire, highlighting the implementation of Napoleonic governance.
Although a comparative analysis is hampered by gaps in historiography 
and archival sources, this small-scale study indicates that a transregional 
approach to Napoleonic governance can yield relevant results. 
Notwithstanding the relative brief duration of Napoleonic rule in these 
regions, its possible impact on state and society should not be dismissed 
beforehand. Attempts at suppressing traditional governing practices and 
local institutions, in favor of Napoleonic ones, succeeded and failed at the 
same time. Efficiency and uniformity, the spearheads of Napoleonic gov-
ernance, were appealing to many, but nevertheless  not easy to 
achieve. Moreover, Napoleon’s heirs, the Restoration governments, later 
gave their own interpretations to Napoleonic governance.
This concluding chapter begins by examining the downfall of the 
French Empire in the North. It will then go on to explore the legacy of 
Napoleonic governance. Finally, it assesses the extent to which Napoleonic 
state representatives have succeeded in their endeavors of conquering, 
incorporating, and integrating the North.
The Collapse of napoleoniC rule in The norTh
Early 1813, Prussia and Russia declared war on Napoleonic France, start-
ing the Sixth Coalition War. More to the West in Germany, the population 
turned against the French, starting in the Grand Duchy of Berg where, 
because of conscription, thousands of farmers and workers harassed gen-
darmes. Only with great difficulty uprisings were suppressed. Unrest also 
reached the Hanseatic departments. Fearing the approach of Russian 
troops, Napoleonic authorities fled mid-March, many toward the Dutch 
departments. Concurrently, the wave of protest moved to Ostfriesland, 
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and subsequently the Netherlands. The French in the Netherlands became 
restless. For example, Police Director De Villiers du Terrage made evacu-
ation preparations. It was not until mid-April, when a French counter- 
offensive was launched, that rest was restored to the northern periphery 
and conscription intensified.1 As shown in the chapters on the prefectoral 
system, numerous prefects and subprefects were transferred or replaced. 
In one extreme case, Bremerlehe’s subprefect Von Gruben was declared 
an enemy of the state and banished from the Empire in July 1813, as was 
Secretary-General Johann Michael Gries.2 Exiled Hanseatic Germans 
formed the ‘Hanseatic Directory’ to promote their common interests and 
stimulate the armed struggle against France. Meanwhile they entered into 
negotiations with the Allies to ensure post-war independence.3
In the autumn of 1813, the French authorities were put under still 
further pressure. On 4 October 1813, De Villiers du Terrage warned the 
prefects of Frise, Verstolk van Soelen, and Ems-Occidental, Petit de 
Beauverger, about a possible underground anti-French network connect-
ing the Dutch departments, via Westphalia and Münster, with German 
rebels. The latter were allegedly associated with the (disbanded) Prussian 
secret society the Tugendbund. De Villiers du Terrage feared that secret 
messengers and insurgents were wandering around in the northern periph-
ery, and local policemen were summoned to track them down. Whether 
there really was a transregional resistance network is unclear, but it was 
certainly feared by the French.4
Autumn 1813 was characterized above all by chaos. Following 
Napoleon’s defeat against the Sixth Coalition, on 19 October at the Battle 
of the Nations, the French authorities definitively lost their faith in the 
Dutch. Beginning of November it was rumored that the Emperor had 
died and Davout was heading for Amsterdam to discuss with 
Charles- François Lebrun the surrender to the Allies.5 Fear took possession 
1 Katherine Aaslestad, Place and politics: Local identity, civic culture and German national-
ism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era (Leiden 2005) 297.
2 Arrêté de amnistie, 24 July 1813.
3 Aaslestad, Place and politics, 298.
4 Johan Joor, De Adelaar en het Lam: onrust, opruiing en onwilligheid in Nederland ten 
tijde van het Koninkrijk Holland en de inlijving bij het Franse keizerrijk (1806–1813) 
(Amsterdam 2000) 500–501.
5 Johanna W. A. Naber, Overheersching en vrijwording: geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens 
de inlijving bij Frankrijk, juli 1810–november 1813 (Haarlem 1913) 243; Bart Verheijen, 
Nederland onder Napoleon: partijstrijd en natievorming 1801–1813 (Nijmegen 2017) 283.
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of the French. De Villiers de Terrage’s home went up in flames. Prefect De 
Celles was confined to bed because of gout and De Villiers du Terrage 
struggled to secretly bring him to safety. On 11 November he wrote: ‘If 
we are not saved within six days, we are dead [… ] a different governor 
and eight hundred men would have been able to retain these provinces’. 
When, on 15 November, French soldiers left Amsterdam to combat the 
advancing Cossacks, the population of Amsterdam rebelled. The people’s 
anger focused mainly on the repressive forces: the customs, police, gen-
darmerie and tax collectors. Douaniers were lynched. General-Governor 
Lebrun urged Amsterdam’s notables to restore order, but they polity 
refused to help. Escorted by the gendarmerie, Charles-François Lebrun 
left, without being harassed.6
Meanwhile, the situation in Northwest Germany was also chaotic. For 
example, after the expulsion of French troops from Bremen, the city was 
briefly recaptured. But the French left Bremen permanently by the end of 
October, when Davout was ordered to preserve Hamburg after the Battle 
of Leipzig. Beginning of December the French sway over Lübeck ended. 
This was followed by the siege of Hamburg which lasted four months. 
Living conditions in Hamburg grew worse, as food became scarce. Many 
starved. Also, the French army and the population of Hamburg were 
plagued by typhoid. Intendant De Chaban also fell prey to the disease. 
Enclosed by Allies, the French were only remotely aware of the First 
Empire’s collapse.7 Davout only left the city at the end of May 1814, long 
after Napoleon had abdicated.
napoleoniC foundaTions for The new sTaTes?
The Low Countries
On 17 November 1813, as the French fled the Netherlands, a provisional 
government was formed in The Hague. Stadtholder William V’s son 
Prince William Frederick was requested to return from England and accept 
the dignity of Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands.8 For continuity’s sake, 
6 Auguste de Caumont la Force, L’architrésorier Lebrun, gouverneur de la Hollande, 
1810–1813 (Paris 1907) 328–329, 336–338.
7 Alexandre Boudet de Puymaigre, Souvenirs sur l’émigration, l’empire et la restauration 
(Paris 1884) 160–165.
8 Jeroen Koch, Koning Willem I, 1772–1843 (Amsterdam 2013) 226.
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and to guarantee rest, the invaded Allies ordered all Dutch members of the 
prefectoral system to remain at their posts. In cases where prefects or sub-
prefects of French origin had been employed, Dutchmen took over their 
functions, for example, the Secretary-General or the maire of the district’s 
capital.9 Also on the national level, most former Napoleonic administra-
tors were kept and contributed to the construction of the United Kingdom 
of the Netherlands.10
Although few political purges took place in the Netherlands, not every 
former Napoleonic official was directly accepted by the new government. 
An individual case shows how forgiving and reprimanding were balanced. 
The 30-year-old Bernard Hendrik Alexander Besier had from the begin-
ning of the incorporation been subprefect of Brielle, on the island of 
Voorne, southwest of Rotterdam. On 15 November 1813, rebellious 
farmers, on Brielle’s market day, threatened to clash with the French gar-
rison. Maire Jan Marcus Heeneman (an administrative veteran of Orangist 
origin) managed to prevent French troops from brutally intervening and 
sent the farmers away. Prefect Besier immediately reported the maires’ 
intervention to the prefect, also dissatisfied that the maire no longer 
respected his authority. Three days later, a similar incident took place 
between citizens and French customs officers, in which Heeneman could 
also prevent bloodshed.
A group of notables, including Heeneman, secretly contacted the new 
government in The Hague, planning to seize power. They were betrayed 
and it was subprefect Besier who, together with the gendarmerie, forced 
Heeneman to leave his post. Besier sent a threatening message to all maires 
in his district. Retaliations were taken against openly unwilling surround-
ing villages. French soldiers, for example, took several local dignitaries 
hostage. Besier further made himself unloved by the rural population 
because, on French orders, he seized foodstuffs for the army. The local 
population took the initiative when French troops, together with the sub-
prefect, entrenched themselves in the town center, awaiting reinforce-
ments. They were attacked by a combination of deserted Dutch cannoneers 
and local militia members. In the following days, Besier was taken 
9 J. A. M. Y. Bos-Rops, J. G. M. Sanders, and A. P. van Vliet ed., Noord-Brabant in de 
Bataafs-Franse Tijd, 1794–1814: een institutionele handleiding (’s-Hertogenbosch and 
Hilversum 2002).
10 Matthijs Lok, Windvanen: Napoleontische bestuurders in de Nederlandse en Franse restau-
ratie (1813–1820) (Amsterdam 2009).
7 CONCLUSIONS: INCOMPLETE INTEGRATION 
152
prisoner, his functions taken over by the returned Heeneman, and trans-
ferred to The Hague awaiting trial.11
Besier was the only Dutch former member of the prefectoral system 
who was subsequently brought to trial. He was accused of excesses, vio-
lence, and exactions, in function. The court in The Hague pronounced its 
verdict on 17 May 1814 and decided that ex-subprefect Besier should not 
be prosecuted, since he had acted on orders of the French military com-
mander. The court ruled that it was unreasonable to ‘judge his actions in 
his capacity as a French civil servant by the principles of the present 
government’.12 In this vein, all Dutch former Napoleonic officials were 
assessed. That individuals had collaborated with the French was not held 
against them, however, very devoted and persistent ones were frowned 
upon. The case of Besier (who was to continue his career in Indonesia) 
indicates which behavior was just barely considered acceptable.
Although Napoleonic governance was essentially preserved, as well as 
former (sub)prefects, many Dutch jurists and politicians deemed  it an 
example of excessive centralization, in which lower governments were 
suppressed in favor of the central government.13 Main author of the new 
Dutch constitution Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp, argued that a restora-
tion of old provincial institutions would be beneficial, even to a nation- 
state. He pointed out that the traditional provinces could serve as a 
political platform for the nobility, and that only provinces truly respected 
the country’s ‘spirit’ and that of its inhabitants. However, prominent 
Dutch politicians who had been active during the incorporation, or under 
Louis Bonaparte, objected to the historically inspired federal state envis-
aged by Van Hogendorp. A provincial revival could threaten the nation, as 
provincialism had caused so many problems in the past. They argued that 
Van Hogendorp did not sufficiently take into account the experiences of 
the years 1795–1813. Furthermore, William I wanted to preserve the cen-
tralist essence of Napoleonic governance to strengthen his personal power. 
Thus the unitary state was successfully preserved, and with it the 
11 Herman Bosscha, Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche staats-omwenteling in achttienhondert 
dertien. Tweede deel (Amsterdam 1917) 63–71; G. J. W. Koolemans Beijnen ed., Historisch 
gedenkboek der herstelling van Neêrlands onafhankelijkheid in 1813. Derde deel (Haarlem 
1913) 185–187, 205.
12 Bosscha, Geschiedenis II, 75–78.
13 Nico Randeraad, ‘Thorbecke en de inrichting van het lokale bestuur’, Tijdschrift voor 
Geschiedenis 107, 537–558.
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achievements of the revolutionary and Napoleonic era, as guarantee for 
national unity.14
Meanwhile in the Belgian departments, after the collapse of the Empire, 
the Allies replaced Napoleonic prefects with intendants. Various interme-
diary governments were formed, in line with Napoleonic practice, among 
which the Gouvernement général de la Belgique under supervision of the 
Dutch prince. More and more former imperial departments were added to 
‘Belgium’. At the Congress of Vienna it became evident that the Northern 
and the Southern Low Countries were to be united into one state. The 
Kingdom of the Netherlands was intended to be a buffer state against 
France and included the former Dutch Republic, the Austrian Netherlands, 
and the Prince-Bishopric of Liège. In this process, the Dutch state made 
good use of the knowledge and skills of former Dutch Napoleonic offi-
cials. For instance, in August 1814, former prefect of Frise, Johan Gijsbert 
Verstolk van Soelen, was sent to Liège in newly occupied Belgium to pre-
pare this region for incorporation and integration into United Kingdom 
of the Netherlands.
With the union of the North and the South, territorial governance was 
again reexamined. Because in the South the departmental structure had 
been functioning properly for 20 years, Belgian members of the constitu-
tion commission of 1815 advocated its preservation. A complete reform 
would also require a lot of effort. And the former departments had the 
right size to fit into the Kingdom, they observed. Only the names of the 
southern provinces should have a traditional ring to them, referring to the 
past, instead of French neologisms.15 Thus, the provinces regained some 
influence, but the central government, headed by an autocratic monarch, 
wielded considerable power. The prefectoral system was essentially kept; 
prefects were renamed gouverneurs. Most were loyal servants of the king, 
and served as his eyes and ears, just like Napoleonic prefects had done.16 
All in all, Napoleonic governance took root in the Low Countries, albeit 
tailored to traditions and national demands.
14 Brecht Deseure and Diederik Smit, ‘Pre-revolutionary provinces in a post-Napoleonic 
state’, BMGN—Low Countries Historical Review 133 (2018) 103–104. https://doi.
org/10.18352/bmgn-lchr.10589; Matthijs Lok, “Op een gelijksoortige klip schipbreuk 
leiden’. De politieke argumentatie van voormalige napoleontische bestuurders in de grond-
wetscommissie van 1814’, Leidschrift: historisch tijdschrift 19 (2004) 93–94, 101–102.
15 Deseure and Smit, ‘Pre-revolutionary provinces’, 111.
16 F. J. M. Otten, Gids voor de archieven van de ministeries en de Hoge Colleges van Staat, 
1813–1940 (Den Haag 2004) 35.
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Former Napoleonic Germany
Evidently, in Germany the restoration was more fragmented, because the 
Congress of Vienna distributed the French departments over several new 
or restored states. And in the former Northwest German departments 
there initially was relatively little personnel continuity since territorial gov-
ernance had relied heavily on French prefects and subprefects. Some of 
them fled, others, like prefect Jannesson, were captured by Allies. Many of 
them returned to France and could make use of the experiences they had 
gained in peripheral departments.17
Prussia (re)claimed large parts of Germany; for instance, Münster 
returned under Prussian rule, as did the Rhineland. Although Prussia later 
in the century pursued a more restrictive recruitment policy, on the basis 
of criteria such as Protestantism and former attitude towardthe French, 
the Napoleonic period seems to have had a limited effect on the subse-
quent careers of former Napoleonic officials of German descent.18 In the 
Prussian provinces, experienced Napoleonic officials were quickly reem-
ployed, allowing, for instance, the prefects and subprefects of Westphalia 
and Berg to continue their careers in Prussian service. Take Clemens von 
Oer, the former subprefect Steinfurt, who became Kreiskommissar in 
Steinfurt, and subsequently Landrat in the Province of Westphalia, as was 
Gerhard von Lommessem, former subprefect of Goes and Aachen.
The preservation or rejection of Napoleonic governance shows to 
which extent French innovations were accepted. Michael Rowe has shown 
how Napoleonic state-building has been an enduring legacy in Germany. 
Even though few longed back to Napoleonic authoritarian rule, with its 
high taxes and merciless conscription, the local elite of the Rhineland 
strongly defended the French institutions, since local socioeconomic cir-
cumstances fitted the French inheritance. Napoleonic officials had partly 
condoned old governing practices and traditions in order to assert their 
rule. In this way regional traditions could survive within a French institu-
tional framework.19 The elites in the now Prussian Rhineland were strongly 
17 Aurélien Lignereux, Les impériaux: administrer et habiter l’Europe de Napoléon 
(Paris 2019).
18 Nicola Peter Todorov, ‘La réintégration des fonctionnaires des États napoléoniens par les 
États allemands: l’exemple de la Prusse’, Histoire & mesure 29 (2014) 23–46. https://doi.
org/10.4000/histoiremesure.5056
19 Michael Rowe, ‘Napoleon and the ‘modernisation’ of Germany’, in: P.  Dwyer ed., 
Napoleon and his Empire. Europe, 1804–1814 (Basingstoke 2007) 216.
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aware of their provincial identity. This tendency was reinforced as each 
province had its own deliberative body, whereas the kingdom as a whole 
had none. Regional sentiments manifested themselves in adherence to the 
Napoleonic legacy, such as French legislation and the relatively liberal sys-
tem of local governance. Regionalist sentiments also flourished in the 
neighboring, highly composite Province of Westphalia. The Westphalian 
and Rhenish sentiments were a catalyst for German nation-building, refer-
ring to a larger German nation instead of the Prussian monarchy.20
In the now Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, Peter Friedrich Ludwig 
returned, also being made Prince of Lübeck. The Grand Duke appointed 
a provisional government committee, predominantly conservative in char-
acter, bypassing former Napoleonic officials. Although they wanted to dis-
tance themselves from Napoleonic governance, a return to the old 
situation was not considered, as it was recognized that the French struc-
tures were well-regulated. Nor did the Peter Friedrich Ludwig advocate 
political purges. The new government consisted of a mix of conservatives 
and former Napoleonic officials. Take Gerhard Anton von Halem, former 
Secretary-General of Bouches-du-Weser, who was appointed highest gov-
ernment representative in exclave Principality of Lübeck.21 Similarly, in the 
Kingdom of Hanover, ruled by the British monarch, political purges were 
initially opted for. However, many officials were quickly reinstated. Take, 
Adolf von Grote, the former subprefect and ex-member of the imperial 
Corps législatif, who was appointed Landrat. Ostfriesland was united with 
the Kingdom of Hanover. There, Johann Christian Friedrich Eisendecher, 
formerly subprefect in Nienburg and Quakenbrück, became Amtmann 
in Emden.
Likewise, in the Hanseatic city-states, collaboration with the French 
was hardly an issue. Few had to defend themselves afterward.22 For 
instance, former Secretary-General Bouches-de-l’Elbe, Johann Michael 
20 Michael John, ‘The Napoleonic legacy and problems of restoration in Central Europe: 
The German confederation’, in: D. Laven and L. Riall ed., Napoleon’s Legacy. Problems of 
government in restoration Europe (Oxford 2000) 83–96; Julian Wright and Christopher 
Clark, ‘Regionalism and the state in France and Prussia’, European Review of History 15 
(2008) 285–287. https://doi.org/10.1080/13507480802082607
21 Gerd Steinwascher, ‘Das Herzogtum Oldenburg’, in: S.  Brüdermann ed., Geschichte 
Niedersachsens: Band 4. Vom Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges 
(Göttingen 2016) 165–170.
22 Helmut Stubbe da Luz, ‘Franzosenzeit’ in Norddeutschland (1803–1814). Napoleons 
Hanseatische Departements (Bremen 2003) 254.
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Gries, was reappointed Syndicus in Hamburg. As for the Hanseatic cities 
at large, no new joint central government was set up. True, the Hanseatic 
cities had worked together, but attempts at new reforms that transcended 
the urban level, let alone democratic reforms, were seen as dangerously 
revolutionary. Allies impeded the reform agenda of former Patriots and 
thus restored the sovereignty of the time-honored traditional local coun-
cils. In Hamburg, for example, voices were raised to preserve the best of 
Napoleonic governance, but the dominant sentiment was highly conserva-
tive.23 Thus, the reaction in the restored Hanseatic city states was, remark-
ably, significantly more conservative than in the surrounding monarchies 
and principalities in the Low Countries and the Low German Plain.
degrees of CompleTeness
Whether the Netherlands and Northwest Germany were successfully inte-
grated into the Napoleonic Empire, has been matter of debate. Antoinette 
Joulia’s observations from her 1972 dissertation on the Ems-Supérieur 
department still hold up. She considered the introduction of Napoleonic 
governance in Ems-Supérieur a partial success. Joulia showed how at the 
highest level, reforms were carried out rather systematically and thor-
oughly. But for the layers below, that cannot be said. A lack of clarity, time, 
and staff hampered the process. To quote Joulia: ‘the work [has] remained 
incomplete’, but ‘one [can] only be amazed at the degree of its 
realization’.24 To a certain extent, her conclusions can be extrapolated to 
the entire North. Attempts to integrate these regions were only partly suc-
cessful, therefore integration was incomplete.
Since Joulia, the body of literature on Napoleonic Europe has grown 
enormously. Speaking of Europe as a whole, several different explanations 
have been put forward for the extent to which Napoleonic integration was 
successful. Summarizing historiography, Geoffrey Ellis distinguishes on 
the one hand between historians who emphasize the geographical distance 
from France and the length of Napoleonic rule as an explanation for the 
degree of integration; and, on the other hand, historians who believe local 
circumstances determined how French institutions took root, or not. And 
Alexander Grab has noticed that it is often assumed that the way Napoleonic 
23 Aaslestad, Place and politics, 299, 307–309.
24 Antoinette Joulia, ‘Ein französischer Verwaltungsbezirk in Deutschland: Das 
Oberemsdepartement (1810–1813)’, Osnabrücker Mitteilungen 80 (1973) 98.
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institutions were received locally usually depended on, first, the duration 
of the incorporation into the Empire; second, the place that the area was 
allocated within it (pays alliés, pays conquis or pays réunies); third, the exist-
ing local socioeconomic, cultural, and political structures; and lastly, the 
level of local resistance to the Napoleonic authorities.25
In other words, the success, or failure, of integration is often explained 
in terms of distance, duration, legal status or local circumstances. However, 
perhaps the problematic nature of Napoleonic governance has been over-
looked. By this I mean that more attention could be given to the ways in 
which the various territories were actually governed, and how that affected 
the state’s functioning. To limit myself to the integration of the North, its 
incompleteness can be explained in several ways.
Firstly, from early on, coordination was an issue, since no overall plan 
of approach to integration was conceived. Around 1800 various forms of 
temporary governing bodies had emerged in conquered lands. Initially, 
these were more civilian in character, but gradually hybrid forms between 
military and civil administration developed. Concerning the North, the 
Emperor was ambivalent toward Dutch and Germans, so his intents were 
not always consistent, let alone those of his collaborators. Both ‘harsher’ 
and ‘milder’ approaches were considered desirable, depending on the par-
ties at hand. Paradoxically, precisely the actors who questioned the need 
for rigid integration, in certain cases contributed to making integration 
more ‘complete’, understood as creating support from locals and letting 
Napoleonic governance take root.
Consequently, in the regions, there was less uniformity than desired in 
territorial governance. Paris was often reliant on the willingness of actors 
at lower levels. Supervision was partly delegated to the intermediary bod-
ies of governance, which had a not always clearly defined scope of deci-
sion-making discretion. Though formally not autonomous, in practice 
these intermediary governments were responsible for balancing the inter-
ests of Paris and those of the departments they oversaw. Even more fre-
quently, integration in essence depended on mediating individuals. 
Prefects had the difficult task of actually introducing strict Napoleonic 
measures. Stimulating personal mobility between different parts of the 
Empire was a possible means of accelerating integration and increasing 
uniformity, as governance knowledge could be disseminated. Lack of uni-
formity also presented itself at district level. In one district there could be 
25 Geoffrey Ellis, The Napoleonic empire (2nd ed.; Basingstoke 2003) 91–93; Alexander 
Grab, Napoleon and the transformation of Europe (Basingstoke 2003) 24–26.
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a diligent subprefect, in other districts policies could be only partly imple-
mented. So where measures succeeded, or failed, could be rather arbitrary.
Scant coordination and lack of uniformity partly resulted from, and 
contributed to, animosity and opposition within the Napoleonic state 
apparatus. This ranged from passivity to outright conflict with colleagues, 
which hindered the workings of the Empire. The General-Governments in 
Amsterdam and that in Hamburg could have been partners in integrating 
the North, but remained within their own circles, not sharing a common 
view. So remote from the supervision of the imperial capital, many actors 
competed for influence. At lower levels, prefects and subprefects had 
clashes, internally as well as with third parties. Admittedly, other state bod-
ies in the Netherlands and Northwest Germany, such as the police, cus-
toms, and gendarmerie, were organized more strictly, but these often 
worked poorly together with the members of the prefectoral system, slow-
ing down integration. So although some branches of the Napoleonic state 
performed better than others, in many fields competition prevailed over 
cooperation.
The abovementioned shortcomings do not necessarily mean that the 
workings of the Napoleonic Empire were ineffective. Often the Empire’s 
ability to raise huge armies is presented as an example of its success, as well 
as other military feats, or institutional and administrative reforms. To sepa-
rate different, possibly contradictory, developments, this study distin-
guished three different phases of empire-building. The phases of ‘conquest’ 
and ‘incorporation’ can be regarded as ‘completed’. French military 
supremacy was a given fact, which made conquest straightforward. 
Subsequently, the Netherlands and Northwest Germany were incorpo-
rated in two steps: first, a sort of ‘declaration of intent’, ensued by more 
elaborate decrees. These were followed in both areas by a clash between 
the traditional political culture and the imported French governing men-
tality, something that could not be solved with a stroke of a pen. In this 
phase, Napoleon and many of his close collaborators underestimated the 
resilience of existing ideas. Consequently, whereas on certain terrains the 
integration phase proceeded smoothly, on other terrains there was no lin-
ear progression, and phases overlapped.
Not seldom, there was no agreement about the phase in which an area 
was situated, nor about the extent to which the phase had to be com-
pleted. Contemporary reflections on the status of conquered lands can 
illustrate this. Napoleon on occasions spoke of (conflicts over) phases in 
the integration of conquered lands. For instance, when explaining his 
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right of conquest concerning Northern Italy, he discriminated between 
the phase of ‘the right of conquest’ and that of the ‘work of peace’. In 
particular, Napoleon criticized the new rulers he had installed for assum-
ing themselves to be in the latter phase while, in his eyes, the first was not 
finished.26
In sum, integration was incomplete, but the degree of incompleteness 
highly depends on the divergent norms set by the different parties. The 
Grande Armée had made conquest possible. Yet, the next steps of incor-
poration and integration could have been easier if there had been more 
coordination, a clearer division of tasks and competences, and less internal 
rivalry. This seems to have been a shortcoming of Napoleonic governance. 
Of course, conclusions of this study are based on the northern periphery 
and hence do not necessarily apply to other regions of the Empire. And, 
certainly, the immense financial and personal costs of warfare, as well as 
imperial exploitation, must not be ignored in assessing degrees of incom-
pleteness. Notwithstanding these limitations, it is plausible that aforesaid 
structural flaw manifested itself in many corners of the Empire. Therefore, 
the issue of Napoleonic governance and empire-building, specifically from 
a transregional perspective, is a relevant one that deserves further 
exploration.
26 Pierre-Marie Delpu et al. ed., Le Royaume de Naples à l’heure française: revisiter l’histoire 
du decennio francese (1806–1815) (Villeneuve-d’Ascq 2018) 13–29.
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